

East-West Studies
on
THE PROBLEM
OF THE SELF

Edited by

P. T. RAJU and ALBUREY CASTELL



MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE

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*Papers presented at the Conference on Comparative
Philosophy and Culture held at the College of
Wooster, Wooster, Ohio, April 22-24, 1965*

Edited by
P. T. RAJU AND ALBUREY CASTELL



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INTRODUCTION

The general characteristics of the decades after the last World War, so far as the human situation goes, include two phenomena: these decades are marked by man's dissatisfaction with himself, his confession of ignorance of himself, his anxiety about his future, and also his earnest search for the ground of his being, which can give him a feeling of security with reference to his life here and hereafter; they are also marked by man's pride about his achievements in science and technology, a hope of a better life on earth, and a faith in himself as capable of engineering the individual and society for realizing peace, harmony, and happiness for all men. The contemporary thinking man is conscious of the predicament these two kinds of characteristics have created for him, admits failures, hopes for improvements, and works for them. In carrying out this work, he has to and wants to know what human life is, what the meaning and purpose of life are, and why his struggles and achievements have not succeeded in giving every man a reasonable amount of comfort and happiness. He has come to realize also that the accumulation of material comforts does not necessarily lead to happiness, although happiness for man – except for the monk, *fakir*, or *sannyāsīn* – is not possible without material comforts.

Here we have the problem. Control and conquest of the environment, although necessary, are not sufficient for the happiness and contentment of man. If some demands of man's nature are satisfied by material comforts, others are not. The many demands of man's inward nature are coordinate to the different external forms of comfort and happiness. So the question: "What is the nature of the external world?" becomes a coordinate of the question: "What is the nature of man's inward being or what is the nature of his self?" Paul Valéry said: "It is the same with our spirit as with our flesh: both hide in the mystery

what they feel to be most important.”¹ Science has pushed our knowledge of the external world, particularly towards the microscopic, to the point, where Heisenberg says, we cannot go farther; and it is increasing our knowledge of the macroscopic world. But no corresponding attempt has been made, in what can be accepted to be a scientific way, to fathom the inward world of man, in understanding the nature of the self. The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* says: “God created man with senses directed outward; man knows, therefore, only external objects, but not his self; only the brave one knows the self by turning the senses inwards.”² The Upaniṣad exhorts man to know the self also, not merely the objects that can be known by the senses. Not merely for the individual, but for the whole of humanity, knowledge of the self is as necessary as knowledge of the external world for realizing human perfection. Similarly, a culture that is either one-sidedly outward or one-sidedly inward can hardly be adequate to the total life of man who seeks complete happiness.

This knowledge of the self was traditionally given by religion both in the East and the West. But now during our times, when science and philosophy have tended towards developing an indifference to religion – such indifference is on the increase even in the East in the name of modernization, science, and technology – it is only depth psychology that becomes the source of our information about the self. But depth psychology is not so much concerned with the inner nature of the normal man as with that of the abnormal. For the sciences, whose main concern is with externality and with the methods derived from the study of externality, the study of man’s inner life lies beyond their scope. Descartes separated mind (self) from matter, and the latter was made available for scientific study, which developed its methods during the process. Mind then was left for religion and faith. But now if we recognize the coordinateness of the inner and the outer nature of man, we have to make a rational study of the former also, instead of leaving it to faith. What methods then do we have at our disposal for the purpose? Should we regard the methods given by existence philosophies and psychologies as both necessary and sufficient? They may be necessary, but very few people would say that they are sufficient; for they cannot go deep enough into the inner nature of man, i.e., to the point beyond which human reason cannot go and at which a new Heisenbergian principle can be significantly and experientially enunci-

¹ Quoted in H. Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, p. 3, Meridian Books, New York, 1964.

² A free translation of the passage II, iv, i.

ated. There seems to be much in the inner nature of the self to be grasped and utilized for making man fully happy, if we accept the truth that the inner and outer natures of man are coordinate. Our complex and confusing world outlook, in which science and technology have thrown up more human problems than ever before, makes the problem of the self important and pressing. As the problem is left outside the scope of the special sciences, it is only thinkers in the fields of religion, philosophy, and psychology who can now elucidate the nature and structure of the inner self.

It was for this reason that the problem of the self was suggested to President Howard Lowry as worth a conference on comparative philosophy and culture. There was another reason also. The College is a liberal arts college. Its aim is to train young men how to be complete men. They can be complete men when they are well-informed and educated in terms of the knowledge accumulated by man up to the present, and keep their minds open and alive; they can then react rightly and adequately, with courage and moderation resulting from understanding, to the problems that may arise in the slowly developing world outlook appearing in the horizons of our knowledge. And this outlook, in which science and technology, philosophy and culture have to find a common basis or denominator for living together and for adjusting themselves to one another in its light, is bound to be general and universal. To give young men such training, knowledge of the self is as necessary as knowledge of the external world. The problem of the self is, therefore, a fitting problem for a conference sponsored by a liberal arts college.

But the self is differently understood or at least taken to be differently understood by the different philosophical traditions of the world. Every tradition may think that it possesses the final answer to the problem. But in our times it is now seriously felt that, even when some traditions give an apparently same answer, they have significantly different approaches, significantly different elements or factors in seemingly same concepts; and certainly all traditions do not give the same answer. And we have to note also that the same tradition contains different answers. Because of the admitted imperfection of the knowledge of the self – at least in the academic, if not in committed religious circles – in any one of the traditions, it becomes important to know for every tradition what the other traditions say about the self. Hence comparative philosophy becomes enlightening and informative. Goethe said that one who knows only his own language does not really know it;

we may add that one who knows only his own philosophical tradition does not know it. This is the reason for making the conference on the problem of the self a conference on comparative philosophy and culture.

The classifications of cultures have been various. Some say that the Western is composed of the Greek and the Christian, – thereby treating the Jewish as a forerunner of the Christian, – and the Eastern of the Indian and the Chinese, assimilating the Islamic to the Christian. Some maintain that we should not ignore the Egyptian and Mesopotamian contributions to the Jewish and, through it, to the Christian and that they also should be added. Some point to the Jewish as the source of both Islam and Christianity and speak of the three religions, including the Jewish, as Israel-born; they hold that we should have them added to the Greek, Indian, and Chinese cultures and civilizations. Others, taking the common features of the Greek and Indian cultures, speak of them as forming one cultural unit, of the Israel-born world outlook as the second, and the Chinese as the third. There are still other classifications of cultures and world outlooks given by Spengler, Toynbee, Sorokin, Northrop, etc., made from different points of view – religion, geography, social forms, history, science, epistemology and so forth. These criss-crossing divisions show that any pigeonholing of cultures and even of religions becomes arbitrary and that dispersion, if not mutual influence, of different ideas and the resulting penetration by them of religions and cultures were more wide-spread than we generally think.

But for philosophical purposes, taking both geography and ideas into consideration, we may say that China, India, Israel, and Greece stand out as conspicuous originators of thought. But the Greek and the Jewish traditions merged in what is now called the Western. Then we have the Western, Indian, and the Chinese. Just as Christian thought in its development became a combination of Greek and Jewish thought with the teachings of Christ – in fact Jewish thought itself absorbed many elements of Greek thought – Islamic thought also, apart from the orthodox standing aloof from all philosophy, became Islamized Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Neo-Platonism, with this difference that in Islam philosophers did not fare as well as in Christianity. Yet there were men in Islam who devoted considerable thought to the problems of self, God, and nature. In spite of its treatment of its philosophers, Islam need not be excluded from philosophy; for it is still a great living force, a living culture and civilization. Philosophy may still have a new future in its lands and is bound to have a future if the

Islamic countries absorb and assimilate the new rational and scientific outlook and make it a factor of the growth and development of their culture in the changing world that is becoming more and more close-knit.

Now, which of the traditions can be represented in a conference on comparative philosophy and culture? Indeed, the answer can be: All the living and the non-living. But there were limitations, financial and otherwise, imposed on the organizers. The Conference was organized as a pre-centennial event of the College and as inaugurating Indian and Islamic studies. So in addition to the Western, only the Indian and Islamic representations were arranged. Even then it was not possible to have a representative of every school of every tradition. It was thought useful, of course, to have some contributors show how the ideas of two traditions could be brought together in significant and critical comparisons, as otherwise the impression created would be that each tradition stood alone by itself and no bridge could be built from the one to the other.

That comparative philosophy and mutual philosophical understanding are desirable for the present age, in which men of differing cultures have to live together, is accepted by many leading thinkers, particularly in America and Germany. But the task cannot be accomplished by a single conference. The papers of this Conference may be regarded as a sample of what has to be accomplished. The problems concerning the self are many – spiritual, ethical, social, political, economic, and biological – even if we leave out those which science, technology, and industrialization have created. But the aims of this Conference had to be limited. Apart from recognizing the importance of the problem, they are: (1) To promote mutual understanding of the philosophies and cultures of the East and the West; (2) To show, as John Dewey said using the term coined by William James, that there are no cultural “block universes,” but only one universe in which cultures have significant common areas and significant differences; (3) To discover what is permanently significant in each of the thought-patterns and what can be of importance to every culture and philosophy, the non-recognition of which makes our cultures lop-sided and harmful; and (4) To contribute to the discovery of what is significant in the differences, the non-recognition of which prevents proper East-West understanding and communication.

The attempt was made, within limits imposed on the organizers, to secure papers from scholars belonging to the traditions themselves. It

is only recently that the principle has been accepted that the philosophers of the tradition itself should present its philosophies. This helps to avoid wrong interpretations by people of a different tradition, who may not only be ill-acquainted with alien traditions, but also prejudiced and unreasonably self-assured. It is not meant that the eastern philosophers themselves will give an absolutely clear and correct presentation of their philosophies. It is to be remembered that they have to use a foreign language, choose a foreign technical terminology; they have to be capable of not only grasping and presenting the philosophical insights of their own traditions, but also have a reasonable acquaintance and grasp of the fields of thought in the West similar to the ones in their own tradition. They need also academic detachment in interpreting their own schools other than the one to which they belong either by birth or conviction. Yet in spite of such difficulties, their interpretations can be expected to be more authentic than those given by men who look at the culture from the outside.

The reader, it is hoped, will find much material for reflection in the papers. He can see some common features: for example, that the self was not understood by the traditions without reference to an underlying transcendent ground called the Supreme Spirit, Absolute, God, etc., however its nature was conceived; that the self's relation to the transcendent ground raises problems of ethics, which the philosophies attempted to handle in different ways; and that this relationship creates problems of personality, whether it can have its distinctness, what it is in this world and the next and so on. Not every paper discusses all the questions. But the reader can see that these questions are present in the traditions, even if differently answered. He can ask himself what significance and importance these differences can have. This asking might interest him in traditions other than his own, stimulate him to study and understand them further, and prevent him from treating them as outlandish and opaque. The result could be a deeper awareness of his own culture and philosophy and a more valuable mutual understanding of East and West.

The Executive Committee decided that the opening address of the General President of the Conference and two subsequent lectures should be for the general public. The Committee was fortunate in obtaining F. S. C. Northrop of Yale as the General President, a philosopher who is internationally known for his writings on East and West. One public lecture, "Love, Self, and Contemporary Culture," was given by Richard McKeon of Chicago, who is also an internationally known philosopher.

The second, "The Problem of Immortality," was given by Paul Tillich, one of the world's great theologians.³ The other contributions were intended for specialists, although open to all who were interested. At the end, Dr. Sterling M. McMurrin of the University of Utah, in the concluding speech, "Concern for the Person," gave his over-all impressions of the Conference.

The order in which the lectures and papers are arranged is not that in which they were given at the Conference. The latter was determined by considerations of convenience, location, and persons. In this book they are arranged according to the form of the lectures and the traditions. First are given the opening presidential address and the two general public lectures, then the papers of the representatives of the three traditions, who do not deal with the same topics but with those which they consider to be of special interest in their traditions, then the papers that are more or less comparative in their discussions, and lastly Dr. McMurrin's concluding address.

The idea of the Conference originated with President Howard Lowry, who preferred to stay in the background throughout. It is thanks to him that there was a Conference. Our next thanks go to the anonymous donor and the Lecture Committee of the College, without whose help the Conference could not have been what it was. The success of the Conference was due not only to the Executive Committee, the representatives of the traditions who made their contributions through lectures and papers, but also to the administration of the College which cooperated in all decisions arrived at by the Committee. Our thanks are due to all of them. They are also due to the students of the College and the public of Wooster, who not only helped the Committee, but also took interest in the lectures and papers and attended the sessions. Six countries, twenty three states, and thirty five institutions were represented at the Conference; we acknowledge our thanks to all of the representatives.

THE EDITORS

The College of Wooster
Wooster, Ohio

³ His lecture was perhaps the last of its kind and his Executive Committee was grieved to know of his death.

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I

TOWARDS A MORE COMPREHENSIVE CONCEPT OF THE PERSON

F. S. C. NORTHROP

We are in the midst of a world-embracing philosophical and cultural interaction and reconstruction. Every cultural and philosophical tradition, as embodied somewhere in social customs, is involved. Every species of the old is both affecting and being transformed by the new. At the same time, two normatively incompatible political and economic philosophies for modernizing the world are competing for men's minds and customs in Asia and Africa as well as the West, even to the brink of war in an atomic age.

The deepest assumptions of every domain of human experience – religious and secular, naturalistically descriptive and normatively prescriptive – are engaged. Our beliefs both about what is and what ought to be – classical and contemporary, Oriental and Occidental, African and Aryan – are affecting one another and, in the process, transforming the religious and secular beliefs, institutions and social customs of people everywhere.

The naturalistically descriptive transformation shows in the fact that the peoples of Africa and Asia are of their own choice adopting for themselves the instruments and practices of modern agricultural, medical and physical sciences. This is a new kind of technology. For, like the atomic bomb, it derives not from the naive realistic way of thinking of natural history science, or ordinary observation, but from the imageless, many-termed relational, indirectly confirmed, logically realistic constructs of mathematical scientific thinking. So much have Japanese, Chinese, Indian and other Asian scientists made this ancient Greek and modern form of thought their own that today it can no longer be called Western and is world-embracing.

The normatively prescriptive transformation exhibits itself in the fact that the peoples of Africa and Asia have imported from the West, and made their own, the similar imageless, syntactical constructs, with

their novel norms concerning what *ought-to-be*, of Western secularly cosmopolitan egalitarian and religiously ecumenical science. This science was the discovery and creation of the Roman Stoics, but received its most consistent articulation in the Jeffersonian Declaration of Independence and in the Bill of Rights which he, due to direct Stoic as well as modern Lockean influence, insisted upon being added to the American Federal Constitution. This legal science of political and economic constructs, laden with incompatible naive realistic content, passed also via Justinian's Constantinople into Tsarist and then into Marxist Russia where, again, it was filled with mid-19th century naive realistic materialistic content. Thus it is that today both the nation which is the Soviet Union and the nation which is the United States of America are legal constructs, as are all other modern Western nations. In this century, peoples everywhere have appealed to the Jeffersonian version of Stoic Roman contractual legal science to declare their own political and cultural independences. The consequence is that all the modern nations throughout the world today are legal constructs. So also are all modern economic institutions, be they the General Motors Corporation, Burma Oil Ltd., the Bank of India, or the Bank of Ghana. Of these new norms concerning what *ought-to-be*, both religiously and secularly, and the old norms they are transforming, more later.

Immediately it must be noted that the interphilosophical and intercultural movements of our world are not merely one way from the modern to the ancient and from the Occidental to the Oriental and the African. Equally important influences have occurred and are occurring in the opposite direction. Each people throughout the world is insisting on building their new egalitarian polity, so far as possible, in the light their own respective religious and other cultural traditions. Also, indigenous Asian and African cultures have had and are continuing to have prodigious transforming influences upon the modern West. I refer to more than the Western concern with Oriental philosophy, in which the French and Dutch have long been proficient, and which the East-West Honolulu Conferences beginning in 1939 and this conference show to be important in the English-speaking world. In the realm of art, recall the stimulus given to early French impressionism by Chinese painting. Note the transforming influence of African music, by way of New Orleans, upon Hollywood, the dancing of Western youth, and contemporary Western radio, television, and the theatre generally.

But in the process, the beat of the jazz is torn from its native tribal African ritualistic aesthetic and normative social controls to be com-

bined with something of the written scales and forms of classical Western music but without its full normative cultural context and discipline. The result is that, when this native tribal African, non-Western music has run full circuit culturally almost around the world to make its impact in Australian radio broadcasts on the native tribes of Borneo, the effect is as culturally and socially disturbing there as it is in the behavior of the Beatniks in London. The ethnologist, Mr. Tom Harnett Harrison, has observed and described what has happened as follows:

Until 1950 nobody had a radio in Borneo's mountain regions. But then each long-house bought a radio, which was kept on the verandah of the chief's room, and radio music became the normal music . . . As a result, the natives' own instruments and old customs are disappearing. On the coast, the development is staggering. Where drums could once be heard all night radios are now bellowing at full blast.

This development has a tremendous effect upon the people, because once you have discredited the old music (and only certain individuals could play those beautiful instruments), once you have discredited the dancing (and only the finest dancers could hold everyone spell-bound with their sword dances), then you have discredited a whole set of faiths connected with art and culture and, even deeper than that, you have discredited certain types of intellectual leadership so that it seems silly to do old things.¹

Clearly, no culture, however isolated and primitive, or modern, is immune. Each is having its impact upon every other with results which are leaving the normative beliefs and customs of no people entirely what they were before.

Furthermore, the personal and popular manifestations everywhere are emotionally disturbing, if not embittering. The cultural reaction in Mississippi by religious persons and groups to the unanimous decisions of the Supreme Court in the desegregation cases illustrates this in the so-called modern American West. Earlier reactions of right-wing Hindus to the implementation of the similar Fundamental Freedoms in Free India's Constitution exemplify it in Asia. The present-day Liberian in Esther Warner's *New Song in a Strange Land* expresses the same emotive, existential predicament when he says: "All we got to live under two laws. We got to live under the Liberian government (modern Western) law. They got plenty soldier. We don't give our heart to that law. The other law is the law of our people where the chief is the big man. That one we give heart to."²

¹ *The South-East Asian Round Table*, a Symposium on Traditional Cultures and Technological Progress in South-East Asia, SEATO, Bangkok, undated, p. 14.

² Esther Warner, *New Song in a Strange Land*, Houghton-Mifflin, Boston, 1948, p. 36.

These examples suffice to show that it is not merely man's more overt secular customs, but also his inner feelings and normative convictions about what a person *is* and what it means to be a good, just, or religiously virtuous person that are being challenged, interculturally influenced and expanded, and, therefore, perhaps, made capable of a more comprehensive articulation today. In any event, it is to this last topic that the remainder of this paper will restrict itself.

The foregoing considerations show that in the impact of Western contractual legal constructs, with their political and economic institutions, and of contemporary technological instruments of communication, upon the traditional religious and other customs of the world, two different and, in considerable part, incompatible philosophies of the religious and the secular person are in conflict. It is important that we bring into the open the difference between these two philosophies.

The cultural anthropologists give the distinguishing mark of the traditional concept of the person when they describe the degree to which universally the normative beliefs and customs of people traditionally were and, to a greater extent than most liberal democrats realize, still are, a function of family, tribal and racial loyalties or, in short, what anthropologists call their kinship structure. For this reason we shall refer to this world-wide traditional concept of both the naturalistically descriptive and the normatively prescriptive person as the kinship anthropological conception of the person.

Empirically, its mark is that, strictly speaking, both the naturalistically empirical person that *is* and the normative moral, legal, political and religious person who *ought-to-be* is not the individual, but the patriarchal or matriarchal kinship anthropological, large ancestral joint family, or the racial, purely bred tribe in which the individual is embedded. If the kinship structure be patriarchal, then all normative authority is predominantly in male hands; if matriarchal, the converse is the case. Thus moral rights and privileges are not egalitarian educationally or otherwise with respect to differences in sex. Nor are they egalitarianly normative for either sex, since in both the family and the tribe, the rule of primogeniture determines who is the trustee of the tribe and the family. Politically and religiously, to attain national unity, this entails ordering the families hierarchically vis-à-vis the first theocratic or royal family. Case follows as a corollary in any community where there are peoples of different racial ancestry.

The top-most virtue, called "filial piety," and the elder brother-younger brother prescription in Confucian ethics illustrates this concept

of the natural and the moral person in classical China and the Confucian component of Korean, Japanese and Indochinese cultures, as do the large joint patriarchal families and the first familial theocratic Emperors or Maharajas in Chinese, Shinto Japanese, Hindu Indian and Hindu Buddhist Asian cultures generally. The caliphates of the Shiites, with their rule of primogeniture, illustrate it in Islam. The frequent revolts of the African tribal chieftains in the contemporary new African contractual legal nations expresses its presence there, as does the aforementioned statement of the Liberian that it is "the chief (who) is the big man . . . we give heart to." Similarly, for the African Ruanda, the cultural field anthropologist, Professor Jacques J. Maquet, has found that their kinship anthropological culture is grounded thus hierarchially in the normative principle of inequality.³

Nor is this kinship anthropological concept of the person foreign to the West. Fustel de Coulanges' *Ancient City*, like C. W. Westrup's studies in early Roman law, make it evident that the norms of the morals, law and religion of the early Western peoples were similar. Only the names of the religions are different. The present English historian, Mr. Peter Laslett, has shown recently that Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*, which states and defends this kinship anthropological, Judaic and Christian theory of God's will for man, is not the transcendental religious and philosophical hocus-pocus it seems to be when read from the standpoint of the egalitarian contractual legal assumptions given in Locke's criticism of Filmer in the former's treatise *Of Civil Government*. Instead, Laslett shows ⁴ that Sir Robert's classic is but a descriptive statement of the de facto beliefs and customs existing educationally at Oxford and Cambridge, legally at the Bar, and politically and religiously in the Crown and Canterbury of early 17th century England. Laslett's first-hand study of the parish records of colonial Virginia ⁵ reveals also that this conception of the good Christian gentleman and the just educational and social system was carried by the younger sons and the daughters of the gentry of Kent and Essex via the Virginia Company into the American colony. From there, as the American colonial historians, Professor Rollin G. Osterweis and others have shown, it spread throughout the American South to capture later even

³ F. S. C. Northrop, and Hellen H. Livingston, editors, *Cross-Cultural Understanding: Epistemology in Anthropology*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964, pp. 13-31.

⁴ Sir Robert Filmer, *Patriarcha and Other Political Works*, edited with an Introduction by Peter Laslett, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1949, pp. 1-46.

⁵ Peter Laslett, "Sir Robert Filmer: The Man Versus the Whig Myth," *William and Mary Quarterly*, Vol. VI, No. 4, Series 3, pp. 523-546.

the middleclass nonconformist Southern American Protestants. There it persists as a religious and social challenge to the contractually legal, cosmopolitanly universal and religiously tolerative and ecumenical philosophy of the person of the Stoics, Locke, Jefferson and Madison and the present Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Seen in this cultural anthropological context, the present emotional disturbances and embitterments can be described as the product of the acceptance and uncompromising application of egalitarian contractual legal science, not merely in Africa and Asia, but also in the West, to shift the concept of a person and his religious or secular customs from the kinship anthropological to an egalitarian contractual legal basis in which all individuals (regardless of naively sensed natural history biological and kinship anthropological differences in sex, color of skin, racial ancestry or temporal order of birth) stand equal, existentially consensual, and, therefore, meaningfully self-responsible before a contractual common law.

Epistemologically stated, this means that both with respect to (a) the descriptive naturalistic *is* of human nature and (b) the prescriptive *ought-to-be*, the shift is being made from a naive realistic conception in which sensed differences between persons are of the essence, to an imageless, relationally syntactical, hypothetically contractual, and existentially consensual, logically realistic meaning in which naively sensed differences are normatively irrelevant. All these adjectives are necessary, as the following considerations will show.

The symbol for this concept of the person is well known in our Western cultural tradition. It is the blindfolded maiden with her pair of scales measuring out justice; blindfolded because, in the constructs of hypothetical, logically realistic thinking, whether it be that of mathematical physics or contractual legal science, sensed images, though important by way of rules of correspondence or epistemic correlations for indirect confirmation or procedurally, do not enter into the syntactical construction of the fundamental concepts of the theory.

Expressed in the language of pure mathematics or the symbolic logic of relations, this means that the ultimate entities are always imageless, many-termed relationally defined variables which, after the manner of Ernst Mach's relational theory of mass, derive their scientifically naturalistic or their contractually legal normative properties syntactically by way of the imagelessly formal properties of the relations in which they are the terms. From this it follows analytically and tautologically

that the formal properties of the relation must hold for all values of the entity variables.

This means that any concept of the person in the normative social sciences or the humanities, which understands and is adequate to the moral, religious and social revolution that is transforming today's world, to produce the contemporary existential agonizing, cannot be a purely existential philosophy even though individual existential personal commitment is involved in the consensual component of the theory. For the logically realistic contractual construct, to which the existential commitment is made and from which alone the egalitarian, cosmopolitan norms follow, entails universal lawfulness and hence an essentialist philosophy.

As shown in greater detail elsewhere,⁶ the logical realism of this normative philosophy of the person has several implications. It is the equivalent, expressed in realistic epistemological terms, of Kant's idealistic epistemologically grounded categorical imperative. Such is the case because it makes universal lawfulness the criterion of morally good behavior. But it differs from Kant's theory in certain significant respects.

First, it extends this normative prescription of Kant to embrace law and politics as well as personal morality, never permitting in principle the personal morally good to be one thing and the official legally and politically just judgment to be quite another, after the manner of Hobbes, the 19th century English jurist Austin and more recent Anglo-American legal and political positivists, such as the late Judge Learned Hand, or, as occurred when Kant distinguished the good in personal morality from the normatively good and just in law and politics by grounding the former completely in the categorical imperative and the normative meaning of the latter in part at least in a posteriori factors.

A second difference between the logically realistic conception of the normative person and Kant's idealistic epistemological version is that the former entails a more rigorous and symbolic logically analytic statement of the categorical imperative than Kant gave, thereby freeing it from vulnerability to the well-known criticisms that, for example, the morality of Hitler's Germany (which incidentally was of the German folk kinship anthropological kind) passed Kant's criterion of being generalized into universal laws. This criticism arises be-

⁶ F. S. C. Northrop, *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience*, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1959, Chapters XVI-XXII.

cause Kant expressed his categorical imperative in ordinary language and thereby left it ambiguous whether not merely the normative relation as a whole between persons, but also its substantive content must be universally quantified for all persons. As noted above, logical realism, whether referring to the descriptive *is* of mathematical natural science or the *ought-to-be* of normative subjects, requires all elementary entities in its theory to be variables, receiving all their defining properties syntactically from the formal properties of the imageless many-termed axiomatically or postulationally constructed relations in which they are the terms or relata. This entails that the content of the intrinsic norms as well as its quantification as a whole must be universally quantified for all persons. The logical realistic statement of Kant's categorical imperative, extended to cover normative law and politics, then becomes:

For any person *p* and for any object of moral, legal or political judgment *x*, to say that *x* is either personally good or legally and politically just is equivalent to saying that there is an imageless, axiomatically constructed, many-termed relation *R* such that *R* is universally quantified for all *p*, thereby making it a universal law, and the substantive content of *R* is also universally quantified for all *p*.

Hitler's laws, like the segregation laws of the Southern States or the caste codes of the ancient Hindu laws of Manu, meet the first of these two conditions, but not the second. For the concrete import of the second quantification is that it permits the contracting parties, with respect to what Kelsen has called the basic norm of the normative system, to put any substantive content whatever into the universal laws, subject to the condition that if this context prescribes specific rights and duties for one person (or class of persons) in the system, any person whatever must be substitutable for that person with respect to these specific rights and privileges. That this was implicit in Kant's ordinary language statement of the categorical imperative, it is reasonable to suppose.

In the logical realistic formulation, its warrant is, however, different. Because, as repeated above, in such theory the entities receive their essential or defining properties syntactically and therefore analytically from the formal properties of the postulationally or contractually constructed relations, it follows on tautological grounds that the relations must hold for all instances of the variables, after the manner of Peano's Fifth Postulate in pure mathematics. Hence appeal to the synthetic *a priori* is no more necessary in the logically realistic normative concept of the person than it is in pure mathematics.

But as such, the logically realistic intrinsic norm given above designates merely a normative moral, legal and political possible. Something more is required, as in mathematical physics, to make it a *de facto* actual normative imperative. This something more is three fold: (1) Ethical. Elsewhere reasons have been given for believing that the analytic logically realistic concept of the normative person is more than a hypothetical possible imperative, or what Kant termed a maxim, but is a tautologically true categorical imperative apart from which both normative language and especially normative responsibility become meaningless.⁷ (2) Existential commitment to the logical realistic analytically true basic norm is also essential. This is the major insight of recent existential ethics and theology, though by no means restricted to such thinkers. (3) Operational procedures and epistemic correlation with radical empirical immediacy is also necessary. (1) is too technical a matter to pursue further here. (2) is insured today by particular contractual legal procedural acts, such as incorporation, etc., and by the afore described degree to which political leaders everywhere are committing themselves and their people to contractually legal political and economic constructs. (3) entails that an adequate and comprehensive contemporary concept of the person, both descriptive and normative, must include also an irreducible radically empirical component of both nature and human nature. In the latter connection, the following Asian and Western developments take on considerable significance.

The rejection of the naive realistic kinship anthropological concept of the person is not due solely to the impact of egalitarian contractual legal science. Since the 6th century B.C., there has also been the influence of the Buddha with his repudiation of caste and his positive teaching concerning the radically empirically immediate and immanent, undifferentiated and timeless Nirvāṇa self. Equivalent to it is the non-dualistic Vedantic "Ātman-that-is-Brahman-without-differences" self and its egalitarian prescriptions for conduct, when the latter is stripped, as it has been by Ambedkar, Gandhi and others in post-World War II Free India, of its naive realistic Vaiśeṣika dualistic kinship anthropological joint familial and caste associations.

Ambedkar, let it be recalled was the chairman of the committee which wrote Free India's contractually legal constitution. In addition, he was Prime Minister Nehru's first Minister of Law, and the leader of

⁷ F. S. C. Northrop, "Law, Language and Morals," *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 71, 196 pp. 1017-1048, esp. pp. 1045 ff.; *Man, Nature and God*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1962, Chapter 13.

India's Untouchables, a firm believer in the Buddhist Nirvāṇa concept of the person and the nondualistic Vedāntic self also.

Gandhi tells us that his politics derived from his religion and makes it clear that his religion was fundamentally Buddhist-Hindu.⁸ His rejection, in the latter part of his life of the caste system of Hinduism meant that, as in the case of Ambedkar, he retained the nondualistic Vedāntic concept of the self and rejected its traditional naive realistic Vaiśeṣika dualistic kinship anthropological accompaniments.

The Buddha, of course, did this early in his life when, as the eldest son of a ruling Hindu Maharaja, he threw aside all the regal riches and prerogatives that went with such a kinship anthropological concept of the moral and political person, to go forth and teach all Asian mankind that in the radically empirical immediacy of anyone's experience there is, when all radically empirically sensings and sensa are eliminated or abstracted away, a timeless, undifferentiated component of the person with respect to which all people are not merely democratically equal, but identical.

At this point, the logically realistic contractually legal concept of the person, which today is as African and Asian as it is Western, and the radical empirical Buddhist-nondualistic Vedānta concept supplement and reinforce one another. This is as it should be, since, as noted above, logical realistic theory takes on existential import only by epistemic correlation with radically empirical immediacy. The final question, therefore, arises: Is it possible for contemporary Western descriptive, normative and philosophical thinkers to accept this radically empirical Buddhist-nondualistic Vedāntic concept of the person also?

There is considerable evidence that this is already occurring. There are, in addition, cogent, radically empirical reasons and philosophically theoretical reasons for believing that it is necessary.

The occurrence appears in the prodigious impact upon the lay public, as well as professional philosophers, theologians, artists and scientists, of the personality and lectures of the Zen Buddhist, Professor Suzuki. Even more notable is the degree to which practicing Western psychiatrists, artists and art critics have gone deeply into the Buddhist and nondualistic Vedāntic concept of the self as essential to a constructive, creative art, an emotively healthy contemporary Western human personality, and an effective psychiatric therapy. Among recent psychiatrists, Jung is the outstanding example. In the arts, this concept

⁸ M. K. Gandhi, Gandhi's Autobiography, *The Story of my Experiments with Truth*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1948.

of the person is present consciously and explicitly in what the following contemporary Western artists are doing: (1) The contemporary paintings of Rudolf Ray, as exemplified in his eight-stage portrait of Suzuki; (2) the dance and accompanying music of Erick Hawkins and Lucia Dlugoszewski; and (3) some of the more recent art analysis and criticism of Sir Herbert Read. Since the above was written, the psychiatrist Gardner Murphy, Director of Research of The Menninger Foundation, in an article entitled "Human Psychology in the Context of the New Knowledge," tells us that today there are "three main classes of evidence (with which) human psychology must cope." The second he describes as "the classical experiences described in the yoga sutras of Patañjali and the yoga system derived from him and his era, cross-articulated with Buddhist insights, carried to China, Japan, and much of the Far East. There is much that is profound that has been written about the experiences, from the pre-yoga doctrines of the Upaniṣads through many variations of Hinduism and Buddhism, to the Zen Buddhism which has come to our Western attention recently."⁹

The radically empirical and philosophically theoretical necessity of such a development in the contemporary West shows in several ways. The American radically empirical William James pointed out implicitly that Hume's description of radically empirical immediacy, as nothing but the temporal succession of immediately sensed, differentiated, perishing particulars, was correct, but incomplete. This occurred when James noted that such is the case only for the part of radically empirical immediacy that is usually in the focus of attention; the remainder, which James called the periphery of radical empirical immediacy, being vague and undifferentiatedly indeterminate. The present writer expressed this same thesis in *The Meeting of East and West* by saying that radically empirically immediate experience is a differentiated, impressionistically aesthetic continuum, the differentiations of which, following the description of Hume, are merely temporally successive, perishing particulars, the continuum apart from these perishing particular differentia being ipso facto both timeless and undifferentiated.

The modern Western philosophical reasons for accepting this conclusion become evident when we consider the theory of radically empirical consciousness with which modern scientific psychological and philosophical thought began. This theory, as expressed in the Cartesian and especially the Lockean doctrine of mental substances, assumed that

⁹ Gardner Murphy, "Human Psychology in the Context of the New Knowledge," *Main Currents in Modern Thought*, Vol. 21, 1965, pp. 78-79.

denotative sensitivity consciousness is atomistic and pluralistic. If the development of modern Western scientific and philosophical thought teaches us anything, it is that this pluralistic theory of radically empirical, denotative, sensitivity consciousness simply does not work. The reason, as the sequence of modern philosophical theories, following the breakdown of the Lockean-Cartesian mental substance-material substance ontological dualism, shows, is that it leaves as an utter mystery not merely the question of how the mind knows its body, but also how it knows any other conscious spirit.

In his book, *What is Life?*, the distinguished mathematical quantum physicist, Professor Erwin Schrödinger, has drawn what seems to be the obvious answer. After noting that "the pluralization of consciousnesses or minds . . . leads almost immediately to the invention of souls, as many as there are bodies," he concludes that the "only possible alternative is simply to keep to the immediate experience that consciousness is a singular."¹⁰ In other words, for the radically empirical sensitivity consciousness, as distinct from connotative, discursive, theoretic consciousness, an atomistic, pluralistic conception must be replaced by an existentially, monistic or radically empirical continuum theory. What is this but the Buddhist-nondualistic Vedāntic theory?

It is not, therefore, beyond the range of possibility that out of the world's contemporary, emotive disturbances and demoralized existential agonizing there is emerging a truly world-embracing, more comprehensive concept of the person which is a correlation of the afore-described logical realism and Buddhist-nondualistic Vedāntic Hindu radical empiricism.

¹⁰ Erwin Schrödinger, *What is Life?*, Macmillan, New York, 1946 p 89, p. 90.

LOVE, SELF, AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

RICHARD MCKEON

Philosophic problems are stated most clearly and comprehensively today in paradoxes and dilemmas. The philosophers of the past who have come into new prominence as guides in unsnarling new problems are the masters of paradox, like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, or the masters of precise distinctions which skirt paralogsms, like Hume and Kant. We live in a time suited to the expression of the utmost anxiety and despair precisely because the opportunities and hopes for human accomplishment which circumstances have opened up are without potential limit. It is a time in which the self is lost in alienations and suppressions, in imposed conformities and irresponsible eccentricities, precisely because for the first time in history all men may aspire to realize themselves as they conceive themselves and their needs and ideals. The three terms in my title mark the determinants of philosophic problems of the self in the face of such paradoxes. I shall talk about the self in "contemporary culture," which is at once distinct from the earlier cultures from which it developed and at the same time inclusive of the values of past cultures and of diverse traditions. The particular problems of our time reflect the universal problems of mankind. We shall therefore consider changeless problems and new problems and the relations between permanence and change. The "self" in contemporary culture is all selves, the selves of all men, whereas the self which was analyzed by philosophers in the past was the selves of saints, or sages, or initiates supplemented by the self which was depicted by poets, tragedians, and epic writers in the thoughts and actions of men who had sinned, committed tragic errors, or discovered by themselves as outsiders. The self manifests and expresses itself in "love," which has always been a broad term covering ambiguously all objects of desire, inanimate and human, but which has been transformed in its meanings in conjunction with "tolerance" to constitute

the plural selves in the modern world. Love is self-oriented, and it is motivated in three perspectives which present in philosophic analysis problems of knowledge, of action, and of value.

Since the problems of the person or the self are stated in paradoxes, three philosophic problems can be distinguished in the three basic paradoxes of the self. The first is the paradox of philosophy and knowledge: the self is self-knowledge, therefore it is at once knowledge of the limitations of a particular, conditioned self and of the perfections of a universal, ideal self. From Greek antiquity to the present the aphorism "Know thyself" is synonymous with "Be thyself," for the identity and being of the self are determined by the self's knowledge of itself. Like other oracular prescriptions, the self-knowledge of the Delphic inscription is ambiguous: it can mean the analysis of the peculiarities and repressions which distinguish one man from other men, or it can mean, as it came to mean in Socrates' dialectical recourse to the aphorism, the search for the virtues and values which any man shares in self-realization with all men. The individual in self-knowledge and self-realization is the *self*. The second problem is marked by the paradox of philosophy and action: the being of the self has been seen to be self-knowledge, but the character of the self is the product of action, and the self as agent is the cause of actions to be performed and as character is the product of actions already performed. A character is formed by performing actions which thereafter, once the character is formed, are performed more easily. Habit becomes second nature, and characters, good or bad, are the result of actions. Virtue, according to Aristotle, is habit in accordance with the rule of right reason. The individual as agent in any action and as agent in virtuous actions is the moral *character*. The third problem is the paradox of philosophy and values: the self is the repository of values in the paradoxical sense of being both the creator of values (for things acquire value because one desires or prefers them) and also the creature of values (for one grows in character and reality in the degree in which one desires and prefers what is good). The self is the maker of values and the perceiver of values, the embodiment of rights and the judge of what is right. The individual as moved by values and as exerciser of rights is the *person*.

The three paradoxes of the self arise from the reflexivity of the self. The self as self-knowledge is ground for pessimism or optimism, for what is known in self-knowledge is both the imperfections of individual men in particular circumstances and the perfections of man in universal possibilities. The character of a self is self-determination in action, both

in the sense that all actions, good and evil, are determined by the character of the agent and in the sense that good actions are activities or actions following from the nature of the individual as contrasted to evil actions which are passivities or passions determined by the influence of external things. The person is self-realization in values; and again paradoxically, values are the realization of what the individual wants, and values transform the individual so that he comes to want what he should want. Each of the paradoxes yields, on one side, an apparent relativity of the person to his conditioning external circumstances and, on the other side, an irresistible objectivity of the person internally reflexive to himself. This reflexivity makes it possible to cultivate diversity without disorder, pursue pluralism without relativism, and set up criteria without dogmatism or constraint. The opportunity of the self in contemporary culture is to use the new possibilities of reflexivity to achieve freedom and to assume responsibility as opposed to the automatic conformism and the aggressive irrational self-assertion which are the heteronomous effects of new circumstances frequently presented as the dominant characteristics of the age.

1. Philosophy and Knowledge: the Self as Knower

The long history of interpretations of the nature of the person and the causes of his development and frustration is a history of the knowledge and presentation of the self in myth, poetry, religion and philosophy. The ancient poems and scriptures of the East and the West present unique insights into the thought, action, and problems of individual persons in a diversity of interpretations which are the beginnings of philosophic analysis of the self. The continuity between literature and philosophy in ancient Greece has its basis in the problems men face, and it is an easy step from the plots and heroes of epics and tragedies to the narratives and descriptions of histories and geographies and to the inquiries and analyses of moral and political philosophies. Plato may have distrusted the insights of poets unchecked by dialectic, but he went to Homer, and Pindar, and Sophocles for problems and precepts in his analyses of the virtues of men and of states. The philosophers made explicit the basic assumptions concerning the nature and the motivations of the self which were employed without system by poets and practical men, and the beginnings of philosophy in its classical phase were in oppositions of theories of man, his knowledge, and his environment. Four opposed theories emerged which have been used in the application of growing bodies of relevant knowledge to changing

circumstances and evolving modes of life both to preserve the continuity of basic views of man in traditional cultures and at the same time to initiate the innovations of cultural change bearing on man and his conception of himself and the world.

Two of these basic theories had already been formulated when Plato elaborated his theory of the self. He criticizes them in the dialogues in which he develops his own theory of man, and the state, and the universe. One theory, which engages the attention of Socrates repeatedly in Plato's dialogues, finds the defining characteristics of the self in spontaneity and creativity in thought and action. Man is the measure of all things. The Sophists who wander through the Socratic dialogues hold that the knowledge of things and the virtues of action are manifestations of man's power. The second basic theory appears less frequently in the occasional refutations in the dialogues of the materialistic conception of man and nature, which are assumed to be references to Democritus although his name is never mentioned by Plato. In this theory the person has a natural or even a metaphysical foundation. Man, like everything else, is a congeries of atoms. An individual man is characterized by the internal motions of his constituent parts and by his external actions as an organic whole and his reactions to the motions of external bodies that impinge on him. His motions are studied in the science of physics, of which physiology and psychology are subdivisions and his morals and politics are determined by pleasure and the passions and by agreements among men concerning common desires. Plato sets forth a third theory, opposed both to indeterminate relativism and reductionist materialism, in which the person is conceived as being by participation in an eternal, spiritual, good model and as moved by attraction to a changeless, transcendent, ideal realization. The person appears on a background of values and aspirations, cognizant of moral, cosmic, and religious ideals. The fourth theory, formed in reaction to explanations of the self by use of "power," "nature," or "ideal" as basic concepts, seeks the person in the interaction of individual and environment – natural, biological, social, political, cosmic. The individual, paradoxically, is formed by the environments which in turn is modified or formed by the self. The central problem is the relation of the individual and society, the citizen and the state, the person and the universe. Plato held that the virtues of the individual and those of the state are the same, because the parts of the soul and the classes of society are analogous. His pupil, Aristotle, denied the analogy and held that the virtues of men and the institutions of states are causally re-

lated, and that politics is a single science, divided into two parts oriented respectively to the study of virtues which are the sources of action, including prudential political action, and to the study of constitutions and institutions which provide rules for action, including the formation of customs and moral virtues.

In the discussions of philosophers these basic conceptions of the self and the person are frequently in controversial opposition, but each of them gives emphasis to a recognizable aspect of the self; and in the formation of persons and cultures they enter into cooperative interplay. As is frequently the case, the same distinctions which, in the oppositions of philosophy, lead to the discovery or accusation that one's opponent is raising meaningless questions may, in the communications of culture, lead to the formation or recognition of supplementary values. Materialists and spiritualists have opposed each other and have borrowed terms and dialectics from each other; and the same is true of all the distinctions that move back and forth between philosophy and ordinary speech: the realist has ideals, and the idealist recognizes reality; the absolutist recognizes relativities, and the relativist encounters invariants; the moralist who stresses intentions and purposes has a place for utilities as well as criticisms for utilitarians, and the moralist who examines consequences and preferences considers ends in the processes of formation as well as categorical imperatives in the fixities of stultification.

The being of the self and self-knowledge are interrelated. Both in turn depend on the actions of the self, for the person is what he does and he is known by what he does. The consideration of the actions of the self, however, is involved in a new set of paradoxes. An action is properly considered the action of a person only if, on the one hand, he has chosen it freely and if, on the other hand, it results from stable and fixed characteristics of his person. If it is done, not by choice, but by necessity or as a result of force or fear, it is not an "action" in which he is free and for which he is responsible, morally or legally. If it is done, not by fixed habit, but by accident, or whim, or inattention, it is not an "action" and it does not depend on moral nature or character or entail responsibility. The actions of a person and the formation of a person both result from the interplay of freedom and obligation, from balances of the unrestrained and the restrained. The art of balance between the two depends on the utilization of the relation between the individual and the state or society or the cosmos, between men and other men or things or values. It is the art of love, and "love" is the concept which

provides the key both to the discussion of the relation of man to his environment and to his ends and also to the formation of selves and communities.

"Love" therefore has as many meanings as "self." Both concepts have an important place among the undefined and well-defined terms which form the network of continuing philosophic discussion. From antiquity "love" has been a central term of coherence to explain the communities, associations, schools, and sects of men and a central term of aspiration to explain the formation and devotion of lovers, sages, saints, heroes, and leaders. Love is attachment to persons and recognition of values. It is a feeling of attachment to others and an activity in pursuit of the good. It is attraction between opposites and attachment of like to like. It binds the lover to the object which satisfies his particular desires and needs, and it associates those who share common interests in a community to achieve a common good or in an association to use power to acquire what is wanted in common. It is defined or described by means of values, needs, interests, wishes; and its analysis leads to the generation of ladders of love relative to the good, priorities of satisfaction relative to needs, kinds of association relative to common interests, and structures of organization relative to common ends. Different kinds of love are given basic places in different analyses or systems, and all other loves are assimilated or reduced to charity (*agape*, *charitas*), appetite (*epithymia*, *horme*; *appetitus*, *cupiditas*), or to erotic love (*eros*, *amor*, *libido*), or to friendship (*philia*, *amicitia*). Any of these basic conceptions of love can be used, and has been used, to relate the self or the individual to the societies in which he is formed and ultimately to mankind and the universe, to analyze the interdependences of the exercise of rights and freedoms and the formation of virtues and obligations, and to explore the interdependence of equality and individuality, of love and tolerance. I shall bypass the mystic, the appetitive, and the erotic loves as roads to modern culture and concentrate on friendship or *philia* because the passage from friendship to society is blocked by fewer analogies and clarified by fewer intuitions than the other loves.

The analogy of friendship to society brings to attention a proportion which has been employed with remarkable persistence in Eastern and Western philosophy as a postulate concerning the functions of love and tolerance in the associations of men. If all men were of equal virtue and intellectual attainment, there would be no need for coercive force, or for law, or for the state. Men would be associated in love and friendship.

There are no laws in Plato's *Republic* except the laws establishing and regulating education, for there are no contracts or breaches of contract, no property or theft, no torts or crimes of violence. By way of contrast the institutions of second best or actual states depend on laws which are part persuasion and part force, and the dialogue in which Plato examines those institutions is called the *Laws*. According to the theory of Marx, the state will wither away and the use of coercive force will disappear in the classless society, but the preparation for that ultimate freedom is the dictatorship of the proletariat. According to Aristotle, a friend is another self, and friends have everything in common, without distinction of mine and thine. They therefore encounter no problems of rectification or retribution. If men were continent, the rules of right action would be effective as soon as they were understood without the need of the habituations of virtue; if men were equal in understanding and in virtue, they would act together by love without need of impulsion by consideration and restraint by tolerance. Love and tolerance need to be understood better today, since love is attachment to goods and to persons and things conceived to be good in themselves and by themselves, and tolerance is endurance of evils, apparent and real, in order to avoid more widespread and more fundamental evils.

Since men are not naturally equal in all respects, associations are formed which institute artificial equalities agreed on for the common purposes of the association or state. These instituted or recognized equalities take the place of the natural equalities of love which make a friend another self. The Greeks were fond of the word "equality" (*isotes*), but they used it most frequently in conjunction with an adjective or as the prefix to a noun to specify the mode of equality intended. Instituted equalities are called justice or rights. The relation of justice (or the right) and the rights consequent on custom or law is not as immediately clear in English as in other modern Western languages which have suffered less attrition in the distinction preserved from ancient languages of *dikaiosyne* and *dike*, *iustitia* and *ius*. Law and custom take the place of love as the bond which binds men together in states. They establish rights and provide sanctions and rectifications of wrongs done contrary to law. Love and tolerance provide the foundation of laws and rights, or *lex* and *ius*, in a world of men who are not equal in abilities and virtues, but who are equal in the communities in which they live. In love, all goods are held in common. Law is designed to protect the common good and to preserve the private good. In the differentiation of public interest and private interest, which becomes

necessary when the judgments and wants of men differ, law depends on mutual confidence. Mutual confidence is somewhat less than *philia* or friendship; it is the operative aspect of love in a society. Tolerance, as its etymology makes clear, means to endure, that is, to tolerate. Toleration is the endurance of unavoidable or unforeseeable evils. A right is designed to protect an individual from the harm done by others which is controllable for the common good; tolerance is the endurance of the distasteful but tolerable effects of actions performed by others in the exercise of their rights. The meanings of "rights" and of "tolerance" tend to become confused in discussion today because tolerance is a precondition to the advancement of rights. Tolerance prepares for the acquisition of rights, but it is not needed when rights exist and are recognized. If a man has a right, he is entitled to expect protection by legal and administrative action in the possession and exercise of that right. Tolerance is an attitude proper to the endurance of qualities or actions of others which one does not like, toward which one is not sympathetic, from which one expects consequences inconvenient or harmful to one's own interests. One does not tolerate what is congenial or what is thought to be proper, and tolerance of disquieting changes of circumstances is an unavoidable step in the diffusing and growth of the rights of others and in the exercise of one's own rights.

A pair of words has been used in flexible relation to each other in all the languages of the West to discuss and to form the relations between the individual self and his conditioning associations – *nomos* and *dikai-on*, *lex* and *ius*, law and right, *loi* and *droit*, *Gesetz* and *Recht*. There is no fixed relation between the two: "lex" and "ius" are both translated in some contexts by "law," and we forget that the word which is translated by "righteousness" in the *New Testament* is translated by "justice" in philosophical treatises. Nonetheless the development of the person in political, social, and cultural history has been the development of laws and rights. This development of laws and rights has its foundation in the development of mutual confidence and respect in the community (in the place of love or trust in personal relations) and of mutual understanding and tolerance in the relations of members of the community (in the place of endurance of or resistance to the objects of hate or distrust).

The philosophy of the person, as formed and presented in self-knowledge, explores two sets of problems which are important in understanding the nature of the self and in acting in accordance with one's nature as a self. In the first place it discloses the structure of meanings

assigned to the "person" or the "self" in the variety of philosophies that have guided men's thought and action and, therefore, the continuing problems of persons which give the ancient insights of poets and sages relevance to problems today and make the wisdom of saints and sages of the East and the West significant and illuminative to all men. In the second place it discloses the structure of differences of context in which these common problems emerge in different forms in different circumstances and, therefore, the persons of different periods, different cultures, different religions, different societies retain their proper intelligibility and unique purposiveness.

2. *Philosophy and Action: the Self as Agent*

One of the central problems of morals and of policy is the problem of the relation of knowledge to action or of the use of reason in action. If the philosophy of the person were limited to problems of knowledge of the person, the question of the relation of knowledge to action would be merely a variant of the general problem of the relation of theory to practice. The philosophy of the person, however, inquires into problems of the transition from the expression of ideas in propositions and precepts to the organization of constitutions and the formation of characters in which institutions and habits embody ideas in operation and in orientation to action. Ideas expounded in theory and used intentionally may be made institutional or habitual sources of action. It is possible to find the basic *ideas of rights and justice* in the scriptures, the classics, the codes, and the philosophies of the ancient East and West, but the first *bills of rights and liberties* were promulgated in the West in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The basic *ideas of law and rule* are found in the same classics, but the processes of *law-making and judicial review* were modern developments. The idea of law-making and legislation is closely related to the idea of rights as liberties, and they emerged together in the Renaissance in the West to be worked out in the development of constitutional government in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Laws had been viewed as established regulations whose binding force was attributed to universal reason or immemorial custom, but the new sovereignty after Bodin and Locke was legislative sovereignty. Law-making was an exercise of rights, and rights were instituted and protected by laws.

The paradoxical reflexivity which makes self-knowledge a defining property of the being and nature of the self takes on a different form in self-rule which becomes a property of the self in moral and social action.

The application of this reflexivity in action is part of the history of the modern development of law and human rights. The idea of self-rule was used in antiquity to define democracy, and Aristotle made it part of the definition of a citizen, but Spinoza seems to have been the first major philosopher to argue that democracy is the most “natural” of all forms of government because it is most consonant with individual liberty and with the preservation of equality in the natural rights of all men. Kant made autonomy or self-legislation the foundation of morality, and John Stuart Mill undertook to prove that representative government is the ideally best form of government by adducing two other reflexivities as criteria – its contribution to making human beings self-protecting and self-dependent. Self-rule moderated the fixities of natural law in political philosophy, and it is one point of agreement between Kant’s *a priori* categorical imperative and Mill’s utilitarian greatest-happiness principle. The reflexive idea of self-determination is no less ancient than self-rule, but self-determination was particularized in action as freedom of thought, expression, belief, and assembly to take its place in the varieties of liberties of self-determination which were formulated and given institutional implementation in the development of bills of rights and constitutions as self-rule was particularized in moral, political, economic, and natural laws in the development of the rule of law.

The history of the development of human rights has its own reflexivity, for the recognition of human rights follows an evolution based on the exercise of human rights. Freedom of thought and belief took on institutional status in the universities and nations of the late Middle Ages and the Reformation. The early rights formulated in bills of rights were *political* and *civil* rights – the right to participate in self-rule which was transformed by recognition of the sovereign right of law-making and right to free speech, free assembly and other freedoms essential to the exercise of political rights. In the nineteenth century, *economic* and *social* rights were given separate statement and distinct institutionalization; and in the nineteenth century the emergence of *cultural* rights is transforming the operation of the series of rights developed for self-determination. After the approval of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, two covenants were drawn up, a Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and a Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.

The interconnections among the human rights are so close that they may be viewed as distinct rights or as a single identical right, and in their evolution any one of them may be thought to be fundamental.

Freedom of teaching and of speech evolved as a consequence of political action, lay and ecclesiastic, and freedom of belief showed its political origin in the fact that it was at first a freedom of a ruler or a nation not a freedom of an individual or a citizen. Civil and political rights were achieved either by negotiation between the king, who was frequently also the feudal lord, and his subjects, or by revolution. The emergence of political and social rights by both negotiation and revolution opened the way to the recognition of economic and social rights, for the negotiations were made effective by using considerations of revenue and taxes to impose limitations on the power of the ruler by obtaining the recognition of rights or the establishment of constitutional checks, and the revolutions were frequently the concerted action of a class or a party or the inhabitants of a region, which had not previously enjoyed equality in the exercise of rights, to achieve the rights of which they had been deprived. The freedoms of thought, belief, and expression, and the economic and social rights were therefore implicit in the political and civil rights which were established in the early bills of rights and which became the basis for the development of economic and social rights in the nineteenth century. That development followed two models: the development of economic and social rights in the British and American tradition was by legislation about political rights or judicial interpretation of political rights (the Reform Bills in Great Britain and the decisions of the Supreme Court in the United States derived, from the extension of suffrage and the interpretation of due process of law and police power, economic and social consequences from political rights), while the development in the French tradition differentiated economic and social rights sharply from political and civil rights (Babeuf thought that a second economic revolution must follow on the completion of the political revolution, and a long line of thinkers which included Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Comte, and Marx developed economic and social theories that had consequences in human rights).

Once again the reflexivity of the problems of the self produced controversial oppositions. In the one tradition the new rights appeared by interpretation or extension or use of the old; in the other they emerged as antitheses, and they took priority over the old rights or even rendered them meaningless. The opposition between parliamentary democracy and mass democracy in the twentieth century is an opposition between the two conceptions of rights. In the framework of parliamentary democracy the basic rights are political and civil: once men have acquired the power of self-rule they are free, and in their

freedom they have the power to advance economic and social rights and equalities by individual and political action. In the framework of mass democracy political and civil rights are meaningless unless men have economic and social equality, for those who have economic power and social status control their preferences and decisions: once men have acquired economic and social equality the coercions of politics and the state will be unnecessary. Is it necessary to establish political and civil or economic and social equalities first? The tactics and ambiguities of the controversy suggest that the resolution of the controversy will not be by an unambiguous choice between the two alternatives, but that new conceptions of freedom and responsibility will emerge from the reflexivity of the self in thought and action. The controversial oppositions of the two opposed traditions may be transformed into cooperative interrelations, much as the oppositions concerning the French Revolution which seemed diametrical and irreconcilable contradictions when Burke wrote his *Reflections* had been attenuated to alternative approaches to civility and equality when Matthew Arnold wrote his *Equality*.

3. *Philosophy and Values: the Self as Judge and Critic*

The problems of the knowledge of the person and of the actions of the person are closely related to the problems of the person as embodiment of rights and as judge of what is right. The new problems of the person which have arisen in the twentieth century and in the period since the close of the Second World War are problems of the self as judge and critic, and problems of the first two kinds, of the known nature of the self and its voluntary actions, arise now in relation to judgments and decisions. What is a person? He is constituted by his self-knowledge, but his self-knowledge is an action of self-determination and self-rule which he performs as an agent. Self-determination and self-rule set up rights to act and laws governing action. When rightful or lawful actions are considered or projected, the question arises, What is or should be right in the exercise of rights? The paradox of reflexivity appears again in the justification of rights. A right would not be a right unless it were the right to do as one pleases without constraint, yet the justification of the right to do as one pleases is that the exercise of that right makes it possible for one to do what ought to be done or what is good. The right to do as one should is a liberty only if one is led to want to do it by one's own judgment. The right to do as one pleases would seem to be sheer relativism, unless the good either is defined as what one wants or as

what is accepted as what one should want. What a person wants to do is frequently not right in any but the arbitrary sense of preferred and voluntary, and yet to decide what is right and to impose that decision as a precept to guide the action of a person would not, even if the action were good in general and good for him, constitute a right or a self-determination to truth or value. A right is a reconciliation of the two extremes: it is freely chosen but it is also in a significant sense rightly chosen. The right of all men to do as they please is a necessary prelude to the right of wise men to do what is right and of saints to do what is good, and the right to do what one should is the justification of the right to do what one pleases. The reflexivity of these two aspects of the self, determining rights and discovering what is right, has in the recent past opened up new senses of right and of democracy, of self-determination and self-rule. The relations of peoples in the world has broadened toward a community of mankind by transforming the concepts of tolerance and of love. That transformation is seen concretely in the history of human rights and the history of law-making and of the rule of law since 1945. The advancement of rights is on a background of the actual complexities of what men conceive to be evil or undesirable and of a growing tolerance of customs and preferences of others which differ from our own. The spread of the rule of law is on a background of the ideal simplicities of what men conceive to be common goods or common protection for private goods and of a growing confidence in others and values which others share with us.

Chapter X of the Charter of the United Nations, signed in 1945, provides for the establishment of the Economic and Social Council to study international economic, social, educational, and health problems, to "make recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all," and to prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly concerning these matters. One of the projects on the first-year program of UNESCO, which was founded in 1946, was an examination of the philosophic and historical bases of human rights. The results of the inquiry were sent to the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council which drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The task UNESCO undertook was to answer two questions: (1) the eighteenth century bills of rights employ the language of natural law philosophy which was widely held at the time: would a twentieth century bill of rights require a like agreement on a common philosophy? and (2) new rights have been recognized since the eighteenth century:

how are they related to the rights set forth in the early bills of rights and what are the rights of *all people* and *all the rights* of free people? The Committee of Experts which assembled the results of the UNESCO inquiry in July 1947 concluded that philosophy was important in the determination of human rights, but that there was no need for agreement on a common philosophy: rather a pluralism of philosophies and traditions might provide different bases and reasons for a common set of rights. In the Report of the Committee human rights are divided into Civil and Political Rights, and Economic and Social Rights, to which Cultural Rights are added, "the right of all to share in the advancing gains of civilisation and to have full access to the enjoyment of cultural opportunities and material improvements." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1948, and the two conventions on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights have been ratified by some member States of the United Nations, but not yet by the United States. The difference between right and law, thus, reappears in the difference of attitude of "sovereign" states to a declaration of rights and to a convention which has the binding force of law.

Reflexivity and pluralism have operated conspicuously in the short but crowded history of human rights since 1945. Advance in any of the rights is advance in all the others, for they are all modes of self-determination, yet exercise of any of the rights may impede or confuse the consequences or diminish the desirability of each of the others. All rights are economic rights, and equally significantly all rights are cultural rights. These identities are no new discovery in action or statement concerned with rights. The declarations and constitutions drawn up to establish the governments of the United States and of the individual states in the eighteenth century used the expressions "life, liberty, and property" and "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" interchangeably, because property means not only material "goods" but all that a man possesses including his virtues, his knowledge, and his ideals; and happiness is not only the final good pursued by man but also the means, including material instrumentalities, that are needed for its attainment. If the exercise of economic rights is concentrated on increase of material possessions, however, it will produce such a debasement of culture that cultural rights have little scope or exercise; and the exercise of cultural rights may lead to freedom of judgment which departs from customary criteria of economic status and social appro-

bation. The possibility that the various rights may be in opposition is the reason for the numerous pessimistic and despairing diagnoses of the culture of our time, but there is evidence that they may be supplementary rather than contradictory and that departures from the norms and the esteems of other times offer possibilities for cultural advances by new self-determinations or rights in a life richer in art, prudence, and civility, in science, insight, and wisdom.

The history of human rights since 1945 has illustrated both their contradictory and their supplementary interrelations. In that history we have recognized a movement from the consideration of rights in terms of power to impose balance against power to resist imposition through the consideration of rights in terms of indifferent toleration of peculiarities we do not share to a consideration of human rights in terms of interested tolerance of values which we have not yet considered or fully understood. Each of the five kinds of rights has been broadened in scope and diversified in perspective as a result of modern industry and modern communications, and each has acquired a universality of application to all men and all actions by reflexive determination of itself.

Economic rights have been transformed in technical assistance and cooperation programs. The right of all men to satisfy their basic needs has received new effective recognition. Basic needs may expand from minimum provisions of food and shelter, health and security, education and adjustment, to self-realization and freedom of action; and material assistance may countervene rights to political independence or social values. UNESCO was associated with the multilateral technical cooperation programs of the United Nations to relate the programs to the cultures of the recipient nations and to institute programs of education to make possible the use of the new knowledge and implements; and bilateral technical cooperation programs have struggled to separate or to relate economic, educational, political, and military aid and influence.

Political rights have been transformed in the transformation of colonialism. Imperialism, conceived as the relation of a home country and colonies which are governed, exploited, or settled, had been transformed politically and economically between the two wars by increased claims for self-government, education, and economic development; and it has yielded after 1945 to economic and cultural imperialism with political and military manifestations in spheres of influence, regional alliances, common markets, federations, and international

parties. A large number of peoples who were not self-governing before the war acquired the right of self-government and were admitted to membership in the United Nations where they exercised international political influence unprecedented in the previous history of small nations. As in the past their internal political problems have been complicated by economic, educational, religious, and cultural problems as well as by external political and diplomatic problems, but the problems of political rights conceived as opportunity to participate in making basic decisions concerning one's own destiny have been radically changed, in the new self-governing countries and in the older countries which all claim the term "democracy," by new forms of manipulation and corruption, of persuasion and deception, and of coercion and dictatorship.

Civil rights, the freedoms of expression and association, have been transformed with the transformations, the supplementations, and frustrations of economic and political rights. Civil rights are essential to the operation of parties and are misused in the machinations of factions. James Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He argued that the *causes* of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought by controlling its *effects*, which is possible in a large republic by taking in a greater variety of interests and effects. We have learned that action groups in the twentieth century have a different function than factions in the eighteenth century, for the pluralisms and reflexivities of world contacts are means of determining the rights of other citizens and the aggregate interests of mankind. Rights which are long established in statement, opinion, and law are often not recognized in practice; and new rights become possible from the use of recognized rights. Men have the right to satisfy the sense that they are getting somewhere, that progress is possible for oneself and one's own; that progress is rightfully determined by where one wishes to get and not by objectives set for one. Freedom of thought and expression are prerequisites of progress in knowledge and art and in the use of reason in morals, politics, and social relations.

The transformation of social rights has been marked by the movement of the center of consideration of equalities from the institutions of state to the customs of society to the associations and relations of men.

When Aristotle divides justice into distributive and retributive, justice is a particular virtue concerned with honor or money or security. It is a political virtue, and it is an institutionalization of economic rights. Aristotle also treats justice in a general sense in which it is the whole of virtue, for men are formed in virtue by the customs and approbations of the communities in which they grow up. These are equalities of men in the obligations which determine their actions in the community and in the recognitions accorded actions valued in the customs of the community. They have become more and more, with recent social changes, what they have always been to some extent, equalities achieved by the action of the person rather than equalities imposed by the judgment of the community – that is, equality of consideration (or the right to equitable judgment of actions already taken) and equality of opportunity (or the right to self-determination in actions to be taken). The specification that justice shall govern the operation of many of the special programs of the United Nations, like the technical assistance programs, would be meaningless if justice were interpreted in older senses than equal consideration and equal opportunity.

The recognition of cultural rights has transformed all other rights. Cultural rights are rights to participate in the benefits of advancements in science and technology and of achievements in art and knowledge. It would be easy to treat cultural rights if they were simple additions to other rights – if after one had the means to satisfy one's needs, to participate in common life, to express one's opinions, and to take advantage of one's opportunities, one turned finally to the enjoyment of culture. Cultural rights are added to other rights only by transforming them: to participate in the advances of culture is to practice the liberal arts and so to change what one conceives to be individual needs, common goods, worthy of expression, and to one's advantage; and the effects of knowledge and art transform one's circumstances as they are pertinent to the exercise of the different rights. It would be easier if material needs were measured by some fixed objective standards, if the regions of common decision were separated sharply from the regions of individual choice, if freedom of thought and expression could be enclosed within clearly marked limits beyond which thought is properly controlled and expression is properly censored, and if values were ranged in a definite order and hierarchy; but all these freedoms are affected by the cultural freedom of judgment and criticism. The evolution of the sense of justice or equality which relates different rights by means of cultural rights has been possible through "tolerance," which

has moved in that evolution from "endurance" of unavoidable evils, to "toleration" of the distasteful, the inconvenient, the unaccustomed and disapproved, to "comprehension" of the novel, the strange, and the emergent.

The history of law and of the transformation and spread of the rule of law since 1945 moves similarly by the antithetical oppositions of law differently conceived and differently effective, not only political and natural, but moral, social, economic, and logical law, by the supplementary addition of different kinds of law and different nomic forces. As rights have developed in a context of tolerance (which makes possible the development and pursuit of individual differences by men restrained in circumstances and bound in associations in lieu of the natural equality and mutual understanding of ideal men in ideal states), so laws have developed in a context of responsibility (which binds men in actual associations and communities in lieu of the love and mutual confidence which associates the equal citizens of utopias). The evolution of rights and laws depends on related changes in the concept and operation of power. Rights establish the possibility of using power to achieve the good of individuals or groups within a more inclusive community; laws are established by the possibility of using power to achieve the common good of the inclusive community. The rights of the individual are determined by the sovereign power of the community and they in turn determine the effective power of the individual; the laws of the state are determined by the exercise of rights by individuals and they in turn determine the effective power of the community. The evolution of rights has been seen to depend in the emergence of tolerance as a third stage in the use of power: when right is coextensive with power, the rights of those who lack power have their framework in *endurance* of what is imposed; when rights are established as limitations on sovereign power, the rights of all have their context and possibility in the *toleration* of what is different from the customary and accepted; when rights are established as self-determination and mutual interest, the rights of mankind are developed in the context of *tolerance* or mutual-comprehension, which advances one's own rights or self-determination as it makes the rights of others possible. The evolution of law depends on a like development in the meanings and uses of power.

The history of law is bound up with the history of democracy, for law is the exercise of power to bind men in communities or polities for common ends, and it derives its power from the sovereign power of the community, which is the power of the "people." The first stage of the

evolution of that power is in "ruling," and the constitutions of polities were described in terms of the functions of ruling and being ruled. The analysis of law and power had already reached a high degree of subtlety in antiquity when Aristotle argued that the definition of state (*polis*) depends on a prior definition of constitution of government (*politeia*) which in turn depends on the definition of citizen (*polites*). He then defines the citizen as one who shares in judicial functions and deliberative offices; those who share these functions have supreme power or sovereignty, and it is they who govern. This is a reflexive definition of the ruled by their functions as rulers of themselves. Aristotle grants that this definition is best adapted to the citizen of a democracy, but it is the definition of citizens in other states as well. Reflexivity and pluralism enter early in the evolving conception of law. It is frequently said that Aristotle did not hold democracy in high esteem, and that the Greeks did not have a true conception of democracy, although they did provide us with the name, for their democratic states were based on slavery and were ruled by an elite or, as in the case of Periclean Athens, by a single citizen. Aristotle placed "democracy" among the three bad constitutions; but the bad constitutions were each the perversion of a good constitution, and the name that he gives to the good constitution corresponding to democracy is the generic name of constitution, "polity" (*politeia*): the good democratic constitution is by implication the very nature or essence of political constitutions. Aristotle's defense of democracy is that, as the many are better judges of music and poetry than a single man or a few or an expert, so too in the exercise of deliberative and judicial functions in the state the many provide in their multiplicity the faculty of judgment and criticism. The same Greek word is translated "judge" and "critic", and our vocabulary of judgment and criticism preserves the relation between moral and esthetic thought which tends to be stiffened into oppositions, like those between moral censoriousness and esthetic immoralism, in our theories. In antiquity and in the Middle Ages law is recognized by judgment of what is right.

Against this background of law as rule and self-rule the emergence of the modern conception of law and sovereignty in the Renaissance is sharply marked as a distinct and second stage of development. It is not true that the Greek and Latin philosophers had no word for, or concept of, sovereignty or supreme power; these ideas were not inventions of the Renaissance. What is true is that the idea of legislation or law-making was developed and was made the characterizing property of

sovereignty. Law is made by the exercise of power rather than recognized by the exercise of judgment relative to the use of power. The concept of the sovereignty of the people in the exercise of power in the offices of the state was not new, but the notion that the exercise of power is fundamentally the making of law concerning the exercise of power marks a new stage in the conception of democracy; and after Kant, morals too could be conceived as a kind of law-making. Kant's politics and ethics of self-rule and Mill's politics and ethics of self-protection shared differences from the ethics of virtue and the politics of power which are reflected in nineteenth century developments in democracy and in conceptions of democracy.

We have entered on a third stage in the history of law and the rule of law which gives a new sense to "world law" not unrelated to the new sense acquired by "human rights." As conceptions, both are found in the ancient literatures of the world, but the senses in which world law and human rights apply to all men and to the actions of all men have become more precise and more operative. It has been seen that in the history of human rights the transition has been from the rights of the strong to the rights of the individual and to the rights of all men, as the institutions and associations of men have embodied more effectively the conceptions of power, individuality, and universality which have appeared in statements about rights from the first. The history of law parallels those three stages of rights and equalities in three stages of law and democracy. The transition has been from the exercise of the sovereign power of law-making by the people to reflexive actions of all men in the social democracy of contemporary culture. Democracy is still defined by the mode of recognition and operation of law, but it is no longer defined satisfactorily by identifying the people (the many or the poor) as the ultimate power in the administration of the functions of the community or as the sovereign will in making the constitution and the laws of association; the differentia of democracy has come to be found in discussion to secure agreement as opposed to the use of power in actions and words to secure acquiescence based on subterfuge or coercion.

The related histories of rights and law, of *ius* and *lex*, come to their crux in the emergence of the self or the person in contemporary culture. He is the product of rights, which have been made possible by the transformation and growth of "tolerance," and of laws, which have been made possible by the initiation and growth of "responsibility." Tolerance is the surrogate for understanding in the multiplying re-

lations among men; responsibility is the surrogate for love in enlarging associations and communities of men. Tolerance has moved with the development of human rights from endurance to toleration, to the tolerance of mutual comprehension, to give new meanings to the old recognitions that rights are coextensive with power and that all men are born free and equal in their rights. Responsibility has moved with the development of the rule of law from agency to representation, to the responsibility of mutual confidence, to give new meanings to the old recognitions that laws are the ordering of the ruled by rulers and that laws are the expression of the will of the people. Rights have ceased to be limited to freedoms which can be guaranteed by preventing interference with the decisions or actions of individuals, as is the case in freedom of worship and freedom of expression; they have come to include rights which depend on what all men or the inclusive community of mankind does, as is the case in freedom from want and freedom from fear. Laws have ceased to be the product of law-making conceived as the distinctive activity of one branch of a government: the American legal realists have concentrated attention on "judge-made" law, administrative agencies exercise judicial and legislative functions, and the rule of law has extended to the world community without the enactments of a recognized law-making body, or the coercive jurisdiction of a world court, or the operation of a federated administration.

Tolerance is a context (like equality or mutual understanding) within which the establishment and operation of rights is possible. Responsibility is a context (like love or mutual confidence) within which the establishment and operation of law is possible. There is no reason why freedom and responsibility should not be enhanced rather than limited by the opportunities and antagonisms of the more complex world in which we live. The self would then be the new creation, in freedom and responsibility, by which a fuller realization of the individual and a greater diversity of the world community might open up unanticipated possibilities. The pessimistic pictures of the coercions and uniformities of contemporary culture are the frustrations which impede the realization of the opportunities for freedom and responsibility. The new philosophy of the self must be more than a theory: it must be a new operation of love or confidence in others and of tolerance or understanding of others to develop new freedoms and responsibilities which can be exercised by any man only as they are extended to all men.

3

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY*

PAUL TILLICH

There have been complaints that our conference was more directed towards God than towards the self although it was a Conference on the human self. This is beside the point. The planning did not include psychologists and sociologists but experts in world religions, because of the fact that Eastern Philosophers have not separated the self from ultimate reality – and it might well be that this is one thing the West can learn or rediscover in the dialogue of the world religions which has started.

I have been asked to continue this trend of relating the problem of the self to the problem of the ultimate by speaking about a symbol in which the dimension of the ultimate in the self is most obviously expressed: the problem of immortality. The first thing I must do is to describe the meaning of immortality, historically and systematically, and then to ask: “How is it related to the human self as we see it today?” Of course, when one speaks of immortality one looks immediately back to Plato’s so-called arguments for the immortality of the soul. I believe that none of them is an argument in the technical sense of the word, but all of them point existentially to the trans-temporal validity of the true and the good, and to the trans-temporal participation of individuals in this realm of the good and the true. They are not arguments in the technical sense of the word, but arguments *ad hominem*, or as we would say today existential arguments. If they were considered as arguments in the technical sense, then the warning of Socrates in the *Phaedo* would be justified. He says you cannot be altogether confident of that. But if they are understood in the second sense, then they formulate something of which we are sub-consciously or consciously aware.

* The following is the tape-recorded lecture of Tillich, who promised to revise it but passed away before doing so. A few editorial changes are made by the editors according to the suggestion of Dr. Robert C. Kimball, Literary Executor of the Estate of Paul Tillich. The editors thank Dr. Kimball for his cooperation and permission to publish the article.

We human beings belong to two orders – that of the temporal and the transitory and that of the trans-temporal and essential. Or as Plato expressed it in half mythological language, we belong to the realm of the visible and to the realm, the heavenly realm, of the ideas, the essences. In Plato's discussion of this problem another element came in through the Orphic tradition by which oriental elements such as migration of the soul, ultimate judgment, and final return of the soul, were told as myths by Plato. The combination of this more genuinely Greek element with this more oriental element – this combination was received by Christianity and is effective up today. But how effective is it today? It is a badly popularized idea, usually brought under the term, "life hereafter," and this "life hereafter" is imagined as the duplicate of the present life after the removal of the evils and in a bodiless form. The soul is considered as an immortal substance, and its status is the life of an individual self with endless joy. The alternative possibility of endless pain, which belonged formerly to this idea, is mostly repressed in the American version of this idea. This, of course, is not only pseudo-Platonic, it is certainly non-Christian. So I have observed that it is often the only remnant of Christian thinking in many people in this country because it concerns them. It is, as I would like to call it, a popular superstition and is rejected by many serious theologians, but is still used even by theologians in terms of consolation, especially in funeral homes by friends and relatives, by ministers and often – and this is the most dangerous part of it – by oneself.

Now, not only this popularized idea but already the basic and genuine Platonic idea has been under attack from several sides, the first and most important, that of today's Aristotelian. The soul for him is the enlivening form of the body and ceases to be an individual principle when the body ceases to move. The mind which comes from outside is transtemporal, but not individual. It is a universal principle of the *nous* or the mind. Eternal life for Aristotle is participation in the eternal self-intuition of the divine mind. This idea had in the Middle Ages great influence both on the Islamic and the Christian world in terms of a philosophy called Averroism, and the same idea came up again powerfully in classical German philosophy of the Hegelian type; and above all this, there is the idea of mystical reunion in neo-Platonic, Islamic, and Christian mysticism.

Against these ideas, the Church resisted; and it resisted because of the emphasis of the Church on the individual moral responsibility. It is the old conflict which we all know even today between the education-

al point of view and the ontological or philosophical point of view. And the Church rejected more or less the ontological point of view for the sake of the educational. There are other attacks, of course, which I do not need to mention here in this context; they come from naturalism, especially the reductionist naturalism, and positivism; but this comes from outside and denies the problem as a problem and therefore it is not our concern at this moment. But there is another attack not only on the popular distortion of Platonism but on Platonism itself, which comes from Persian ideas, from the religion of Zoroaster which was sporadically accepted in late Judaism, when Palestine was subjected to Persian ideas of resurrection of the body. These ideas were then fully accepted and carried through in many respects by Christianity.

They were applied first to Christ, on the basis of his appearance to his disciples, as the first one who was resurrected, and then at the end of history to all men. This leads in principle to a monistic understanding of the relation of body and mind, to a unity which is in contrast to the idea of souls as bodiless spirits, which I would call simply ghosts. Immortality of ghosts is not a Christian idea, which is a better doctrine of men, a better psychology than Plato's in its dualistic interpretation. It has also another vision of man's nature as well as of his predicament, which it first emphasizes. This is the original Christian idea: there is no natural immortality in man. He comes from dust and he goes back to it. Only the gods have natural immortality; they are therefore called in Greece the immortals. And in the *New Testament* the word appears only twice: in the one case it says, "to God who alone has immortality" and the second time, "who can clothe our mortality with immortality." There is no word of natural human immortality. And this corresponds to the *Old Testament* tradition. The tree of life in its original mythological meaning in the paradise story is food of the gods, which gives them immortality. Man in the paradise participated in this food. When however trespassing the prohibitions of the gods he got knowledge of the good and evil powers in nature, he was prevented from eating the food of the gods as otherwise he also would have become like one of the immortals. Now these ideas which are transformed in the biblical story are symbols which were carried through and carried further by the apostolic fathers, especially Ignatius, immediately after the apostolic age. There is again the tree of life, there is again food of immortality. It is the sacramental food of the Last Supper. This gives immortality.

The decisive point in all these symbolic kinds of speaking is the negation of a natural immortality in terms of an immortal soul sub-

stance. But in spite of these attacks, the Platonic tradition persisted. And when you look at the psychology of Thomas Aquinas, you will find his great difficulties in the reconciliation between this tradition of the Platonic idea of immortality and his own great work of introducing Aristotle into the doctrine of man. For him soul is a form of the body; and the soul is not an independent substance. This conflict of traditions characterizes one side of the doctrine of immortality.

Now let me try to give you an interpretation of the symbol of resurrection, first in Paul's writings. There is in Paul an element of ancient dualism between spirit and body; and this encourages him to protest against the crude ideas of bodily resurrection as we can see them, for instance, on many medieval pictures which, as pictures, are great works of art. But if you look at them as teachers of immortality, then I must think of a word of my colleague, teacher, and friend, Rudolph Otto, the author of the *Idea of the Holy*, who once said about an orthodox colleague who wrote about the resurrection: "This man has given us a transcendental osteology," meaning a doctrine of the bones. This is one side on which Paul fights against the crudeness of such imaginations, if they are taken literally. On the other hand, his Jewish tradition works in him. Human spirit without body is naked, as he calls it. Ghostly existence is something to be ashamed of. It is not full humanity. And now he gives his solution. He speaks of a spiritual body. Let us look at this term. It is a combination of words without any empirical basis. How can we understand it? It must be understood as a piece of two negative statements – a two-sided negation – in order to determine a place between them, but this place we can never reach in terms of a definite word. It must be understood as two prohibiting signposts. The one signpost toward the one side says: "Don't go this way, don't imagine man in the resurrection as a pure ghost." And the other signpost, in the other direction says: "Don't imagine man in the resurrection as having a material body." But more Paul could not say. And more, I believe, we cannot say. The truth lies in the place which is determined by these two negations and is unapproachable to all conceptualizations.

Therefore, the task of theology is not to say more, but to do two things. First, to maintain this paradoxical formula against people who want to say more. I think, for instance, of the anthroposophical movement which considers spirit itself as a kind of higher matter and which produces then the kind of higher physics when it speaks about resurrection. Secondly, theology must try to understand the existential

meaning of this symbol – existential for us, symbolically, denying its literal character and showing its function within the whole of the religious symbols. In John, in the Fourth Gospel, there is an even more fundamental demythologization or, as one better could call it, the deliteralization of the symbols of eternal life. The Fourth Gospel tries to overcome the temporal character of immortality. It is not seen in the future only, but also in the present and in the past. Immortality as well as resurrection are replaced in many places in the Fourth Gospel by the term eternal life and the idea is that one has eternal life here and now. Whoever is in a spiritual unity with Christ has eternal life now. And Jesus comes from eternity; he precedes Abraham, as the Fourth Gospel lets him say of himself. It is not life hereafter, it is the coming from the eternal; and as Jesus then says in many words in the fourth gospel we return to it. But many other questions must be asked. One is the question of the time of resurrection and the destiny after it. For this question, already in early Christianity and now for us, the use of Indian traditions is certainly necessary. If resurrection is thought of for the dead and will happen on the day of consummation, then the question arises: What in the time between death and the ultimate day? Then the preliminary existence must be demanded; but isn't then this preliminary existence just what the idea of resurrection wanted to avoid, namely, an existence as bodiless ghosts? If immediately after death the resurrection occurs as for instance in the words of Jesus to the crucified criminal, "Today thou wilt be with me in paradise," then the last day is not the decisive moment. Then this last day had meaning only for the people who lived at that time. Now what does all this mean? We have here several conflicts of traditions of symbols for eternal life. And these conflicts unavoidably appear if the symbols are taken literally. But the problems remain; and they are very important when we think of the ultimate destiny of all human beings and ask the question, what about the children more of whom died before they reached the first year of their life than ever were adults on earth. What about the insane? What about those who never could reach maturity for psychological or environmental reasons? This leads us to ask the question: Isn't there perhaps a value in the symbol of reincarnation which we find in Asiatic religions, and also in the Orphic?

And we find it even in some enlightened people of the 18th century, people like the greatest representative of German enlightenment, the poet and philosopher Lessing, in his *Education of Mankind*, where he wants that all those who have not reached maturity should get it after

they have turned again into existence in the age of reason, which he expected as a man of the 18th century. But we ask the question: If there is an identical self in all the incarnations of a being, has that any helpful meaning if he doesn't experience this destiny? We don't know our previous incarnations. The doctrine presupposes a lasting non-bodily substance, but a substance which has no continuing consciousness. And so one may ask, about this Karma doctrine: Are categories like rebirth and punishment meaningful? If the acts by which they are produced are not known to him who receives the reward and the punishments, has the term *self* any meaning without the act of self-identification, without memory? I believe the answer must be: No. And I know from my meeting with Buddhists in Japan that, when I asked them these questions, they were willing to agree with me that it's a symbol because it puts before us the problem of maturing of those who never have matured in time and space. This situation has led some people to attempt to find a memory of their former incarnation in themselves now. Or it has produced stories about extra-ordinary people who were said to know out of which incarnation they came. It is interesting that such ideas were taken up by the leaders of rationalism and enlightenment and that they presupposed a substance of the soul which would last through different incarnations. I think this came to a definite end, at least in European philosophical tradition, by the criticisms of Hume and Immanuel Kant against the concept of substance, which is presupposed in these ideas.

But now let me ask directly, why did Christianity prefer the symbol of resurrection to the symbol of immortal soul? For two reasons – first, because of the problem of individualization and second, because of the relation of the human self to nature. In both respects the imagery of resurrection must be understood. The body is the expression of our individualization, but as Mr. Northrop called it, determined-self. He who has a body is an individual, fully determined self. And therefore the possibility of fulfillment without body is something negative. But the body also indicates that man belongs to nature. Resurrection, in contrast to the immortal soul, retains the monistic element of the interpretation of human nature which is so strong in the *Old Testament*. And I think these two reasons make the symbol of resurrection a superior symbol over against the immortality of the soul. But on the other hand, we must know it is more exposed to superstitious literalism than even the immortal soul with all the superstitions connected with

it. I prefer, with the Fourth Gospel, the symbol of eternal life to all the others.

Now, if we speak of eternal life, how is it related to man's self? There is first of all to be considered the popular quest for continuing self-consciousness in all forms of ideas of immortality, more or less superstitious ones. It includes memory, the degrees of maturity, the degrees of blessedness obtained, distinction from others, development – that means, it contains in the superstitious imagination the whole structure of finite reality. This symbolism, which is taken literally by most people has its deepest roots in the Jewish, Christian and predominant Islamic evaluation of the individual person. All doctrines are different under this view. All theological doctrines change if this view is put on. From the Christian point of view, which affirms the individual personality in its eternal meaning, the creation is understood as good. The Fall is responsible for the evil in reality. History is evaluated as a place of salvation, and eternal life, not everlasting life, is possible. And it has also many practical consequences. It produces in the three Israel-born religions – Judaism, Islam, and Christianity – social and ethical points of view. It produces, especially in Christianity, the technical conquest of reality. It produces in Christianity the ethics of *agape*, of that love which is described first in *I Corinthians 13*, over against the love which is predominantly compassion and which was put in many discussions with the Buddhists in Japan as the corresponding concept, which however is not the same because it is rooted in the identity of the substance in all beings.

And now let me continue the Johanian demythologization in an attempt to find another solution for the problem of immortality and the self. First of all, eternity is not endlessness. The genuine meaning of eternity is *olam* in Hebrew. *Aeon* in Greek is a large number of temporal moments seen together in a unity from above. So one can speak of *olamin ha olamin*, the eternities of the eternities. It is not timelessness either, it is a unity which transcends our temporal experience. In endlessness we are subject to every moment; in eternity, there is a unity in every moment, in all moments together. So we must say, eternity is neither timelessness nor endless continuation of time. But this means something for self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is dependent on the temporal process. Without the change of subject and object, the subject would become catatonic, looking at one and the same point immoveably and the object would never become a real object. So the finite structure of self-consciousness is dependent upon our form of

temporal process. And this leads to the question: What can self-consciousness and memory mean in eternal life beyond subject and object and the split? Now, let me introduce here the very often used concept which you all know, viz., the concept of essence. We know, again from Plato, it means universal or that which is expressed in universals. It means types of being, it means qualities of being, which are universal. And here a question arises which seems to be very scholastic and is very existential, namely, the question, is there an essence not only of treehood, redhood, manhood, but also of an individual human being? Now this question has been answered affirmatively by philosophers, some neo-Platonists, and has been affirmed instinctively by mankind by giving human beings individual names. And what an individual name means has been known better in former periods than in ours. God has written our names in the book of life, or "I have called thee by thy name," God says to Israel. There is a secrecy about the name. There are fairy tales in which human beings don't want to give their name because giving it means giving one's inmost power, one's essence which is more than any moment of our temporal existence. And even the demons have their essence; and if the Saviour God comes to them and deprives them of their secret name then they will lose their power.

But there are other witnesses for the idea that the individual has an essence. I speak of all arts. I have in mind especially the visual art, the art of portrait. What does it try to do? It tries to give in one moment's vision something which is the essence of the whole life development of this human being. If you look at the old age paintings of Rembrandt, his paintings of himself and of other old men or women, then you see in their faces a life history, an essence which is an individual essence. And the same of course can be done in the art of the word. Now on the basis of this, I have used a word which was originally used by the philosopher Schelling, the friend, predecessor, and successor and critic of Hegel, namely, the word essentialization. Leaving temporality does not mean continuation either as ghost or as material body; but it means essentialization, coming to the fulfillment of one's potentialities. I heard today two talks. One is Professor McKeon's, where he said one of the most creative things is a creative deception, if it remains preliminary. And another is Professor Hocking who asked me to give to all my thoughts which I have written in many books a second thought. And for both of these things this idea of essentialization is a good example. It is in the definition of Professor McKeon a preliminary step, a creative deception. And it means not only my second thought, but

second thought of all of you. But without such creative deceptions we would not go ahead in our understanding at all. And so let me say a little bit about it. You can imagine a diagram in which our whole temporal existence is described as coming from above, which means eternity, coming forward and down at the same time to the deepest point which represents the present, and then turning ahead and up again going forward and back to the eternal. This means that eternity here is seen in the past and is seen in the future and is seen from the eternal now, here and in this moment. Therefore, if somebody speaks to you about the hereafter, ask him: What do you think about the here-before? This present, this manifestation of the unique potentiality, this unique individual being, in the creative ground of all being but with this manifestation, is at the same time free to actualize the potentiality itself and, by doing so, to continue the divine creativity. It is the self-constituting of a self as a centered person within a community of selves under the conditions of the world in which we live. Essentialization in this sense is not simply return to the potentiality we had before in eternity as an idea of God, if you want a symbolic word for it. But the return is more than going out; it can also be less; it can be a real fulfillment; it can be lack of fulfillment of what was given to us uniquely in the moment of creation as eternal essences in the mind of God. This allows for a non-superstitious speaking of the eternal dimension of the soul and it allows for the belongingness, for understanding the belongingness of the body to the whole of our being. And when Socrates says that his enemies may kill his body, but cannot kill Socrates, I would say they have killed Socrates' manifestation in time and space, but they have not killed Socrates, neither his body in its eternal essential character nor his soul in its eternal essential character. Speaking of consciousness, memory, and love in eternal life demands the method I have applied already of a two-sided negation. Eternity, we have seen, is neither the endlessness nor the negation of time. So essentialization is neither continuation of time or of encounter with reality, including ourselves, nor is it the extinction of it within an undifferentiated oneness which one could call the absolute metaphysical grave.

More perhaps cannot be said. But in the preceding discussion one point of view has up to now been neglected, namely, the question of speaking in all these terms: "isolation of oneself" and "separation from all other selves." Is the ultimate destiny of men in isolation of his personal self? No. It is no longer possible, if it ever was, according to all biological, psychological, and sociological insights, to speak of absolute-

ly separated individual selves. We do not know in which period of the past a human self started in the biological ascendance from one-cell beings to man. You only can imagine that there must have been a fight in some animal bodies between a predominance of the animal form of being and the beginning of the human form of being. When begins an individual self which has eternal dimension in it? We do not know how much the ancestors of a human being are responsible for his virtue or vice. We do not know the sociological conditions which made him a saint or juvenile delinquent. How could a father want to be saved if by his unconscious guilt, his son is condemned? This of course is a fundamental criticism of any doctrine of predestination, in terms of an eternal split of mankind into those condemned and into those saved. Certainly essentialization refers to individuals, but not in terms of separation from others. And I believe not only in separation from nature – nature I would say against a super strong emphasis on history in our present philosophy and, even more, theology. Nature is not only a condition of history, it has also history in itself. And plants and animals are not simply things. They have elements of subjectivity in them; only men make things after cutting into pieces the beings which nature brings, when he makes tools.

Now as I said, all these ideas are an attempt to overcome the two wrong ways in which we have gone into many conflicts, problems, and impossibilities: the literalism either of the immortal soul or of the resurrection and even of the reincarnation, and on the other hand, the retaining of this fundamental experience of our having in ourselves the dimension towards the eternal, an awareness of belonging not only to temporal order. This attempt is no solution; but it is an attempt which should be carried through by others better than I am able to do. But one thing it may do even today, namely, it may help us to start the great dialogue between East and West, a bit of which has happened in this conference on a point which is of supreme importance.

FREE WILL, THE CREATIVITY OF GOD, AND ORDER

PETER A. BERTOCCI

I

The nature of the finite person and his relation to Reality remains, as it has been for ages in both Eastern and Western thought, a problem for empirical and speculative thought. Nobody, in the East or in the West, denies that the human person stands in an enigmatic relation to the rest of being, for there are dimensions to his nature that seem to link him with the rest of being. A microcosm somehow related to a macrocosm that includes many dimensions of non-personal being, the personal self has tended to be considered some sort of example of some other dimension of being, sub-human or superhuman; man is a created, imperfect image of God, or a focus of God, or a higher animal, or a complicated matrix of electrical energy, or . . . The tendency has been to study him as a good sample of something else to which he clearly seems related.

In this paper I shall try a different philosophical path. Instead of assuming that we have all we need to know about the natural world without investigating the nature of man, the counter-assumption is that man is to be studied not as "another instance of nature;" or, instead of assuming that we know what divine Being must be like and then considering the personal self an imperfect copy of God's nature, I shall try to analyze *one phase* especially of the person, and then ask whether it might help in clarifying the meaning of creation in the theistic conception of God that has been so influential in the West. I shall limit myself to the nature of human freedom on what seems to me to be its own terms before asking the question: What light might this analysis throw on the nature of human freedom and divine creation.

II

Quite understandably, philosophical discussion of will has concentrated on whether human will can be assigned any degree of freedom. In this paper I am assuming that there is limited free will so that we can face the further question: What is the activity of freedom, that is, what does free activity introduce that would not be achieved without it? Nevertheless, it will be necessary for me to set down, somewhat arbitrarily, what I mean in minimal terms when I say that there is free will.

Willing is a distinctive phase of the total activity that comprises personal being. To be a person is to be a complex unity of activities: sensing, remembering, perceiving, thinking, feeling, emoting, wanting, willing, oughting, and aesthetic and religious sensitivity. Our argument here does not depend on agreement about the exact nature of these activities (other than willing). For the main contention is that minimally to be a person is (a) to be at least a unity of these activities, and (b) that these activities, while they are assigned different names, are not different parts whose assembly constitutes the person. To be a person is to be a unity of such activities, a unity defined by what they actually do and can do.¹ To will, then, is for the person to act in a way that can be discriminated introspectively from other personal activities; "the person wills" is the accurate mode of speech, for "the will" is nothing other than one kind of, one dimension of, personal activity.

To say this is to emphasize that the will is not side-by-side, as it were, other phases of personal activity. The will, as a certain kind of activity among the total activities of the self, simply cannot act out of connection with the other activities and structures of personality. To neglect this fact is to invite fears about arbitrary acts of will.

Elsewhere I have tried to further quell this unfounded fear lest the will bring sheer arbitrariness into the life of a person by distinguishing between will-agency and will-power.² The person can will (will-agency) without fully accomplishing the objective he has in mind. When the person succumbs to temptation, we say that will-agency does not have power (will-power). The distinction between will-power and will-agency

¹ For our purpose here we may also neglect the question whether the whole person is conscious or unconscious. Yet, I should want to insist that what we know about unconscious activities we can know only by analogy with the conscious.

² See *Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace*, Abingden, New York, 1958, and "The Moral Structure of the Person," *Review of Metaphysics*, 1962, and also Chapter 8 in *Personality and the Good*, co-author R. M. Millard, David McKay, New York, 1963.

cannot be absolute, since an agency that has no *effective power* at all would be nothing at all. Yet the distinction points out the fact that will-power is the effective difference made by will-agency, given the personality a person has developed, and given the other factors to be dealt with at the moment of choice. Thus, the student who chooses to study after having formed bad study habits, may well find that his will-agency makes little headway, that is, that he has little *effective power* over the habits formed. Yet this does not mean that there is no will-agency at all, or even no will-power at all. The act of willing does have some effect, some power against the formations in personality that render it "powerless" to break the habit. No person wills arbitrarily in the sense that he can do anything at will, or that he wills outside the total context of his native and acquired capacities, or that he is impervious to the environment that impinges on him at choice-point.

To put the same thing differently, any behavior or conduct in which will-agency is present is caused by many factors *including the will-agency*; the person often does not know ahead of time exactly how much his will-agency can accomplish. Nevertheless, will-agency as felt is will-activity and not *want*-activity or *thought*-activity, or *ought*-activity; nor is will-agency the by-product of other activities. Will-power, however, in a given situation may well be the product of all the factors involved in the matrix of activities that constitute the total person-personality. A person's personality is the unique, more or less unified, joint-product of the person's unity of given activities as they interact with the total environment. The person learns or acquires a personality that expresses his mode of interaction with his environment. The person is not exhausted in his personality; but he always lives and acts on, through and in it: hence the word person-personality.

III

Assuming, then, that will-agency is free within limits, but not arbitrary in a specious sense, we may ask: In what does the achievement of freedom consist? As has just been suggested, the person in willing does not act in a vacuum. The person does not will to will; he wills to think or not to think; or he wills to pursue what he acknowledges to be right or wrong. *Moral* freedom is the personal freedom to exert oneself in favor of, or against, what one believes he ought to do. A person uses his freedom to favor or oppose a situation in his personality-environment matrix that his willing *at this moment of choice* did not choose. For

example, will he now, faced with a problematic situation, pursue thinking that is self-consistent and related to the available evidence, even if he knows that the conclusions may be displeasing to his own past sentiments and those of others whose esteem he treasures? Let me answer that he can will to think about the situation. But his willing does not create the structure of logic and of reasonable thinking; nor does it create the evidence to be taken into account. What, then, does his willing do? What difference does it make? What does it create, if anything?

Our point is critical; the person in willing (will-agency) does not will new situations into being; it takes advantage of, or it is confined to the activating of "structures" in its total person-personality. Willing certainly does not create the evidence or the rules of thinking. Nor does it at this moment create the emotional sentiments that may be disappointed as they make themselves felt in a way that can make straight thinking more difficult. New thoughts flood in, and new feelings may come into play that would have been inconsequential otherwise, but we cannot say that willing creates these thoughts or feelings. For only thinking-activity can think thoughts, and according to implicit laws of thought; only emoting-activity expresses itself in one form of emotion or another; and only feeling-activity can take specific forms of feeling; only sensing capacities can experience sense-data. *Willing, it seems clear, does not alter the basic activities of the person, or the basic rules by which they are governed once active, or the basic concomitant that comes raining in upon the choice-situation from learned "structures."*

All the more, then, what does human willing do? If it does not act out of relation to other activities and structures, unlearned or acquired, is there anything left for it to do? Yes. Willing *at least* makes possible changes in the constellation of factors involved in a given choice situation. For example, by holding some factor in a situation in focus (or in action) when they, left to themselves, would cease being active, it changes the outcome that would otherwise have ensued. It makes a difference whether thinking can be kept thinking about the evidence, whether sentiments are kept from becoming the focus of the situation or dominating the associative process. In a word, the *minimal* difference willing seems to make is one of keeping some factors in focus and operative and shutting off or decreasing the power of other factors that in turn would be more effective if willing favored them. To illustrate, if I will to hold on to the hot plate that is painning my fingers, I am keeping in focus the thinking of the goal: "this plate must not be

dropped" and favoring the feeling and other states favoring that goal, and thus refuse to allow the experienced reflex "drop hot plate" from being fully enacted.

I do not suggest the above as a complete account of a very complicated situation; there are many more focal and peripheral factors (conscious and, no doubt, unconscious) that no doubt have an effect in my conscious matrix at any one point. But could I articulate all of these adequately, I doubt that the basic description just given would be abrogated. *Willing is at least that activity of personal effort which, far from producing the situation it confronts at any decision point, does create a situation that would not have ensued had the decision not been made to hold firm to certain activity-contents as opposed to others.* This willing is free insofar as it is not the sheer outcome of a confluence of present and past forces now operative in person-personality.³ But its intended effect is to alter the existent situation in accordance with a goal decided upon at that point.

We have been speaking in minimal terms reminiscent of William James' doctrine of *fiat*. I am no surer than he was of "how" all this comes about. But, undaunted, I wish to go on to say, if I read the situation aright, to will is to create. I use the word *create* and give up the words *change* and *alter* because I have a specific kind of change in mind, namely *creative change*. Creative change is more than the actualizing of potential, although it presupposes both actuality and potentiality in the creator. Creative change is a change in a situation that would not have taken place if the situation had been allowed to "unfold" or to drift, as it were, with the outcome being no more than a consequence of interacting factors left to themselves. Creative change produces, in other words, a change that might well not have occurred, and as far as we know, would not have occurred, without an activity that entered the situation in such a way as to allow a result to take place that simply would not have ensued without effort expended to this effect.

Accordingly, a person is here held to be creative in a given situation insofar as he wills in that situation an end that (ethical or not, aesthetic or not, reasonable or not) would not have taken place until he so willed. Willing to be sure, always is willing in a personality context; but when willing takes place, it (will-agency) effects results believed to be possi-

³ "The Psychological Self, the Ego, and Personality" in *Psychological Review*, 1945, 52, 91-99; and "Foundations of Personalistic Psychology" in *Scientific Psychology*, ed. B. B. Wolman, Basic Books, New York, 1965.

ble in that situation, but results that so far as we know would not have occurred if the willing did not endure until the end was achieved.

Much is involved in what we have said that needs further explication. But the situation to keep before us is nicely described by Professor Wilmon H. Sheldon when he says:

The only genuine cause is one with a power quite its own, underived from what preceeds, deciding so far quite by itself what it will do. Hence, when we reason we are not reasoning in isolation, but we are reasoning and not feeling!⁴

Sensitive to the dynamics of reason, feeling, and willing, he continues:

... Unless there were urges, lures deep or shallow, temporary or lasting, native or acquired, each with its own magnetism, there could be no choice made, no reflection as to which is better or best. And, these lures stand on their own feet actual given trends in the individual make-up. Reason doesn't create them, though it may discover them ... Nor does will create the lures ... The act of will, like reason may discover new goods, but their goodness is not created by the act. Will may indeed focus attention on this or that lure, *letting its force be felt so strong that its opposite lure gradually recedes from the scene. We can by our free choice let the delight of the flesh so dominate our life that the appeal of the finer and more lasting goods disappear below the horizon.*⁵ (italics added).

What, then, is the thesis being suggested? Willing, far from operating in a psychic-biological vacuum, is the effort of the person to deal with the given factors in a choice-matrix that would follow a line of least resistance, as it were, if the person had not directed them in the light of a new task. Willing, on the other hand, could not create the new task, were thinking impossible, or were there no dispositions and trends in the total matrix of which it is a part. Willing does not take over the function of thinking, of wanting-desiring, of pleasing or displeasing; it constructs neither the laws of reason nor the intrinsic functions and sequences of emotions. Willing is like a parent who cannot be a parent without children, who must accept certain brute facts about their actual and possible natures. However, since the parent has energies left that are not exhausted by his children, he is free to manage what they present to him in ways they cannot manage by themselves, and in ways still open to him.

Nothing less is involved, it seems, than to realize that the person, were he simply a *composite* of feeling, emotion, brute-sense-data, oughts and rational activities, could not will. When a person wills he does not become the eyes or the desires or the sense-data or the memories. Yet in

⁴ Wilmon H. Sheldon, *Rational Religion*, Philosophical Library, New York, 1962, pp. 16, 17, 18.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

willing, when he is successful, he is able (will-power) to control these raw materials in the choice-matrix so that while each contributes its share, each further enters into conduct, into the formation of character and personality, in a way it would not, as far as we can tell, if left to itself. What is *new* as a result of a will, or its creative act, is not conduct in which there is no emotion, reason, memory, obligation or something other than these, but those components of each that now constitute the person's purpose (good or bad).

Indeed, in this context, we can say that the character and personality of a person are the partial result of creative will – they are not mere changes or alterations – in the sense that they constitute the kind of unity – the degree of orchestration of dispositions and capacities – that express the self-conscious purpose of the person. In particular, a person's character is a creation of the person because, and to the extent that, he has been able to bring into being – not something which is neither desire nor thought nor obligation but – something that is new, from the point of view of that person's past and present. This new partial creation, this new orchestration, was not impossible in view of actualities and potentialities in the choice-matrix; but they now exist because personal willing sustains and controls one focus rather than another. For example, fear that could easily express itself in cowardly flight is kept from "taking over" the conscious matrix even as other emotions like sympathy, anger, respect, are allowed to play a larger part in an act of courage that was cautious as well as daring.

IV

Is it too much to say that such creative change involves positive addition to, and subtraction from, what is? Is there not illustrated in human personality the production of a change that brings into being new qualities and formations of character and personality at the expense of others? While I grant that it would not be an accurate description to say that willing brings into being the constituent emotion, memories, thoughts, that it would not be accurate to say that willing merely follows the contour, trend, or dynamics of the unattended constituents, I do suggest that willing does produce something new. For it sustains activities that might have ceased, and it activates and directs trends that might have been ineffective.

How often in our lives actions that are begun by impulse are continued when impulse is dead. For example, an act that begins in sympa-

thy for another may still be continued when sympathy is gone (and an act begun by will may continue from sympathy). Something *new* takes place which cannot be predicted from past or present experience, which would not take place if the person did not will action in a given situation toward a goal or end that he envisioned.

To limit ourselves to the clearest instance of willed creation in human experience, the formation of character, something new comes into being, and in two senses: the character-trait might never have come into the world without willed purpose; and what was given is directed into new channels, directions or formations never known before or reached in a particular personality. Such creative change is not mechanical change involving new juxtaposition of pre-existing parts; nor is it emanation or the evolution of potential. It is the bringing into being of something which, *once created, may be interpreted* to be the bringing together of parts at some points, and evolution at others. But did we actually find this in human experience, or are we foisting upon human experience analyses drawn from the physical and biological world, analogies that may well be questioned in the light of what seems to take place there?

For if we stay close to what takes place in willing, something envisioned as required and possible in a situation that the person himself did not choose *is* chosen by the person and willed. In human experience we may build from what we are, actual and potential, but we don't even know what the potential of the actual is until a new stride is made – after which we study the “new order” that was brought into being. A person's character at every stage in his development is a new fact in the horizon of his life.

In sum, a good or bad man – be he a Socrates, a Jesus, a Gandhi, a Hitler, or the heroes and criminals of everyday life – is a creation; each person, in part, creates himself – literally. Such persons show what man can become only because by firm efforts they raise structures that take them beyond the foundations and the raw materials given them. After they create their particular new forms of life, we are prone to talk about these new stretches of thought, and aesthetic, moral, and religious sensitivity as law-ful, as if they were just waiting to be realized. In fact they probably were not “hidden;” they simply did not exist, at least in the specific form in which we now see them. Such creations are not arbitrary because they were built in the context of a pre-existing situation; but they were not built “out of” it, as far as we actually know. Yet they *became*, they came *into being* because of an effort that moved

whatever did exist to become new in form, quality, and pattern.

I am trying to get at a fact that defies articulation into any of the usual forms of intelligibility, or what Tillich has well called the technical reason. We claim to understand the ticking of a watch by taking it apart, seeing how each part functions, and then putting it back again. We claim to understand the growth of a good man by showing how this good man is a fulfillment of past and present potential; that is, rather, that such analysis and description does not do full justice to what actually happens in willing a character into being. I am urging that in the very nature of our experience and development of character, insofar as it is willed, we have a stark, brute kind of event that defies analysis into logical connection, temporal connection, mechanical connection, and even telic connection of the sort exhibited at the biological level. In the creative event to which I have been pointing, something comes into being because of willed effort that we *say* must have been "there" potentially, but this is *ex post facto*, only after the creative event has taken place. This fact, I think, needs more attention than it has gotten in the past. For as far as we know in such instances, the reach actually exceeds the grasp, and we need to be warned about explaining the *reached* as a "lawful" development from a latent past. At least it is a large assumption that may well need to be given up in the light of what we actually experience.

Why not simply hold to what is given, the fact of creation as being the outright addition, increase, positing, of something new that is "like" the old, but not the mere developing of the old? The good man is, if you will, the man generated, not simply *regenerated*; the new man is built not *on* the old man, but with the old man taken into account. There are, no doubt, limits to creation, but this is no reason for supposing that Socrates' taking the hemlock in the spirit in which he took it, is not a new fact in his life, and in the history of the world. *It is related, but nevertheless created*; once created we can look and often we discover the filament with the past. But the filament now there *is* there because it too was created. It is the product of willing by a being who knows not whether his *fiat* will realize his goal and then finds that it did! This is freedom; this is creation in human experience, at the very core of what we hold precious in life, moral achievement.

V

Does this analysis of human freedom and creativity afford any light at all on the problem of God as Creator? I am referring to the theistic hypothesis that God is a creator *ex nihilo*, a doctrine that has been so difficult to understand that great minds have preferred metaphysical monism or absolutism to theism.

For the purpose of this paper, I set aside the question of the ontic relation of the physical and biological realms to God, and limit myself to the question whether a doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, once carefully defined and once its theoretical intent is clear, is as unintelligible as critics have held it to be. But why, in essence, has such a supposedly unintelligible doctrine as *creatio ex nihilo* been advanced? The main ground for holding that God creates *ex nihilo* is to emphasize the fact that God has delegated freedom to persons, that persons are not ontologically part of God, however close their interaction with him may be, and however intimate their dependence upon him for quality in their lives. The doctrine is intended to interpret the fact that persons are free within limits, that no one else, including God, can be responsible for their own free activity. God as creator is responsible for their being free; but since the order of Nature's structures depends essentially on Him and not upon man, God is responsible for the course that consequences of man's freedom take.

But if men are free in this sense, they cannot be foci, or centers of God's center, or the energizing of His being, however their interaction with each other and with God be conceived. The whole metaphysical model of persons as modes of the divine Whole, as centers of a complex Being, must be given up. For this model ultimately carries agency in all of its possible and actual directions back to Being as the One Source of all that is. In place of this model of part-whole, substitute the model of purposers-Purposer, that is, a moral system, an orchestra, if you will, in which finite purposers, rooted indeed in an interactive network they themselves do not create, are free to cooperate with the creator-conductor, and to choose within limits different channels for effectively expressing their freedom. However, the importance is not so much in the model but in the metaphysical conception that it seems to me it seeks to develop. For what is involved in saying that persons are not part of God is that in some sense they are beings that God added and adds to all that is. Persons are no part of, nor do they emanate from,

the rich effulgence of his being. *They are independent, but not self-created, agencies.*

It is this fact, then, that free persons are not God, that *creatio ex nihilo* stipulates. The doctrine does not mean that God *takes nothing* (little bits of nothing, as one of my students said) and makes something out of it. Impossible, no doubt, to imagine, or even to conceive in purely logical terms, the doctrine does mean that where earlier there had been non-existence (no Socrates), there then appeared Socrates, a new being – never *as such* existent before he was born – and that he took a hand in his own creation in relation to God, as he formed the character and personality that took the hemlock.

But the question persists: Whence would such sheer *novelty*, such addition to all there is and has been, come? I confess I have no answer if I take the usual lines of trying to imagine *how* a Socrates came into being from an earlier stage in which, even granting him being in the mind of God, he simply was not the existent that made his Apology for philosophizing before the Athenian judges in 399 B.C. All I know is that if I take the evidence at hand, a new fact, a different quality of existence, came into being, developed, chose to die for his convictions that he should obey God and yet not undermine the state or leave Athens for Beotia.

If I am told that this fact was already among the possibilities in God's mind, I would grant it. But I would still urge that what still defies imagination and logical conception is the *how* of transforming that possibility into actual existence. In other words, I grant that the *creatio ex nihilo*, of Socrates or anything else, cannot be explained if we demand that explanation must involve explaining *how* any sheer novelty can be added to what already is, if we use as a pattern of explanation either mechanical know-how or logical implication. Logical implication simply will not do, for finite freedom cannot be implied totally by a network of logical relationships. And mechanical know-how is simply not forth-coming when the problem is to account for the kind of novelty that is more than the assembling of parts into a new combination.

VI

I am suggesting that in a doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* we have cornered an ultimate fact of being that must be the basis for other explanation but is itself not explicable. And this fact of existence is not

at odds with human experience, and especially that of forming character. For this reason we must turn to the claim that theists themselves have been, I hold, too ready to grant. Nowhere in experience, it has been claimed, do we have an instance of *creatio ex nihilo*. All human creation, for example, deals with materials already at hand, and this surely does not apply to *creatio ex nihilo* which by definition means that God has no Platonic co-eternal stuff, for example, which he persuades to take on desired form. Theists have been wont to argue that in this instance it should be understandable that man, the created, should not find in himself or the created world empirical ground for such a doctrine as *creatio ex nihilo*.

But this is the very point I am challenging, and which, hopefully, the earlier analysis of the concrete meaning of freedom supports. For if human freedom is at all like what we have analyzed, it does involve adding qualities and dimensions to personality that simply were not there, and would not be there now, apart from the free act. Similarly, *creatio ex nihilo* on the part of God need not involve, I suggest, anything essentially different from what is given in our own experience, although there are differences of details beyond human imagination and conception. Why do I say this?

Because it seems to me that whenever, anywhere, there is addition of novelty, when a real difference appears, the problem of *creatio ex nihilo* is on our hand – if it is a problem at all. But I also suggest that it is a problem only if the philosopher insists on trying to explain how novelty comes into being instead of conforming his theory of reality to what is given in experience. Whether God creates, or finite persons create, there is added to what is already present. Specifically, for God to create free, finite persons is for him to bring into being, in connection with what is given in his own being, something that could not come into being, and would not come into being, without his effort. Granted that God not only creates new beings but sustains them in a network of relations hidden from our knowledge, can there be any ontological difference in the act of creation? It matters not what the *how* of creation is, for what is involved, whatever the *how*, is the novelty resulting. And for this our own acts of will, in bringing new dualities into being in our own life, provide the nearest and perhaps the best example we have in experience of what it means to say *creatio ex nihilo* (be it human or divine). At least, this is the suggestion here.

Can it be that in our thinking about this whole matter of creation we have been more affected than we realized by an understandable fear –

from which a more complete and radical empiricism could save us? This theoretical fear is represented in the presumably profound epigram, *ex nihilo, nihil fit*. All that this means is that nothing is nothing, and nobody can make something out of it. But the contention here is not that anyone, God or man, makes something *out* of nothing! In the world of our experience new qualities and existents come into being that are not reducible to recombinations of the old; and some things go out of being whatever residuals are left. For these data there is no clearer statement than one that points up the fact that there is something added where there earlier was nothing; that there is nothing where there earlier was something.

This fear would be justified, did we mean that in the beginning there was nothing, nothing, nothing, and then, behold, one day something came into being. What I actually experience, to take my paradigm, is that I, a person, exist and that I can, at certain points at least, not merely alter but bring into being what was not in being until my effort made it possible. Creation presupposes some existent; and that existent as agent, analogously, the existent God, did not come from nothing, and He does not bring something into being out of nothing. Thus, on the cosmic scale, when we say, "In the beginning, God," we are saying that a certain kind of self-existent Being was able to bring into being, create, new beings; He himself did not come from nothing, and He made nothing *from* nothing; He created – period! *In a word, creating is a kind of change produced by a kind of being who pre-exists his creative act and is co-existent with his creative act, that is, maintaining his own identity as well as sustaining the creative process toward its goal, and to its goal when he is successful.*

If we follow all of the actual data before us, therefore, and keep the creator and the creative activity related to each other, we shall find that our fears are ungrounded so far as what is given in experience is concerned. A finite person may himself die in the midst of creating, but the cosmic Person, as here conceived, is self-existent and continuous with all creativity, his own and that delegated (to human beings). In short, what is experientially grounded is the assertion that there is no creation where there is no structure able to create some sort of order, and on this note we can turn to the relation of order and creativity.

VII

It is unempirical I have urged, to separate the creative act from the existential context in which it lives. And it has been argued that human creativity, while adding to what is (a) works in relation to the matrix of what is given up to the creative moment, and (b) is affected by the kind of opportunities and obstacles constituting the matrix. Put it this way: *there is always some structure, some order of being, as the necessary, although not sufficient, ground of creativity.* Let us illustrate at the human level.

The sensing, remembering, thinking, feeling, wanting, oughting, and appreciating of a finite person – each of these activities has a structure and order of its own that constitutes the inner, continuing base for a person's creativity. But though necessary, each is not the sufficient support for the creative act itself. A person wills within the structure of abilities and dispositions their flexibility allows; and he wills in an environment, social and physical, that has its own structures and possibilities of which his creative act must take account.

If, for example, I say: "I will forgive another person so that he and I can participate in a fellowship that neither of us knew before," I find myself confronting emotional dispositions and traits both in myself and in the other persons that will, according to their own order, offer obstacles and opportunities with which my will to forgive must work. But my will to forgive does not "emerge" or "emanate" from my own or their orders of ability or disposition. To the extent that I succeed in being forgiving, and the other persons cooperate in the formation of the new fellowship, to the extent we are creatively willing into being a *new order*.

If this is true, we may say that to be creative, whether the act eventuate in good or evil, is to begin to build another order that bears some relation to the old order. The order may be short-lived and may not be able to resist pressures from its surrounding world. In the instance at hand, for example, my enemy and I may find in the initial stages of our new relation that hostilities are greater than anticipated, and even insuperable. Creativity, in other words, is initiated within a structure of order, a personal being, who remains to follow through as he confronts other orders of being, as they will to build a kind of stability that was not there before. No order, no freedom; no structures, no creativity. No unified personal structure, finite or divine, no freedom, no cre-

ativity. This means that our actual product of creativity or existence will always be a joint-product of what has been and now is.

We need always to keep in mind that in human experience when we create we never create what bears no relation at all to what already is. For example, in thinking we cannot create a logic that allows us to disregard consistency; and in emoting, we create no kind of emotion totally different from familiar kinds – we do create another emotional quality. Hence, there is little actual ground for fear lest the creative freedom we have will create discontinuities in the structural givens of our lives.

On the other hand, if we do insist on no structural discontinuity with the past, does this justify the contention that what we have called creation is certainly not sheer novelty of the kind designated by “*ex nihilo*”? No. For to be continuous does not mean that there is no creation but only that what is created has characteristics in common with what has already occurred. The fact again seems to be that while we never know in advance exactly how much the creative process will actually accomplish, we discover, once the creative act has accomplished its purpose or any part of it, that we can often trace some continuity between the new accomplishment and the old facts! What the fact of continuity proves is not that there is no creation, but that such creation at least, is related to some order already established. And the fact of continuity can also be understood ultimately in terms of some purpose that is being worked out in and through events that are creative.

VIII

Finally, does this notion that creativity involves the addition of something new, without disregarding the order already established, help us to understand *creatio ex nihilo* at the divine level?

Broadly speaking, it seems to me to suggest that living or organic processes are not reducible completely to inorganic events. The reader may not be inclined to grant this, and, with such discoveries as DNA in mind, prefer to think of the living as another level of the physical. But this disagreement is of no real significance at this point, provided the difference between what goes on in a stone, a starfish, a bone, and the frontal lobe of a brain are seen as real differences. Philosophical analysis here must be impressed not only by the broad differences between the inorganic and the organic, but by different classifications of entities within each one. If the fact is that different types of entities have

properties that others do not have, the philosopher may well ask how it is that such different beings constitute an order of physical nature even before he faces the question of the addition of life to a physical realm. In any case, that there are differences along with similarity or continuity is the basic fact for a theist to keep in mind as he considers what is meant by the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*. If certain realms of being seem to be the necessary but not sufficient ground for new developments we seem to have an orderly world that is at the same time a world of change in which some changes are creations. There is nothing here certainly to keep a theist from holding that the cosmic Person has the kind of unified structure that can create new orders of being, first in relation to his own nature and possibilities, and then in relation to created actualities and possibilities.⁶ For the main thesis is that to talk about God creating the world, *ex nihilo*, is to talk about a Being whose complex, unified nature it is to be creative also, creative in relations to his own given ontic structure. The very fact that, once the creative activity has taken place, it can be seen as a relatively continuous order of change, itself testifies to the fact that, as Creator, God is not arbitrary in the vicious sense, but creates with a purpose in view and in relation to givens of his own nature, and then is *also* affected by the events in which his Creator-creatures are involved.

We draw our argument to a close, reminding ourselves of Plato's warning that in ontological matters we are in the realm of the probable only. God is the kind of unified being who, in creating, is himself involved in and affected by the additions (and subtractions) he makes, although this continuity-in-novelty seems clearly to indicate that they do not exhaust his nature in either change or creation. For to be a creator, as human experience indicates, is to be a creator within a certain structure that maintains itself in and through the creations that reflect the structure. God as a Person, as Creator, is non-changing. But *what* he creates, the quality of his own experience, will be affected by, but not controlled by, the created world.

Startling as such a view of God and man may be, a more basic intention is involved: we must stop thinking of change and creativity

⁶ On other metaphysical grounds I would prefer the hypothesis that what we know as the space-time world of sense-perception is integral to the activity of God, and not "outsie" of His being. But such a personalistic, idealistic, view of the space-time world aside, I would urge in any case that the space-time world, insofar as it manifests related order of change, may well be expressing the purpose of God's inner nature, including his capacity to create again. And for God to create either for an independent space-time world, or to be involved in the graded, orderly interrelated levels of changes as aspects of his own being is for our purposes here not critical.

against a background of permanence. *Creativity-and-Unity, Creativity-in-Unity, here is the ontological fact that forever marries creativity and continuity.* Instead of wondering how anything can be added to all there is *ex nihilo*, we must face the category of categories – that reality is a Creative Order, yes, analagous to, but not reducible to, the creative order exhibited in the finite person. If we conceive of God as the Creator Person – both person and creator at once – what fact of existence, in the scientific, moral, aesthetic, or religious realm have we actually disregarded?

OTHER PERSONS, OTHER THINGS

RICHARD HOCKING

1. A Western perplexity threatening philosophical coherence

In the philosophical dialogue between East and West which is proceeding nowadays with unparalleled vigor, it is proper to admit to a stubborn Western perplexity having to do with the opposition between persons and things. In much of Western thought this opposition is intensified to a greater degree than is the case in Buddhist phenomenism, Vedānta monism or Confucianism. The perplexity is a reflective one which seems, in the practical course of life, artificial and finely drawn. Yet it is pressed upon us in one guise or another by the intellectual situation of heightened duality in which the Western world finds itself and has found itself especially since the scientific revolution and the time of Descartes.

Much of our philosophical thinking about persons at present takes the form of doctrines concerning freedom in human history. Major contributions to this way of thinking about persons come from the existential philosophers in whose writings we find a rich empirical exploration of subjectivity, alienation, encounter, exploitation, absurdity, joy, despair. These terms have become familiar in the climate of a renewed philosophical anthropology.

Meanwhile, scientific thinking about the impersonal order of nature, and about the human animal as an ingredient in the objectivity of nature, knows little or nothing of the existential categories. Scientific thinking, especially since the scientific revolution, is more at home in dealing with the world of things than it is with the existential analysis of human history.

Here are two perspectives of thought within the Western world which pull apart, each maintaining its own mode of autonomy, each claiming its own "ontological weight" (I borrow Marcel's term) in the sense of intending to disclose a real structure. Our thinking about

persons and things is threatened with incoherence. Attempts to mitigate the difficulties often take two forms. In one form, the perspective of history is reduced to the status of mere handmaiden to science; in the other form, the perspective of science is reinterpreted as simply an intellectual thread running through human history. The price of such peace measures is too high in that the ontological claims of one or the other of these perspectives are denied. Is there not a more coherent way to say "both-and" to the historical-existential perspective with its adequacy to the experience of persons and the scientific perspective with its adequacy to the experience of things, acknowledging the ontological claims of both?

For the present purpose let us focus on one element in the experienced opposition between persons and things, namely the sense of the presence of other persons. This is a crucial factor if only because the analysis of it clarifies issues which divide monadic doctrines from existential doctrines of the person. It is one which has not been subjected to close categorial analysis before the present century. In this third quarter of the century, the accumulation of philosophical work on this particular factor which is now available invites appraisal. The presence of other persons is a fact at once utterly familiar and a profound mystery. Consider how readily we articulate the contrast between the "thou" of encountered other subjectivity and the "it" of scientific objectivity in terms other than scientific. Persons are ends as well as means; things are means on occasion, but never ends, we say. A Kantian style persists in the midst of current philosophical diversity simply by reason of its experiential accuracy.

2. *A mode of recovering coherence through a philosophical reversal*

This part of the general perplexity, the part having to do with the presence of other persons, has persisted under a veil. In modern Western thought the inhibitions to an adequate categorial analysis are familiar enough. The Cartesian line of thought could do justice to an intuition of monadic solitude, but not to the experience of other persons. The classically empirical line of thought could hardly advance beyond honest Hume's difficulty about finding even the self-identical person, let alone the encountered other person. And in the critical tradition, we are instructed to retreat to the logical ground of judging that the free individual person is a practical postulate in one's own case, with little categorial basis for the postulation of other persons. It is little wonder that the analysis of the presence of other persons was delayed. Not until

the comparatively recent intensification of the opposition of history and nature was well established could the perplexity be unveiled and analysis proceed. When acknowledged at all as a problem for reflection, it was at first faced in a manner that was either too romantic (e.g. Fichte) or too scientific (e.g. Comte). The scientific leaning was bound to lead to the attempt to analyze the experience of other persons as a special, and dependent, case of scientific objectivity. Given the prestige of science, this approach had priority. The existential stress on history and the historical categories has come about as a late corrective, largely as a result of the exigencies of twentieth century experience.

When a persistent perplexity such as this one is seen to threaten coherence of thought in the light of one approach, it may happen that a reversal of approach will reinstate coherence and overcome the perplexity.

Something of this sort of philosophical reversal is illustrated by Kant's brief "*Widerlegung des Idealismus*" in his first critique. Kant undertakes a refutation of idealism which, in the outcome, indirectly reinstates a more coherent idealism. He rejects the prevalent thesis of the idealisms which he refutes (especially those of Descartes and Berkeley) that mind is better known than objective things, that mind is known immediately and things only mediately. He asserts the precise opposite, that things are known immediately, and mind (insofar as it is empirically known) is known mediately. He makes the empirical case that we come to our knowledge of mind by way of our encounter with things. It is "outer experience" which is really immediate, whereas inner experience is possible only by way of outer experience. Since the context of this philosophical reversal is the thought-grounded frame of the categories as "deduced," Kant has effectively reinstated a transcendently idealistic type of coherence in the experience of mind and of things in a necessary polarity.

By an analogous turn-around, in the spirit of the Kantian *Widerlegung*, there is warrant for laying aside the already familiar attempt to fit the experience of other persons into the perspective of scientific objectivity, since this attempt has repeatedly led to the rejection of the existential immediacy of other persons and to the conclusion that the whole historical perspective on persons stands in no categorial connection with the perspective of scientific objectivity. The reverse procedure would start, instead, with the existential immediacy of other persons as the ground of human history and its categories, and would explore the possibility that, in this context, the ontological claims of

both the perspective of history and the perspective of scientific objectivity could be sustained in a necessary polarity. Within such a categorial frame one could claim to reestablish a threatened philosophical coherence.

3. *Evidences of such a philosophical reversal in progress in recent Western thought*

In the past two generations a number of discussions of the experience of other persons have appeared in the most diverse philosophical contexts and in a number of Western countries. This phenomenon suggests a widespread preoccupation with this special problem, not always consciously shared. In England, writings of John Wisdom, Strawson and A. J. Ayer come to mind; in the United States, those of C. S. Peirce, Royce and Hocking; in Germany, those of Husserl, Scheler and Heidegger; and in France, those of Marcel and Sartre. There are distinct lines of convergence in some of these representative discussions. In general, they all exhibit the enriched ("radical," "wider") empiricism which marks philosophical work in our day.

In order to show that the suggested philosophical reversal is indeed in progress, it is enlightening not only to identify very briefly some of the positions held by these thinkers with regard to the presence of other persons, but also to arrange these positions in a sort of spectrum with the more abstractly scientific (objective) positions at one extreme and the more concrete, dialectically historical (existential) positions at the other. (This mode of arrangement, of course, involves a disregard of chronology).

In John Wisdom's book, *Other Minds*, we find a deal of intricate discussion of the states of another mind after the analogy of a house across the street where the blinds are drawn, whence issue the sounds of a party. One is unable to crash in to see what is up. As this analogy suggests, the comprehension of other persons is at best indirect and tentative. The desiderata of scientific objectivity are to be sought; but they are only precariously to be attained.

In a similarly guarded manner, A. J. Ayer, in his essay on "The Concept of a Person," argues for a "weak analogy" as the logical form of knowing other persons. His position is intended to be positively scientific.

In Husserl's phenomenological study, *Cartesian Meditations*, we find a fifth and concluding meditation on "monadological intersubjectivity" in which the stress is upon the *a priori*, and yet given, "monad com-

munity" (no less!), and upon the distinctive "sharing of a world" by a multitude of monads. The juxtaposition of monadic privacy and the publicity of the world is indeed sharply presented, though without an experiential resolution of the difficulties involved. This position represents a departure from the uncertainties of John Wisdom and A. J. Ayer since it acknowledges a factor of phenomenological certitude. Scheler's work, *The Essence and Form of Sympathy*, furnishes an enrichment of this position, particularly in the chapters which are descriptive of the *Fremderfahrung*, the experience of another person, and other I. The phenomenological orientation is more scientific than historical, as is required by the discipline of the *Wesensschau*.

C. S. Peirce's thought, with its sustained emphasis on a concretely evolutionary cosmology, includes as an aspect of his theory of scientific induction the conception of the scientific community of interpretation, a community of inquiring scientific persons, as itself evolving within an evolving natural world of things. The presence of other persons in the context of interpretation is made an explicit concern. He writes of a resulting "special adaptation of the mind to the universe so that we are more apt to make true theories than we otherwise should do." ¹ Peirce's characteristic reliance on a calculus of chances carries with it its own *a priori* factors. The temporal dimension of evolution comes strongly to the fore, though not with full recognition of the categories of human history.

In Strawson's discussion of persons in his book, *Individuals*, we find such dialectical affirmations as these. "There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others. The recognition of the necessary polar relation of person to other person becomes explicit." "We could not talk to one another about the private if we could not talk to one another about the public." "The topic of mind does not divide into unconnected subjects." Here is a clear step beyond both the monadism of Husserl and the weak analogy of A. J. Ayer. (In fact, Ayer complains that Strawson does not allow the argument from analogy to start). The internal relatedness of persons within a categorial frame is affirmed as a disclosure of descriptive metaphysics.

Heidegger, in *Being and Time, Part I*, pursuing "fundamental ontology," makes the existential, historical character of persons his central theme, and in so doing he emphasizes a basic and existential kind

¹ Buchler, *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, p. 211.

of intersubjectivity as an immediate experience. His descriptive explorations of "being-in-the-world-with-others," "the with-world," "being-with," "being-there-with-others" are characteristic of an existential thinker. He discerns the principle that being-with-others is definitive of every single person.

Sartre devotes Part III of *Being and Nothingness* to "being to others" (*le pour-autrui*). His thought is thoroughly existential in structure. He explores the situation of being an embodied person. His chapter on "the look" (*le regard*) has its expected astringent quality. The presence of another person is judged a hostility, as creating a situation in which one may be made a thing of. Sartre's position is ontological, concrete, historical. There is an intimated sense of organic solidarity in the community of persons, the working out of which is to be found in his *Critique of Dialectical Reason*. It is clear that, in Sartre's judgment, the existence and presence of others cannot be a probability merely, but is a dialectical necessity.

In *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, Part IV, W. E. Hocking explores and clarifies the "experience of not being alone in knowing the world," especially in knowing the world of impersonal things. The initial and central datum, the "concrete *a priori*," inseparable from the sense that nature is a common world, is "the original experience of the presence of God in the world." Here also the break with monadism is decisive. The divine presence in nature furnishes the condition for all fluctuating human experience of the presence of finite other persons.

The explorations by Marcel of the central experience of "presence" likewise refer to the immediacies in the relations of person to person. His Socratic journey of reflections beyond scientific objectivity comes into the light of the divine presence. More coherently than Sartre he explores also the person-threatening situations of "exigence," those negative situations dominated by the sense of the loss of presence of other persons. In Marcel's thought, concreteness and the dialectical sense of an embodied history are essential, not accident.²

In approaching this end of the spectrum one notes that the increasingly shared emphasis is on an ontological necessity involved in the sense of the presence of other persons and on a certain dialectical character of the history of personal encounter. Other persons are not fitted into the perspective of scientific objectivity as inferred entities. The principle of concreteness is exhibited in the immediate experience of other persons. The pertinence of this principle to a coherent cosmology and

² Cf. esp. *Being and Having* and *Creative Fidelity*.

doctrine of the entire polarity of persons and things is announced. The philosophical reversal mentioned above as a mode of recovering coherence is evidently in progress.

4. *A step toward the completion of the philosophical reversal*

With the encouragement of this evidence that a recovery of coherence is in progress, where the polarity of persons and things is concerned, consider the following reflections which are intended to carry forward certain insights of existential thought to the point where they may be recognized as principles both of history and of cosmology. In particular, the intention is to explore a dialectic of mutual support between existential thinking and risk-taking experimental science of nature.³

1. Existential thinkers, in their characterizations of the human individual, emphasize both inwardness and commitment to a shared situation, and not either apart from the other. The familiar stress on subjectivity, including Kierkegaard's description of "the incognito," is always in situations with others so that the polarity of the private and the public is sustained. This gives to the existential exploration its Socratic, dialectical, as a form of indirect communication. A monadic interpretation of the individual person is here simply out of place. The very term "Existenz" means "being committed to a situation," this being understood to include as a matter of ontological necessity both other persons and a shared world. Subjectivity of focus and communal involvement are not disjoined. And yet a certain autonomy of inwardness is essential to the account.

The mathematical conception of a group, with its axiom of closure, can lend clarity to this account of Existenz. The closure of a group means, formally, that the connections among the elements of the group, through its defining operation, preserve a certain self-containedness while at the same time not precluding alternative connections involving these and other elements in a different group. In application to our case, the chain of inner actions in the life of a person preserves an historical self-containedness as a group of actions which is independent of the surrounding world of objective things disclosed to science, and this without prejudice to the intimate polarity of "inwardness" and "being situated with others in a shared world." Just as Whitehead used the mathematical notion of closure to affirm that "nature is closed to

³ My grateful debt to Part IV of W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience* will be apparent.

mind" in a sense required by scientific objectivity, so here, in a reverse sense, one may use the notion of closure to affirm that existential inwardness is closed to nature in a sense required by existential history. Thus, on the one hand, there is no compromising the autonomy of inwardness, and on the other hand no disjunction (or "bifurcation") of personal life and natural process.

2. This theme of existential concreteness carries with it a sense of intimacy with matter, one might even say a non-Marxian historical materiality. The action whereby a person's inner life is committed to a shared situation involves a physical bodying forth of this action in the public domain of the world of things. If we recall John Wisdom's imagery, this is by no means the case of houses across the street from each other with blinds drawn to shield secret lives. Rather it is a meeting of neighbors before their houses on the public street itself. One who chooses privacy returns indoors after publicly signifying his intention to do so. Marcel's thesis that "I am my body" is far from being a declaration of scientific reduction of person to thing. Rather it is the epiphany of a mystery wherein the inwardness of the person is both an autonomy and "not-other" than the body of which one says "I am my body." Marcel writes: "In asserting 'I am my body' one is actually making a negative judgment: 'It is neither true nor meaningful to assert that I am other than my body;! ...'" ⁴

3. Thus far, we are generally familiar with the existential exploration of inwardness, embodiment and situation as historical categories. The account is in danger, however, of passing over in silence a premise involved in the emphasis on embodiment as the ground of historical concreteness. Without the cosmological acknowledgment of the whole impersonal world of things – the domain of scientific objectivity – the existential philosophy of the concrete falters. Physical nature provides the minimum precondition of the physical presence of person to person. "Impersonal nature as shared" is a necessary factor in the existential conception of "situation."

We are reminded that existential thinkers are sometimes chided with being too indifferent to the world of things as disclosed by the sciences. And yet their concern with an empirically adequate, hence historically concrete, doctrine of persons comes sooner or later face to face with the impersonal order of things as an essential constituent of the account. It seems clear that Marcel's "I am my body" and Sartre's "The body is the instrument which I am" begin to establish the

⁴ *Creative Fidelity*, p. 19.

strongest sort of tie with nature as that same world of things with which scientific objectivity is concerned.

4. But once such a beginning has been made, where does one find a stopping place? The process of extrapolation suggests that the nearer environment, and by degrees the further and further environment, not just of other persons (human and any other the cosmos may nourish) but the ever widening physical environment as well, all become continuous shared extensions of our bodies and histories. Why may not Marcel's "not-other," as signifying a mystery in the relation of inwardness and embodiment, grow beyond "my body" to the whole extent of the world? Any stopping part way seems open to challenge as arbitrary. Sartre puts the issue (remembering that his term "for-itself" means personal inwardness): "As such the body is not distinct from the situation of the for-itself, since for the for-itself, to exist and to be situated are one and the same; on the other hand, the body is identified with the whole world inasmuch as the world is the total situation of the for-itself and the measure of its existence." This remarkable statement equates "world" with "situation." This can only imply a thoroughgoing person-centering of the whole cosmos. The same world which is the impersonal, neutral, constant, objective order of physical things is likewise the concrete minimum situation wherein all persons share. The union of the impersonal and the public is too striking to overlook.

5. With this extrapolation a new factor presses for consideration. The impersonal world of things, with its ontological self-containedness (in the sense of Whitehead's group-theory conception that "nature is closed to mind") is what it is beyond any endurance or extinction of human kind and in vast or minute invariance in relation to human creativity and history. To say of this unbounded and self-containedly impersonal world of things that it is the total situation of human persons is to affirm that it actually testifies to the presence of another person beyond human finitude. The world as situation is the divine presence making itself felt, at the very least as unbounded unit. This same whole world of things can be our total situation only as a gift, for our limited creative powers could not bring this result about.

A kindred conception of the divine presence as sensed in the unbounded unity of the world of things is to be traced in some of the cosmological insights of Newton and of a line of predecessors running back to Nicholas of Cusa and perhaps to Robert Grosseteste.⁵

How could one withdraw from this outcome? To attempt to do so

⁵ Cf. Koyré, *From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe*.

would require one or another of two difficult denials. Either one would deny that the world of things is self-containedly impersonal. But this is to deny the "ontological weight" which attaches fundamentally to scientific objectivity. Or one would deny that the world of things is wholly public (this shared character being involved in the conception of the world as "total situation" for persons). But the public character of the whole world of things is also one of the fundamentals of scientific objectivity; it is wholly so or not at all. The conclusion would appear to be that the same impersonal public-ness of the world of things which is fundamental for the perspective of scientific objectivity is likewise fundamental for the perspective of existential history. Expressed in an alternative way, the categorial frame which sustains both scientific objectivity and existential history in dialectical opposition discloses also that each of these perspectives requires the self-contained intensification of the other for its own perfection. The Western perplexity from which we started thus becomes, in the light of our philosophical reversal, a situation of dialectical coherence, once the mystery of the presence of other persons is seen to be the central experience.

6

THE CONCEPT OF RATIONAL ANIMAL

ALBUREY CASTELL

I

I would like to begin by raising a question, but the question I have in mind requires some sort of launching-pad. I therefore ask you to bear with me while I provide my question with the context which I think it requires. To this end I shall quote an abridged passage from the late Professor Bode's book, *Conflicting Psychologies of Learning*. In this passage Professor Bode is setting forth a certain belief about human behavior. He is not asserting the belief, but formulating it for those who do or would assert it. With that reservation in mind, let me read what he says. It is as follows:

There is no significant difference between the behavior of a human being and the behavior of a machine. Such differences as we find are differences of complexity. They are the sort of differences that we find when we compare a wheelbarrow and an automobile. Man credits himself with purpose, or intentions, but these are all reducible to principles of mechanism. Man is a machine . . . This conclusion is repugnant to common sense . . . However, what is called common sense may be nothing more than a name for prejudices to which we have become accustomed . . . Consequently it behooves us to give careful consideration to the contention that all human behavior is reducible to terms of mechanism . . . What is meant by mechanism or mechanical behavior? Mechanism means the absence of purpose. To say that behavior is mechanical is to say that no foresight or aim figures in the result. A cyclone, for example, roots up trees, but the movements of the air currents do not specifically arrange or adapt themselves *so as to* uproot trees. The wind just blows, and this is bad for trees if they happen to be in the way. Dynamite will likewise uproot trees, but if there is any purpose involved, the purpose lies in the man who placed the dynamite at the root of the tree. The dynamite itself is as innocent of purpose as the cyclone. The question is whether the behavior of the man in placing the dynamite where it will blow up the tree is the same sort of behavior as that of the dynamite or the cyclone. Common sense says that the man did it "on purpose," and that his behavior is therefore different from the behavior of the cyclone. But if the "purpose" is just a form of motion, this view is a mistake . . . Scientists in general are suspicious of words like "purpose." To use a sporting term, they have become "gun-shy," and so they

stick to mechanistic interpretations . . . Human behavior is the same *kind* as any other behavior. A machine behaves as it does because it is constructed in a certain way out of certain materials. A human being behaves as *he* does because he is organized in a certain way and consists of protoplasm. The one is no more mechanical than the other. For practical purposes the term "mechanism" means simply that such concepts as "foresight" and "purpose" can be dispensed with . . . Such terms have no proper place in a psychological vocabulary. They are literary, not scientific. We can explain everything that a human being does in the same terms, or the same *sort* of terms, with which we explain the operations of a machine . . . human behavior has no relation to purpose; it is as mechanical as the behavior of a shot-gun or of creeping ivy.

You can sum up what Professor Bode has said in the following syllogism: Man is an animal. Animals are machines. Therefore man is a machine. This is an ancient argument, but in one form or another it is always with us: to understand human behavior you must understand mechanical behavior because all human behavior is mechanical. Man is nothing but a mechanism. Therefore all of his behavior is thoroughly mechanical. Now, given this conception I can return to the question with which I said I would like to begin. It is this: Which departments in a liberal arts college presuppose this conception of man as a condition for staying in business? Which departments would be forced into bankruptcy if this conception were rejected? The question can be extended: Which departments would have no stake in the matter one way or the other? Which departments would be forced into bankruptcy if they were required to presuppose this conception of man as a condition for staying in business?

I do not know how my colleagues would answer. I can imagine a spokesman for the departments of mathematics, physics and chemistry insisting that their subject-matter is neutral to this question, that it does not presuppose *any* conception of man. But beyond these three, how far can you go? What about biology, psychology, anthropology, and sociology? Would their answer be that their business is to find out what man is, not to presuppose what he is? What about departments of history, economics, political science, education, literature, philosophy, religion? I have learned that it is wise to count ten before telling members of other departments what conception of man their subject-matter presupposes, or whether it presupposes any at all. They prefer to do this kind of talking for themselves. All these things being so, I hesitate to answer my question for any department except my own. However, if I understand the sort of behaviors which a department of philosophy seeks to initiate and sustain in the minds of its customers, and seeks also to elucidate for them, then I would say that it would be

forced into bankruptcy if it presupposed, or were constrained to presuppose, the conception of man set forth in Professor Bode's words.

When I think of what goes on in such courses as logic, ethics, aesthetics, semantics, epistemology, metaphysics, I am at a loss to see how these enterprises would make even as much sense as they do, if you presuppose the conception of man set forth in Professor Bode's words. That conception bars the question "Why?" meaning to "For what purpose?" It would also bar the question "Why?" meaning "For what reason?" The questions, "What is your purpose in doing so and so?" and "What is your reason for doing so and so?" would not arise. Under these circumstances, how would those courses acquire or retain any content? If no one ever does anything on purpose or for a reason, what would you have to talk about in those courses? You can say that the philosophical disciplines do not presuppose the conception of man set forth in Professor Bode's words. You can go further, and say that if they do presuppose a conception of man, it is incompatible with that one.

II

I have drawn your attention to the mechanists. This is not the only mode of belittlement to be found among those who address themselves to the question, "What is man? What is it, to be human?" There are also the skeptics. They, in a different way, are no less deflationary. I recall coming upon the following passage in Professor C. A. Campbell's *Selfhood and Godhood*:

About the concept of "God" current philosophy has had little to say . . . Current philosophy has not much to say about the concept of "the world" . . . But what about the concept of "the soul"? On *this* topic current philosophy has unquestionably something very relevant to say . . . And the essence of what it has to say is, to put it bluntly, that the "soul" is sheer myth. For current philosophy, in its most characteristic British expressions, finds no room for a "self" in the sense of an identical, perduring spiritual being . . . Skepticism about the self is a matter of course for Positivists . . . A like skepticism is implicit in the Behaviorists and quasi-Behaviorists . . . The roots of skepticism about the soul or the self are wide and deep.

Professor Campbell does not share this skepticism. He is merely reporting on it. I do not think the British are unique in this skepticism about the self. I recently came upon a not untypical statement in an American journal. The author said:

The anti-novelist designates a certain locus in the field as "Maurice," through whom sensations, thoughts and impulses pass in enough of a pattern to remind us of that old consistency, the "I." But gone is the instantly recognizable self,

the familiar monitor, the volitional independent agent who is the doer, the thinker, the feeler . . . Where did they go? Wrong question. Did they ever exist, except as a cultural assumption reflected in a literary convention? . . . These loci in a field of stirrings constitute a parody of character . . . those basic illusions which underlie all others . . . the fictions of the ego and its "natural" conflicts with the "other" . . . The ego is a social artifact passed off as a necessity of human nature. This feeling about one's being, that "I" am a discrete thing consistent in duration, the knower, feeler, thinker, doer of "my" knowing, feeling, thinking and doing stands or falls with all the other social artifacts which both depend on the ego construct and in turn "prove" its existence . . .

I once went through a number of articles and books with a view to discovering what precisely the authors would tell me if I put to them the familiar question, "What am I, anyway?" The answers were many and varied. One was astringently skeptical: "I do not know what you are. I do not know what an 'I' is. You must either stop asking the question or be satisfied to remain in ignorance." But not all the answers were as clearcut as that. For example: (a) You are a bundle of perceptions. (b) You are a thought. Your thoughts do not require you to think them. They think themselves without you. (c) You are a group of cognita. (d) You are a set of relations among your thoughts, and between your thoughts and your body. (e) You are a grammatical fiction. (f) You are a grammatical mistake. (g) You are what you do. (h) You are like the smoke given off by a locomotive or the clank given off by a chain. (i) You are the exercizings of a set of capacities. These answers are by no means all, but they are typical.

The thing that stands out about them is that they are odd, antecedently improbable, and obscure. When people talk this way about me I come eventually to suspect that they are less intent on telling me what I am than in telling me what I am not. In this sense they are posting a warning. There is something which I *might* think I am; and they want to warn me at all costs not to think *that*. They know I am not *that*; or they know I could not be *that*; or they know there is no good reason to believe that I am or could be *that*.

What precisely is it that so many people are sure that they are *not*? When some one says that I am a cultural assumption reflected in a linguistic convention, what is he trying to tell me? I find it difficult to believe that he intends his statement to be taken literally. How does he know that that's what I am? If he doesn't know it, why does he believe it? If he doesn't believe it, why does he say it? In my less charitable moments I find myself suspecting that he neither knows it nor believes it; but only thinks he believes it. If this is so, he is mistaken about himself. That is unusual but not impossible. Or he may believe that there

are good reasons for what he says, and be mistaken at that point. Or, as I said, it may be that there is something which he is quite sure I am not; and, instead of setting forth his reasons for that negative conviction, he tells me that I am a cultural assumption reflected in a linguistic convention, knowing that if I accept this I will at least not believe that I am what he is quite sure I am not. In this sense he is posting a warning.

III

It is not easy to say precisely what it is that people are quite sure that they are not. It may not be any one single thing. *A* may be quite sure that he is not an *X*, whereas *B* may be quite sure that he is not a *Y*. Fortunately, for my purposes, it is not necessary to know what it is that a person is quite sure that he is *not*, because there is one thing which I am quite sure that he *is*. And I see no reason to suspect that I am alone in what I believe about him. If I tell him what he is, and he doubts or denies this, I would infer that he had not reflected sufficiently on his question or my answer. That is to say, by doubting or denying what I say about him, he may pose me a pedagogical problem but not a philosophical problem. If he wants to pose a philosophical problem, he will have to begin by admitting what I say about him and go on from there.

If any one puts the question, "What am I, anyway?" let him be told, "You are a rational animal." If he doubts or denies that, he opens himself to the question, "Which part is it that you doubt or deny? That you are rational, or that you are animal?" And to a further question, "What are your reasons for doubting or denying this?" However, if on being told that, whatever else he is or is not, he is a rational animal, he asked: "What is a rational animal? How do you spell out that notion?" the dialogue could continue. A rational animal is one that deals in reasons. He can and does reason, and he can be reasoned with. This is one of the most ancient and venerable notions in western philosophy, and it seems to me to be as viable today as it ever was. I think an account of the essentials of this notion moves along three lines.

(1) A rational animal has a body. His body is the locus of physiological processes; that is, processes studied by physiology. Does anyone doubt or deny that he has a body? Or that his body is the locus of physiological processes? Or that these processes are studied by physiology? If he does, he opens himself to the question: "What are your

reasons for doubting or denying these claims?" If he says he hasn't any reasons, and doesn't need any, he opens himself to the question "Why not? Why have you no reasons? Why don't you need any? Is there something about your doubt or denial that makes it self-authenticating?" He could, of course, plead ignorance as to what processes are physiological. But he could liquidate this ignorance by taking a course in physiology. If he refused to do this on the grounds that he doubts or denies what physiologists say, he opens himself to the question: "What reasons have you for doubting or denying what they say?"

(2) A rational animal has a psyche. His psyche is the locus of psychological processes, that is, processes studied by psychology. Examples of these would, I suppose, be sensations and emotions. Does anyone doubt that he has a psyche? Or that his psyche is the locus of psychological processes? Has he never been aware of such psychological processes as pain or jealousy or getting thirstier and thirstier? It is a mark of processes, whether physiological or psychological, that they happen to you. They are not activities which you perform. You are victim or beneficiary. For example: getting hungry is something that happens to you; whereas preparing food and eating it are activities which you perform.

(3) A rational animal, in addition to having a body and a psyche, *is* an agent. An agent is neither a locus nor a process. You come close to it if you say that an agent performs activities. Activities differ from processes in that they are performed whereas processes are not. An activity is something you do, whereas a process is something that happens. Activity is behavior performed by an agent, voluntarily, on purpose and for a reason. Some behavior is process; e.g., dehydration causing you to feel thirst; and thirst tempting you to drink. But some behavior is activity, e.g., getting a drink of water because you believe it will quench your thirst. Does anyone doubt or deny that some of his behavior is activity? Does he believe or assert that it is all process? If so, he opens himself to the question: "What reasons have you for this doubt or denial or belief or assertion?" If he refuses to take up the challenge, what is his reason for refusing? If he takes up the challenge he will be dealing in reasons.

The activities which rational animals perform are either theoretical or practical. This distinction, between theoretical activity and practical activity, is difficult to elucidate. Professor Dewey made a reputation for himself by advancing the theory that all activity is practical. By theoretical activity I mean activity productive of theory. That may not

roll the stone very far up the hill, but it points to something which is an essential ingredient in the concept of rational animal. Theoretical activity may be performed with reference to processes or with reference to activities. When a physician demands a theory about the digestive process before recommending a treatment for indigestion, he illustrates the behavior of a rational animal. But when a pedagogue demands a theory about the learning activity before recommending a teaching-procedure, he also illustrates the behavior of a rational animal.

It takes theoretical activity to elucidate the behavior of the brain and nervous system and the behavior of the solar system. But these two behaviors do not themselves embody theory. The physiologist is not trying to detect the theory upon which a brain and nervous system acts. The astronomer is not trying to detect the theory upon which the solar system acts. This limitation does not mean that physiologists and astronomers do not perform theoretical activities. They do. But it does mean that the behaviors about which they produce theories are radically different from behaviors which embody theories. You do not ask after the theory on which the brain acts; but you had better ask after the theory on which a brain surgeon acts; or an ignorant mind acts when it is engaged in liquidating its ignorance, in getting-to-know.

My point in all of this is that it is the mark of a rational animal to act on theory; and upon occasion to formulate or try to formulate the theory upon which it acts. You cannot say that the body or the solar system *is* a rational animal, because neither acts on theory, and a fortiori, neither formulates or tries to formulate the theory upon which it acts. But you can say that physiologists and astronomers are rational animals. Let there be no question about that. They manifest their rationality in their activity. They perform theoretical activity with reference to behaviors which do not embody theories. This marks them as rational animals. But they can, if they are reflectively inclined, perform theoretical activity with reference to behaviors which do embody theories, e.g., their own behavior as scientists. This doubly marks them as rational animals. You could, I suppose, use the phrase "reason in her more exalted mood" to describe this self-critical activity on the part of rational animals.

When someone asks: "What am I, anyway?" an excellent answer is: "You are a rational animal. You have a body which is the locus of physiological processes, and a psyche which is the locus of psychological processes. You are an agent which performs activities. Some of your activities are theoretical, that is, productive of theory. These

theories may refer to processes which happen, or to activities which you perform. If the former, you are not trying to formulate the theory embodied in an activity; if the latter, you are trying to formulate the theory embodied in an activity."

This may sound like a complicated answer to a simple question. But it may be that the question, "What am I, anyway?" is not simple; and anyway, this answer, no matter how complicated, has the advantage of being indefeasible. When I say that it is indefeasible, I do not mean that it is free of difficulties. I do not know any notion that can give rise to more questions, or to more difficult questions, than the notion of rational animal. But if a notion is indefeasible, if it is an indubitandum, you put up with the difficulties, no matter how many or how great. Though they exasperate you, you hold on.

To make this point clear I would invoke the notion of responsible doubts, questions and denials, by analogy to responsible beliefs and knowledge-claims. If a person says he knows something, he opens himself to the question, "How do you know that?" If he says he believes something, he opens himself to the question, "Why do you believe that?" In both cases we expect him to respond, to answer for himself. If he is not able to respond, not able to answer for himself, we say that, in the matter of his beliefs and knowledge-claims, he is irresponsible. This is a damaging criticism. If he has any respect for our judgment he will not lay himself open to such criticism. Now in talk about the self we are sensitive. We shrink from identifying ourselves with irresponsible belief or knowledge-claims. This is all to the good. When a person, speaking for himself, says he knows he was not created, or believes that he will not survive the death of his body, and gives good reasons for what he says, he commands intellectual respect. It may not end there, but at least a good beginning may be made there.

We have been disciplined to expect and to respect responsible beliefs and knowledge-claims. But I think we are less disciplined in respect to doubts, questions, and denials. We are more ready to doubt, to question to deny, particularly in talk about the self, without asking whether we are in a position to justify, to answer on behalf of, to produce good reasons for, our doubts or questions or denials. If a person asks you: "What am I, anyway?" and you tell him he is a rational animal, and he says, "I doubt that," or "I question that" or "I deny that," he is being irresponsible, unless he can give you good reasons for his doubting, questioning, or denying. But what is a good reason for doubting or denying that you have a body, or that you deal in reasons? If you tell

him that some of his behavior is theoretical, that is productive of theory, sometimes directed upon behavior which embodies no theory and sometimes upon behavior which embodies theory, and he says: "I doubt that" or "I question that" or "I deny that," he is being irresponsible unless he can give you good reasons for his doubting, questioning, or denying. But what is a good reason for doubting or denying that you seek to understand natural processes or rational activities? There may be other indefeasible answers to the question, "What am I?" If there are, so much the better; but whether there are, or are not, there is no good reason for rejecting this one. And if there are, they must be compatible with this one. There is nothing we know, and nothing we have good reasons for believing, which would constrain us to doubt, question or deny that we are rational animals.

IV

Given the question, "What am I, anyway?" "What is it to be human?" and the answer, "You are a rational animal," "To be human is to be a rational animal," there are further questions you can build on the answer, and further things you can go on to say. Before examining some of these it would be well to note the initiating question itself. I have all along been assuming that the question, "What am I, anyway?", while perhaps vague and ambiguous, is not hopelessly so; assuming also that it is not meaningless; and that it is not asked mechanically, or rhetorically, or irresponsibly.

The question, "What am I, anyway?" is not identical with the question "What is man that Thou art mindful of him?," but it has a certain affinity to this more famous question. Asked in a certain way, and for a certain sort of reason, it can indicate that a person has reflected on *la condition humaine*, and finds himself puzzled by it. The point of the question he intends would not be met by saying: "You are an American citizen" or "You are a married man" or "You are a senior in college;" nor is it met in any of an indefinite number of other ways. Perhaps he has been comparing himself with other animals or with plants or inanimate objects or with some cunningly devised cybernetic machine. Perhaps he has caught a belittling glimpse of himself in the light of some aspects of modern astronomy, or modern psychology or modern literature. It is possible for experiences of this sort to goad a person into asking: "What am I, anyway?" The point is that a question

originating in this way is a meaningful question, and invites a meaningful answer.

I have been assuming that the question is not asked mechanically. If you shout the question in a good echo-location, then the sounds that boomerang back to you, if they could be said to ask the question at all, would do so mechanically. If you speak the question into a tape-recorder, and play it back, then, if the recorder could be said to ask the question at all, it would do so mechanically. If clouds were blown by the wind into the shape of the words used to ask this question, then, if the wind or the clouds could be said to ask the question at all, they would do so mechanically. No element of judgment, no element of realized ignorance, no ability or intention to evaluate an answer, entered into the framing of the question in the case of the echo, the tape-recorder, or the clouds. They do not authorize or stand back of the question. In short, it is not *their* question.

The question, "What am I, anyway?" can be asked rhetorically. So asked, it does not invite the answer, "You are a rational animal," because it does not invite any answer. The purpose of asking a question rhetorically is to produce an effect not an answer. You do not want an answer, and are ordinarily flustered or frustrated if you get one.

The question is assumed also to be asked responsibly. To ask a question responsibly is to be able to indicate the grounds, or the sort of grounds, on which you will accept or reject answers. Suppose some one asks you what time it is. You answer: "By my watch, it is 10 o'clock." And he says: "I am not interested in your watch. I want to know what time it is." So you dial the time number on the phone, and say: "By the phone, it is now one minute after ten," and he says: "I am not interested in the phone, I want to know what time it is." Let this go on until your patience or your ingenuity runs out. Then you say: "On what grounds *will* you accept an answer?" And he says: "On no grounds. In the case of this question there are no grounds on which I am prepared to accept answers;" or: "I do not know. In the case of this question, I do not know on what grounds I am prepared to accept answers." He would be asking his question irresponsibly, or asking an irresponsible question. He could not respond, in the name of his question, to your answer. Or suppose he accepted *any* answer you gave him, because he had no basis on which to reject answers, he would then also be asking his question irresponsibly. Once you caught on to this you would say: "Pay no attention to him. Don't try to answer him. Or,

give him the first answer that comes into your head. On *that* question he's not responsible."

I think the question, "What am I, anyway?" can be asked in such a way that the asking of it is not meaningless, not mechanical, not rhetorical and not irresponsible; and that the words, "What am I, anyway?" can express a question to which an indefeasible answer would be: "You are a rational animal."

You can build certain further questions on that answer. These further questions form part of the logical efficacy of that answer. If you accept, or even entertain, that answer, you are thereby entitled to these further questions. If you reject the answer, the questions "do not arise;" in an older idiom "Cadit quaestio." That you are entitled to the question does not mean that you are therefore entitled to an answer, nor to any particular answer you may want or get. It means that the way is clear, that it makes sense for you to ask the question.

For example, you can ask: "How *did* rational animals, as a species, come to exist? How did they originate in the first place? Were they created? Or produced by the operation of natural processes? Or did they produce themselves? Or was their coming to be quite causeless? Or have they always existed?" You can ask: "How *do* rational animals, as individuals, come to exist? How do they originate now? Their bodies are procreated. Does the same hold for the rest of them? If an agent has a body and a psyche, what mode of unity do they illustrate? Does this bear on the question, 'How do rational animals, considered as individuals, come to exist?'"

You can ask what, in the case of a rational animal, the relation is between the agent and his body. There are some answers that you can at least hold up at the border. It will not do, *prima facie* at least, to admit the answer, "The agent is the body." Your relation to your body is obscure indeed, but is it one of identity? There is almost overwhelming evidence for example, that it is an instrument of your purposes, but this does not give you identity. There is considerable evidence that it is the locus of processes studied by physiology, but this does not give you identity. If the relation is not one of identity, then you can ask the further question, "How is it that, in the case of a rational animal, the agent is able to act upon his body?" This is one of the most vexing questions in all philosophy. The more you fuss with it, the worse it gets. I would offer it as an example of what I have elsewhere called "open questions." But, for all its vexing character, I would rather be stuck with the question, "How is an agent able to act

on his body?" than with the question, "Is an agent able to act on his body?"

You can ask whether man is the only rational animal; whether, that is, the concept "rational animal" defines the concept "man." Man, we say, reasons and can be reasoned with. Does this hold of any other, presumably "sub-human," animals? Are there still other, presumably "super-human," animals? Does it also hold of them? You can ask whether there is a necessary connection between the concept "rational" and the concept "animal." If you are rational, must you be animal? Must you e.g., have a body and (presumably) a psyche? If a being has neither body, parts nor passions, does it count as an animal? If not, does that rule it out as rational? Would you be unable to say that it reasons and can be reasoned with? I see nothing wrong with the question, "What am I, anyway?"; nor with the answer, "You are a rational animal," but I see nothing wrong with the further question, "Is man the only rational animal, or the only rational being?" There may be other animals besides humans that are also rational. There may be other beings, besides animals, that are also rational. But whether there are, or are not, it still makes excellent sense to say that man is a rational animal; that he reasons and can be reasoned with. However, if there are, then we know something of what it would be like to be one of them.

If, in the case of rational animals, the agent be not identical with his body, you can have the question whether he survives the death of his body. This is a good question. I do not see why some persons hold it in contempt. It is a highly speculative question, no doubt; but not therefore either meaningless or contemptible. I see nothing in the concept of rational animal, nor in the claim that I am one, that vetoes the *question*, "Do I, as agent, survive the death of my body?" I think those who would rule this *question* out as improper are simply too intent upon having their fireworks on the ground.

There is the thesis that man is a rational animal. Some persons insist that the important part of the thesis is that man is an animal. They are more convinced that he is an animal, or more impressed by the fact that he is an animal, than that he is rational. If they cannot get it nailed down that man is an animal, they feel perhaps that they cannot go on to the further thesis that animals are machines. This is important because they want to argue that man is a machine. This is a familiar line of reasoning. Within recent years, however, the thesis that humans are machines has lost the spot-light to the thesis that machines are

human. More articles and chapters are written these days having to do with the claim that some machines are human, than that all humans are machines. The thesis is that machines can be constructed to do anything that humans can do. Given a machine that can do everything that a human can do, why should we hesitate to say that such a machine is human? There is no particular desire to argue that such machines are animals. The desideratum is to argue that they are rational, in the sense that humans are, in the sense that they reason and can be reasoned with. If the thesis that man is a rational animal is tied to the thesis that he reasons and can be reasoned with, then you can have the question, "What is it to reason and be reasoned with?" My point would be that you had better have an answer to that question before you set about to construct a machine which reasons and can be reasoned with, or before you point to such a machine and say that it reasons and can be reasoned with. It will not do to say that you cannot answer the question, "What is it to reason and be reasoned with?" unless or until you have succeeded in constructing a machine which does these things. There is no future in saying that machines are human if you have still to deal with the question "What is it to be human?"

You begin with the question: "What am I, anyway?" You get the answer: "You are a rational animal." You can go on to ask what traits mark the behavior of a rational animal. This question will be found to cover a large tract of closely contested ground. I do not propose to follow it out over this terrain, but I think you can see where it would lead. For example, you can ask whether the behavior of a rational animal is value free or purposive or responsible or fallible or corrigible or self-critical or experimental or judgmental or normative, etc. My point here is not to ask these and related questions, let alone try to answer them. My point is that as a rational animal, you are entitled to the question, "What traits mark the behavior of a rational animal?"; that these and related concepts are among the live possibilities to be considered; and that they can be ruled in or out if they are required by or are incompatible with the fact that you are a rational animal. Given that, these and similar questions persist. Some of them, no doubt, illustrate what Kant had in mind when he said that even if we have no metaphysical answers, we nevertheless do have an ineradicable desire to raise metaphysical questions.

V

I am aware that in these days of post-Christian religion, post-Freudian psychology, linguistic philosophy, thermo-nuclear warfare, behavioral sciences, op art, pop art, anti-art, population explosion, automation, space exploration and racial emancipations, it ill-behooves a person to sponsor so vague and general a question as "What am I, anyway?", "What is it to be human?", "What do we know or believe or hope about the 'I' in 'I know' or 'I believe' or 'I hope'?" The question, in all intellectual and social conscience, is bedraggled enough; but to follow up with the answer "Whatever else you are, you are a rational animal," is to invite impatience and incredulity and a certain intellectual intolerance. "Rational animal, indeed! If there is anything we know, anything we have learned, anything we have conceded and come finally to terms with, it is that man is an animal; and, if anything beyond that, an *irrational* animal." If your thesis is that man is an ignorant and irrational animal, you will get a concessive hearing, provided it does not take you too long to make your point. But to claim that man is first and foremost a rational animal is no more plausible than to claim that he is a sinner as much in need of forgiveness as in need of knowledge.

It is not easy to account for this state of mind. It may be a mood of disenchantment, but whose fault is that? Who was the enchanter and who the enchanted? There is nothing particularly enchanting about the fact that man is a rational animal. If you start to unpack it, you come upon the fact that he reasons and can be reasoned with. Whatever else you may come upon, there is no future in denying *that*. What would you use for evidence? How would you come by such evidence? How would you use it? At each step you would exhibit the fact that you reason and can be reasoned with. If experience and history and science prove anything, it is that man reasons and can be reasoned with. It seems to me that the thesis that man is a rational animal is not so much a great truth as a neglected or ignored or forgotten truth; not so much a great truth as a fundamental truth, one which you do well to begin with if you propose to arrive at any further truths about what it is to be human. There is a difference between a fundamental truth and "the whole" truth, whatever the latter may turn out to be; but there is this connection: the "whole truth" must not contain a denial of a fundamental truth.

For example, if you ask: "What am I, anyway?", you have to live

with the answer, "You are a rational animal. Whatever else, you are that. If anything else or nothing else is, that at least you are." However, I do not find in this any help with the much more difficult and haunting question, "Who am I, anyway?" To ask: "What am I?" is to ask a generalizing question. To ask: "Who am I?" is to ask a particularizing or individualizing question. I am not indifferent to the question, "What am I?"; but I am much more concerned, and much more caught in the bottle, with the question, "Who am I?" My point is that an indefeasible answer to the what-question does not seem to promise any help with the who-question. If it does, I am over-looking something.

It seems to me that, of all people, teachers in a liberal arts college are ill-advised to look askance at the thesis that man is a rational animal, that he reasons and can be reasoned with. If he were not, where would they get in the exercise of their profession? They have a professional concern in the activity called learning, in the sense of getting to know. Their primary aim is to initiate and sustain in the minds of their customers this activity called learning, in the sense of getting to know. Now, to learn, in this sense, is to add to what you already know. Pedagogy begins at that point. It presupposes that you already know something, and it proposes to get you to add to it. If you cannot reason or be reasoned with, how is this ever to be done? Pedagogy aims at responsible learning. What makes responsible learning responsible? At least this, that you come to see, and are able to show, that what you already know requires what you propose to take on as learning. How could you do this, if you could neither reason or be reasoned with?

By way of conclusion: the concept of rational animal, and all that you can legitimately squeeze out of it, is fundamental to understanding of the human, whether in oneself or in others. As you first encounter the notion it may strike you as vague, general, obscure, ambiguous, inflated, burned out and trivial. No matter; you must work at it and with it. I do not think the task is hopeless. There are at least four well-trodden ways in which, if you put your mind to it, you can learn what it is to be a rational animal. (1) You can begin by recognizing that you are one, and set yourself to learn from that, what it is to be one. In the end, there may be no better way. (2) You can, and do, learn, from dealing with other rational animals, what it is to be one. Attend to the fact that others reason, and, within usable limits, can be reasoned with. Attend to what they do and how they do it. Next to the fact that you are a rational animal, I would place this fact that you have dealings with rational animals, as a way in which you can and do learn what it is to

be one. (3) You can and do extend your holdings considerably by mastering the traditions and documents in which the history of rational animals is embodied and recorded. Rational animals have been in business a long time. For whatever it is worth, their rationality is embodied in an enormous range of big and little achievements. This whole thing is human civilization, human activity as human beings performed it and then worked up the story of it. Rational animals have a history, in the sense of a past; and they have a history in the sense of a worked-out story of that past. By getting to know this history, you extend and deepen your knowledge of what it is to be a rational animal. (4) And, to complete my list, there is much to be learned by mastering the disciplines in which modes of rational behavior are studied. I can speak most responsibly here if I restrict my remarks to the philosophical disciplines. Other persons can speak better about other disciplines. My point is that it will not do for a person to say: "I am a rational animal; therefore, I have no stake in logic or ethics or aesthetic or semantics." These and other philosophical disciplines spell out for you much of what you say you are. You do not study the philosophical disciplines in order to become, or to learn how to become, a rational animal. You are one, already. If you were not, you could not study these disciplines. But that does not mean that they are useless. It is one thing to be a rational animal. You do not need them there. It is another thing to learn what it is to be a rational animal. They can help you there.

THE SELF IN MU'TAZILAH THOUGHT

ISMA'IL RĀGĪ A. AL FĀRŪQĪ

From Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' who died in Baṣrah in 131 A.H.*/749 A.C. to Abū al Ḥasan al Agh'ari who died in Baghdād in 322 A.H./935 A.C. is a line of brilliant thinkers who constitute the Mu'tazilah tradition.¹ Their time was the formative period of Islamic thought. It was the time when Islam, having come to the Fertile Crescent, had to answer the enquiries of friend and foe, of those who were converted to, and those who resisted the new faith. The Fertile Crescent was the crossroads of Chirstianity, Judaism, Hellenism, Manichaeism, Zoroastrianism and – by one degree removed – Indian religion. The array of ideas and thought-currents it presented to the observer was most bewildering. Until this time, the Muslim's consciousness had been completely dominated by

* A. H. means "After Hejira," from which the Mohammedan era is dated. Hejira means the flight of Mohammed from Mecca in 622 A.D. There seems to be some difference of opinion about this date.

¹ The tradition, founded by Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' (died 131 A.H./749 A.C.) is divided into two schools: that of Baṣrah comprising among its distinguished members 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, Abū al Hudhayl al 'Allāf, Ibrahīm al Nazzām, 'Amr al Jāhiz, Abū 'Alī and Abū Ḥashim al Jubbā'ī; and that of Baghdād, founded by Bishr ibn al Mu'tamar (died 210 A.H./286 A.C.) and counting among its great members Abū Mūsā al Murdār, Aḥmad ibn Abī Du'ād (the Grand Qāḍī of the caliphs al Ma'mūn, al Mu'taṣim and al Wāṭiq, 204–232 A.H./820–848 A.C.), Tnumamah ibn al Ashras, the two Ja'fars (Ja'far ibn Ḥarb and Ja'far ibn Mubashir), Muḥammad al Iskāfī and 'Abd al Raḥīm al Khayyāt. Abū al Ḥasan al Ash'arī was the last great Mu'tazili who, having mastered their thought and method, overturned the tables against the Mu'tazilah and established the first crystallization of Sunnī theology. For a biographical and bibliographical study of the Mu'tazilah, see Ibn al Murtadā, *Tabaqat al Mu'tazilah*, ed. by S. Diwald-Wilzer, Catholic Press, Beirut, 1961. For systematic presentation of Mu'tazilah doctrine and extensive accounts of their history, see Jar-Allah, Zuhdī Ḥasan, *Al Mu'tazilah*, Al Nādī al 'Arabī fī Yafā Publications, Cairo, 1366/1947; Nādir, A. N., *Falsafat al Mu'tazilah*, *Falāsifat al Islām al Asbaqīn*, 2 Vols., Dar Nasr al Thades Mu'tazilah (*Premiers penseurs de l'Islam*), Editions les Lettres Orientales, Beyrouth, 1956. For works by members of the Mu'tazilah, see 'Abd al Rahim al Khayyāt's *Kitāb al Intisār wa al Radd 'Alā Ibn al Rawandī*, ed. by A. Nyberg, Lajnat al Ta'līf wa al Tarjamah wa al Nashr, Cairo, 1925; and A. N. Nādir's Arabic edition and French translation, Catholic Press, Beirut, 1957. (English edition and commentary by this author forthcoming, University of Chicago Press); Al Qāḍī 'Abd al Jabbār, *Al Mughnī fī Abwāb al Tawḥīd wa al Adl*, in serial volumes published by the Ministry of Culture and National Guidance, Cairo, 1959– ; *Ibid.*, *Sharh al Uṣūl al Khamsah*, forthcoming edition by this author, Dār Iḥyā al Kutub al Arabiyyah, Cairo.

the vision of the divine pattern into the likeness of which the adherent of the faith stood under the command to transform space-time; and in his life, the Muslim had been too engaged in the business of making history to articulate his mission and ideology in systematic manner. He certainly argued about it, but controversy had no appeal for him. The greatest and final argument he had was "Voilà!" pointing to himself and his fellow Muslims as exemplars of the faith; and both he and his opponents were convinced by this argument. The spectacle of the Muslim hurling himself upon the realm of religious and moral values, realizing them with a completeness that hardly knew or tolerated exceptions while making history in the process, was as sublime as it was disarming. Three generations later, roughly after a century or a little more, the job of controverting the opponents' opinions, of weighing alternatives and exposing their shortcomings, fell on the shoulders of the Mu'tazilah; and these certainly proved themselves in the many battles of ideas in which they engaged. Their history was as brilliant as that of their brethren who had spent themselves in the realization of the divine pattern within as well as without, in themselves as in the world around them.

Mu'tazilah doctrine is founded on five axioms: first, *al tawhīd* or unity of God. This axiom was emphasized against the contentions of the Karaites (Jewish anthropomorphists), of the Manichaean dualists, of the Christian trinitarians, and of the Near Eastern philosophers who were for the most part gnostic emanationists. Under this principle the Mu'tazilah sought to establish the existence, uniqueness and transcendence of God, which were threatened by those schools. The second axiom was *al'adl* (justice), which was emphasized against the contentions of the advocates of racialism, election, predestination, irrationalism and justification by faith among all the above-mentioned groups, as well as against those Muslims who were determinists, intercessionists and advocates of the primacy of revelation over reason. Here, the Mu'tazilah sought to establish the universalism, rationalism, humanism and moral freedom of Islam. The third and fourth axioms, namely *al wa'd wa al wa'id* (the promise of reward and threat of punishment) and *al manzilah bayna al manzilatayn* (the intermediate station between salvation and damnation) are subsidiaries to the principle of justice. On the one hand, reward and punishment were held to be necessary if God's disposal of man's destiny was to be an absolutely just one. Otherwise, *i.e.*, if all man's deeds ended in forgiveness and paradise, in punishment and hellfire, or in neither, *i.e.*, in vanity and futility, divine

righteousness would be gravely compromised. On the other hand, the necessity of the intermediate station between faith and unfaith, or salvation and damnation, was held for the sake of the faithful who slips into grave sin. This axiom rehabilitated such a person in opposition to two kinds of extremism: that which regarded adherence to the faith as all that was necessary for salvation – the view under which the sinner is complacently regarded as saved; and that which regarded all salvation as logically and materially equivalent to works – under which view the sinner is summarily condemned to eternal punishment. Against both extremes, this principle kept the faithful as faithful and also as sinner under God's accusing finger for the sin of which he is guilty. Finally, the fifth axiom, *al amr bi al ma'rūf wa al nahy 'an al munkar* (the enjoining of good and prohibition of evil), and its role were to establish the necessity of an imperfect yet perfectable creation for man's moral self-realization or fulfillment of the divine command; the need for man to engage himself in its woof and warp, to take history into his own hands, and to knead and remold the world into the likeness of the divine pattern God had revealed.²

These five axioms were cardinal to the Mu'tazilah. Contention against, or denial of any one of them removed the contender from Mu'tazilah rank.³ And yet, if we were to characterize Mu'tazilah doctrine by a single dominant idea, we are compelled to say that the whole thrust of their movement revolved around man's ethical problem; that all their doctrine was an elaboration in Islamic key of the problem of

² A brief statement of these five cardinal principles of Mu'tazilah doctrine may be read in MacDonald, K.D.B., *Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*, Scribner, New York, 1903, pp. 119–164; Tritton, A. S., *Muslim Theology*, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1947, pp. 79–106; Watt, W. Montgomery, *Free Will and Pre-destination in Early Islam*, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1948, pp. 61–92; De Boer, T. J., *History of Islamic Philosophy*, tr. by E. R. Jones, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1933, pp. 41–64; Gibb, H. A. R., *Mohammedanism*, Oxford U. Press, London, 1949, pp. 110–117; Carra de Vaux, Baron, *Les Penseurs de l'Islam*, Librairie Paul Geuthner, Paris, 1923, Vol. IV, Chap. iv, pp. 133–156. Statements of Mu'tazilah doctrine in Arabic are many. The following are classical al Aṣḥ'arī, (Abū al Ḥasan) 'Alī Isma'īl, *Maqālāt al Islāmiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al Muṣallīn*, ed. by Muḥammad M.-D. 'Abd al Ḥmīd, Maktabat al Nahḍah al Miṣriyyah, Cairo, Vol. I, pp. 216–311; and Vol. II, pp. 197 ff.; al Bāqillānī, Muḥammad (Abū Bakr), *Kitāb al Tamhīd*, ed. by R. J. McCarthy, S.J., Librairie Orientale, Beirut, 1957, pp. 252–345; al Ṣhāhrastānī, M. A.-k., *Al Milal wa al Nihāl*, ed. by M. F. Badrān, Al Azhar Press, Cairo, 1328/1910, pp. 61–132; Ibn Ḥazm, 'Alī (Abū Muḥammad), *Kitāb al Fiṣal fi al Ahwā' wa al Milal wa al Nihāl*, Muḥammad Amīn al Khānjī, Publisher, Cairo, 1321/1903, Vol. III, pp. 4–164; al Baḡhdādī, A.-Q., *Kitāb al Farq bayna al Firaq wa bayān al Firaq al Nājah Minhum*, ed. by M. Badr, Maṭba'at al Ma'arif, Cairo, 1328/1910, pp. 93–169; al Rāzī, Fakhr al Dīn, *Itiqādāt Firaq al Muslimīn wa al Muṣhrikīn*, ed. by 'Alī Sāmī al Nashshār, Maktabat al Nahḍah al Miṣriyyah, Cairo, 1356/1938 pp. 38–45; al Qāsimī al Dimashqī, Jamāl al Dīn, *Kitāb Tārīkh al Jahmiyyah wa al Mu'tazilah*, Al Manār Press, Cairo, 1331/1913, pp. 42–63. An excellent modernist presentation is Amīn, Aḥmad, *Ḍuhā al Islām*, Vol. III, Maktabat al Nahḍah al Miṣriyyah, Cairo, 1956, pp. 7–355.

³ Al Khayyāt, 'Abd al Raḥīm, *op. cit.*, Nādir ed., pp. 92–93.

man's ethical nature which they regarded as the central problem of the self. Their concern was a very Islamic one, since in Islam the be-all and end-all of human life – indeed, of all creation – is the realization in space-time of a divine trust; and their reasoning is clear. If God is transcendent – and the Muslim believes He is – He may not be said to invade, or be invaded by, creation. God is forever unique. Therefore, there is in Islam neither incarnation, nor pantheism; neither emanation from God nor fusion into God. These are all constructs devoid of foundation. The only unquestionable, given reality is that man, the creature, stands under an imperative, *viz.*, the command of value, that he is commanded as well as moved by value to seek its realization in the realm of the actual.

According to the Mu'tazilah, four different principles follow from this given reality, and their establishment is the task of all religious and philosophical thought. These are, first, that there is a command, a law, or *sharī'ah* – a divine pattern which is the divine will for man; and that this pattern is not man's creation but is *sui generis*, for though the law is always relational to man, it is not relative to him. Otherwise, if value or the so-called "divine command" is man's creation or is relative to him, then ethics is either the satisfaction of instincts and desires or the rule by convention. In either case the imperativeness and justification of the command are jeopardized. The second principle is that man has an innate capacity to know that command or divine pattern, a capacity cultivable and susceptible of higher and lower degrees of perceptive strength, but nonetheless internal to man's realities and devolving upon him. Otherwise skepticism and cynicism become unavoidable. Furthermore, such capacity liberates man from dependence on external sources such as the church or tradition, which can never by themselves be critical. The third principle is that man, whether as subject or *matériel* of value-realization, has the capacity to act or not to act in accordance with the command. The aspect of man as the subject of value-realization is precisely his moral freedom; his aspect as *matériel* is his malleability as well as that of creation, the openness of all space-time to information by the divine pattern. The fourth and last principle is that there must be an order in which the doing or non-doing of man, his realization or violation of the divine pattern, will not be in vain, but will be of consequence for him, as well as for the cosmos; that while the consequence for the cosmos is an objective, real plus or minus of value, the consequence for the subject is personal reward or punishment. Upon this principle depend the immortality of the soul, resurrection of the

body, the Day of judgment, and paradise and hell. It was the Mu'tazilah thinkers' investigation of the problem of the self in these terms which led to the establishment of these principles in the tradition of Islamic thought.

The Mu'tazilah approached the problem of the self from four sides: the constitution of the self, its liberty to know, its liberty to do, and its place in the order of eternity. Obviously, under each of these headings, the Mu'tazilah sought to establish one of the four principles to which it corresponds.

1. *The Constitution of the Self*

The Mu'tazilah held the self to consist of soul and body. According to whether the relation of soul and body is regarded as substantial or accidental, two views may here be distinguished. The first was the view of Bishr ibn al Mu'tamar, who defined man as "consisting of body and soul, since both these are man; and man, the subject of acts, is both soul and body."⁴ This definition, together with his insistence on the inseparability of the two constituents in the act, on their interdependence in constituting man,⁵ betray the Aristotelian influence under which he labored.⁶ Very few Mu'tazilah agreed with Bishr in this matter; and we may say that his view was not representative.

The second view – namely, that the soul-body relation is accidental – was elaborated by al Nazzām and his master, Abū al Hudhayl, and was held by the majority of Mu'tazilah thinkers. While identifying the self as that "on which the sight falls when it falls on a person," Abū al Hudhayl emphasized that "hair, nails and the like are not definitive of the self,"⁷ that "the soul is accidental to the body,"⁸ and that "the soul is other than the life of the body."⁹ To the soul which is inseparable from the body and essentially related to it in the Aristotelian sense held by Bishr, he gave the name of "life." Such "soul" or "life" Abū al Hudhayl recognized as necessary to and interdependent with the body. But in addition to the "body" and its essentially-related "life," the self consists of a soul whose relation to the living body is accidental.

⁴ Al Aṣḥ'arī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 25.

⁵ Al Ṣhahraṣṭānī, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁶ Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book II, Ch. 1, 2, at the end of which Aristotle defines the soul as "the actuality or formulable essence of something that possesses a potentiality of being be-souled."

⁷ Al Aṣḥ'arī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 24–25.

⁸ Ibn Ḥazm, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 47; al Aṣḥ'arī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 30.

⁹ Al Aṣḥ'arī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 29. To this he added the evidence of the Qur'ān in 39:43, *viz.*, the consideration of the fact that in sleep, man may lose the soul without losing life.

The body and its life are *matériaux* with which and in which the soul, in the second sense, does its work. This work of the soul consists, above all, of cognition of a transcendent realm of being – namely, the divine will or value – and direction of the activity of “body-cum-life” towards the realization of the object of cognition. The accidental nature of the connection of the soul to body-cum-life gives priority to its rational knowledge, to its ethical action or its governance of the body, and to its survival after the body’s death. Rather than to Aristotle, the similarity is here to Plato, who was moved in his psychology by the same considerations.¹⁰

Whereas in Abū al Hudhayl the threefold constitution of the self was only implied, it was given express definition by his student al Nazzām. “The self,” the latter said, is “the soul which is a light body penetrating the opaque body . . . the spirit which is the life in the warp and woof of the body . . . [and] the body in which man is and is seen.”¹¹ Moreover, this view of the self betrays two novel insights unknown hitherto in Islamic thought, *viz.*, the stoic view of the soul as a light body penetrating the opaque body, and the atomistic view which follows from this and the consideration of the soul as part of the self. For, as every part is infinitely divisible into smaller parts, this view of al Nazzām led him to regard the soul as consisting of an infinite number of small particles pervading the body. The Mu’tazilah view of the self has combined, therefore, at once the insights of stoicism and atomism¹² as well as of Platonic essentialism. From Leucippus, Democritus and Epicurus, the Mu’tazilah borrowed the view of the soul as life-particles;¹³ from the Stoics the view that the soul is by itself capable, alive and leads a life of its own (*i.e.*, rational cognition of that into the likeness of which it then molds the *matériaux* of space-time); from Plato, the view that the soul is subject to incapacity in case of breakdown of the body which is its prison and oppressor,¹⁴ its instrument and vehicle.¹⁵ And they

¹⁰ Plato, *The Dialogues*: Phaedo, 73a–76d, for *anamnesis* (the theory of the a priori nature of rational knowledge) and 79d to 84b for the theory of immortality.

¹¹ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 117; Al Khayyāt, *Kitāb al Intiṣār*, *cit. supra*, p. 36.

¹² This was precisely the insight of ‘Abd al Raḥman al Ijlī who commented as follows: “What we call ‘I’ or my ‘self’ is in Al Nazzām’s view a number of light bodies which run through my body like perfume runs through the water, always the same and indestructible throughout my life. If the human body loses a member of an organ, the self that is in it withdraws to the rest of the body . . .” *Al Mawāqif fi ‘Ilm al Kalām*, Cairo, 1357/1938, p. 281; and al Jurjānī, al Sharīf ‘Alī Ibn Muḥammad, *Sharḥ al Mawāqif*, Istanbul, 1286/1870, p. 459.

¹³ For a brief statement of the Greek atomist view, see Freeman, Kathleen, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Blackwell’s, Oxford, 1953, pp. 288–289, 314; and for direct quotation from the source-works, Kirk, G. S. and Raven, J. E., *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers*, Cambridge U. Press, 1937, pp. 404–405, n. 552, 583.

¹⁴ Plato, *The Dialogues*: Phaedo, 86–87; al Ash‘arī, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 274.

¹⁵ Plato, *The Dialogues*: Phaedo, p. 92; al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.* p. 334.

synthesized these insights under the driving idea of Islam. This idea, exclusive to Islam but not far removed from Plato, is the subordination of the theory of man to the Islamic soteriological principle that man is obliged to fulfill God's will, *i.e.*, value or the good, in space-time and that he is capable of doing so.

Upon this tripartite division of the self, the Mu'tazilah built a theory of separate functions for each part. Only "reasoning and willing," they held, are properly speaking "acts of the soul; everything else is an act of the body."¹⁶ Certainly, the soul is operative in the "life" as well as in the "body." But in "reasoning" as cognition of eternal truths and in "willing" as exercise of moral freedom, neither the "life" nor the "body" are the subject of cognition and decision, though they are, as they must be, the space-time carriers of both.

This radical differentiation of the soul, in nature and function, from the body as well as from "life" (or "soul" in the Aristotelian sense) served as the ground for an equally radical differentiation between the objects of each. The object of the soul in its cognitive function, *i.e.*, reason, is rational truth and goodness. The object of "life" (*al rūḥ*, *al ḥayāt*) in its animation of the person is the satisfaction of the instincts and passions, the fulfillment of desires and quiescence of interests. The object of the body in its internal and external movement is the elements of nature. The first is ideal, the second is subjective, the third is material. The first, namely, the ideal, is for the Mu'tazilah the realm of reason. In it are the laws of thought as well as the laws of morality which together constitute an ideally self-existent realm which is as independent of man as the realm of body and nature. That is not the case with the second object, the realm of desires and desiderata, of interests and their quiescence patterns.¹⁷ These are essentially relative to man. Truth and value are what they are in and by themselves. As qualities of propositions and deeds, they are essential to that which they qualify; and this relation is absolute, *i.e.*, not liable to change.¹⁸ Even revelation plays nothing but a reportorial role *vis-à-vis* them. Their revealed status is not constitutive of their truth or value but is only accidental to them. They are what they are independently of revelation.¹⁹ This extraordinary claim of the Mu'tazilah was supported by their metaphysics and theology. If we remember that in their *a priori*

¹⁶ The view is that of Mu'ammār, see al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹⁷ *I.e.*, borrowing the expression of Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value*, Harvard U. Press, Cambridge, 1954, p. 115 ff.

¹⁸ Al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 76, 84.

¹⁹ Al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 356.

and absolute character truth and goodness are also divine attributes, and that the divine attributes are not not-God, but that they are precisely He Himself,²⁰ then we can easily see how the Mu'tazilah perceived a separate metaphysical status for the moral laws which only a soul, metaphysically separate from the body and its "life," can grasp.

2. *Rational Knowledge*

The soul, then, is a constituent of the self, and its role is that of cognizing the divine attributes which are the divine will or command for man. Such cognition is precisely what the Mu'tazilah have called "rational knowledge." On its possibility depends moral obligation. It is all the same whether we regard the animals as not obligated morally because of their lack of rational knowledge, or we regard them as lacking in rational knowledge because they stand under no moral obligation. Using this very comparison with the animals,²¹ the Mu'tazilah held the connection of the two, *i.e.*, rational knowledge and moral freedom, to be absolutely necessary. The one falls without the other. For the Mu'tazilah, both are the first given facts of mature humanity and are reciprocally convertible.

According to the Mu'tazilah, the self is endowed with a faculty which has a dual role. This faculty is reason; and its two roles are speculation, whose object is knowledge; and control, whose object is guidance. By the former, *i.e.*, by theoretical or speculative reason, "we acquire our knowledge" ²² and "reach the universal by means of the particular, and grasp relations between things." ²³ By the latter, *i.e.*, by practical reason, we plan and govern our existence and life. Although knowledge is prior to government, the latter is the more conditioned and hence, the higher. Anticipating the pragmatists, the Mu'tazilah recognized that knowing is for the sake of doing, and they put the higher premium on the work of practical reason. Thus they regarded not instinct but insanity as the opposite of reason, and argued that it is precisely the insane who is free from self-imposed control.²⁴ Instinct, on the other

²⁰ Indeed, this is the characteristic principle of all Mu'tazilah theology and the axis of their *tawhīd* axiom. (al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, pp. 165, 484, 532-7; al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, p. 85; al Khayyāt, *op. cit.*, p. 8).

²¹ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

²² Al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

²³ Drawing on the etymological meaning of "reason" (Arabic '*aql*'), al Jubbā'ī said: "Reason is called reason because by it man controls himself against doing that which the insane man does not prevent himself from doing. The root of the term reason ('*aql*') is the reins ('*uqāl*') of the camel by which the animal is prevented from doing what is not desirable for it to do." (*Ibid.*).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

hand, operates under strict laws. This definition of reason determines at once the Mu'tazilah's interest – which is moral. If the self is to live a moral life, it must be endowed with a faculty by which it can know the good by its own effort, and by which it can freely govern the life of the person so as to pursue and realize that good. To know the good when it is impossible and unrealizable is vain; to govern life so as to realize an unknown good is impossible; and to do either in a determined, not-free manner is not ethical. That is the framework of the Mu'tazilah's theory of rational cognition.

They began their argument with a refutation of Plato's doctrine of knowledge as *anamnesis* or remembrance;²⁵ and again, their objective was moral. In order that the acquisition of knowledge be meritorious, they tell us, it should be free. *Anamnesis* is caused by the Platonic "mid-wifery" activity of the teacher. The learning activity of the self does not devolve entirely upon the learner. How then can he be responsible for his knowledge? But not to be responsible for one's knowledge implies not to be responsible for the deeds which follow from and are dependent upon that knowledge. Therefore, the Mu'tazilah concluded, *anamnesis* contradicts man's given moral freedom which imputes to man total responsibility for his acts, for their unfolding in space-time as well as for all that they presuppose, not excluding the very state of his knowledge. According to Plato, knowledge does not depart completely from the soul, but is veiled therein and remains in a state of potentiality until the subject is reminded of it. For the Mu'tazilah, this too is a compromise of the freedom to know which is constitutive, though partially, of moral freedom. For the potential presence of knowledge in man determines already what he is to become aware of when *anamnesis* takes place. He is not entirely free regarding his own acquisition of knowledge.²⁶ But if rational cognition is not a free activity, but is determined first in its object that lies within the soul and then in the remembrance of such parts of this object as are determined by a person other than the knower, then the moral value of rational cognition falls to the ground. But rational cognition, according to the Mu'tazilah, is cognition of God, of the truth and the good, and is the prime moral obligation of all men, one of the two cardinal functions of the soul. For them, this is an axiom which may be denied only at the cost of a thoroughgoing skepticism; and they concluded that it must therefore be free and, hence, be otherwise than as Plato had found out.

²⁵ Al Jurjānī, *op. cit.*, p. 54 ff.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

Moreover, rational cognition, or theoretical activity of the soul, is not accidentally related to practical activity, to control and guidance. To know the good is not only the presupposition of doing it. The partition between knowledge and action is thin, despite the priority of the former. Indeed, if the prior presupposition of rational control is itself under determination, control cannot escape without injury. And it is doubtful whether moral freedom would remain possible in this case.²⁷ Contrary to Plato, the Mu'tazilah argued, rational cognition is not *anamnesis* but the free exercise of the rational faculty, its survey of truth and falsehood, of good and evil, and its recognition of the truth as true, of the good as good. This was their first point.

The second Mu'tazilah argument is that rational knowledge – both on the theoretical and on the practical levels – is not acquired suddenly as if by illumination, but progressively through the gradual exercise of the rational faculty.²⁸ That this is true of practical knowledge, to which experience can always add, is obvious. The case of theoretical knowledge, however, is otherwise. Abū al Hudhayl divided theoretical knowledge into departments, the one obligatory to all men, and the other not necessary and capable of being acquired in different degrees without detriment. Necessary is the knowledge of God and of the evidence He gave of Himself and of His command;²⁹ contingent is the empirical knowledge of the world and of nature.³⁰ Only the former was held by the Mu'tazilah as indispensable for adulthood.³¹ Al Jāhīz, for instance, was convinced that “no man may be said to have reached adulthood who has not known God.”³² Knowledge of God, he argued, is rationally obligatory (*i.e.*, necessary) and must be acquired if the person is said to be a *'āqil* (*i.e.*, capable of self-imposed control, reasonable).³³ Such a person may be assisted by being told that a God exists who makes such and such commands. As soon as the claim has presented itself to his consciousness, adult man is duty-bound to examine the report, reach the inevitable conclusion and acknowledge God³⁴ and His

²⁷ Al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

²⁸ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

²⁹ “Al Jāhīz said: ‘It is not permissible that a man attain the age of maturity and remain ignorant of God.’” (al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 160). “All the Mu'tazilah agree that knowledge of God is rationally obligatory and insist on establishing such knowledge by reason, not by revelation or consensus of the community.” (al Jurjānī, *op. cit.*, p. 61).

³⁰ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

³¹ “Adulthood is not achieved except with the maturation of the reason and this implies not only the capacity to acquire rational knowledge but also the actual acquisition of necessary truths.” (al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 480).

³² Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³³ Al Jurjānī, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

³⁴ Al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

command. He is not expected to know the full details of *tawhīd*;³⁵ but, in addition to God's existence, he should be aware of the obligations which God had imposed upon him. Otherwise, "he would die a *kāfir* (unbeliever) unworthy of eternal punishment in hell."³⁶

While empirical knowledge is and must always be partial, probable and relative, the Mu'tazilah regarded rational knowledge of God as certain and complete, a partial knowledge of Him being unthinkable.³⁷ That is a thesis hard to defend; but the Mu'tazilah were driven to it by the consideration that there shall be no middle road between *tawhīd* (or the strictly monotheistic thesis) and either polytheism or unbelief. Firstly, they argued, there is but one kind of knowledge of God; and that is rational knowledge. It is impossible that God be object of either knowledge by sense or by report. The former is obvious; the latter – namely, knowledge by report – is not knowledge at all, but a claim for knowledge. But only that knowledge which is acquired by sense or report can be complete or incomplete depending on how much of the object the senses have beheld or the report has covered. Such knowledge is ruled out in this case *ex hypothesi*. God's being cannot be partial because it is indivisible; and since it is indivisible – because in God there are neither parts nor aspects – God is one and simple, and being and perfection are His essence. Any knowledge of Him, they argued, must therefore be complete; and if any knowledge of God is necessary, a complete knowledge of Him (*i.e.*, of His existence as well as of His will and command) must be equally so. Apparently the Mu'tazilah here forgot their identification of God's essence with His attributes and the implication that, since the attributes are knowable partially, knowledge of God is so too. While such criticism of the Mu'tazilah position is legitimate, it should be remembered that it does not affect their position on the existence of God. That God is, that He has a will (or attributes) which is relevant for man – are propositions which, by definition, admit of no middle answer. And it is probably this aspect of the matter that led the Mu'tazilah to shoot, as it were, beyond their target.

As for revelation, the Mu'tazilah assigned to it the role of assisting reason, especially in cases where, for lack of endowment or lack of cultivation, man is prevented from attaining knowledge of God and of

³⁵ Al Nazzām here shows the deep insight latent in the notion that "theologies are human creatures." Man's divergent reports of the nature of God, he tells us, are mere ideational representations of an essence that is one, perfect and complete which is the presupposition of these representations. (al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 393).

³⁶ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³⁷ Al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 391.

moral principles. But even then, revelation does not excuse the subject from the exercise of reason but lays it all the more heavily upon him to seek conviction regarding the truths revealed. As it were, revelation here plays the role of breaking through the obstruction, of furnishing a short lift on the rough road. It never serves as a gratuitous dispenser of all truth.³⁸ It must be repeated that such role is allowed (for revelation) only for the rationally handicapped, which, in one degree or another, we all are. That is why revelation is a highly needed corrective. For normal reason, or reason as such, revelation is not necessary, though its reports – having the same object – cannot but agree with the findings of reason. Exercise of the rational faculty does and should bring man to knowledge of God and of good and evil without external aids.³⁹ It is therefore clear that “normal” or “mature” reason is a distinction the Mu‘tazilah made in order to cannonize the rational method rather than any particular application of it.⁴⁰ Furthermore, what revelation brings is not an overpowering of the rational faculty; it is not a “creed” which must be consented to, despite its irrationality. Rather, the revealed content is itself part of the system of truth which is all rational and critical;⁴¹ and once its breakthrough is made, it should ensue in a renewal of rational activity and a recapture of the same content by rational means.

Knowledge of God and of His command may be rational. But how can it be necessary in the sense that man must seek and attain it? What if man is simply not interested in such pursuit? If he is interested, one can understand how one consideration, such as the givenness of moral obligation, may lead him to another and finally to the necessary conclusion concerning God. His knowledge will then be necessary in the sense that its propositional steps are related to one another according to strict rules of logical deduction. But can we say that it was necessary in the sense that the subject is compelled to initiate and follow such a logical escalation at all?

Yes, answer the Mu‘tazilah; and to accomodate their new thought they invented the notion of “rational fear.”⁴² The idea of God, they

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 480.

³⁹ Al *Shahraṣṭānī*, *op. cit.*, p. 51; al *Baghdādī*, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

⁴⁰ Consider in this regard the Mu‘tazilah’s division of the life of reason into stages (infancy to full maturity) in which the requirement and achievement of reason is progressively greater. (al *Baghdādī*, *op. cit.*, p. 160; al *Shahraṣṭānī*, *op. cit.*, p. 65; al *Ash‘arī*, *op. cit.*, p. 480).

⁴¹ *Taqīd*, or inherited knowledge (tradition, communal practice, etc.) “is acceptable only when it is not oppugn to reason. Until such knowledge is put to the test by reason and its veracity ascertained, it may be accepted as ‘true guess’ (*ẓann ṣaḍīq*),” – doubtless for its practical value. (al *Jurjānī*, *op. cit.*, p. 18).

⁴² Al *Jurjānī*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

argued, anticipating Immanuel Kant as well as Rudolph Otto, is such that its mere presentation, as a claim contending for rational establishment, constitutes such terrifying and appealing challenge that it puts man in a state of "rational fear," unless and until he considers the claim and reaches a conclusive decision regarding it. The specter of punishment and doom as well as the appeal of infinite beauty and goodness which the idea of God presents leaves unmoved only the man devoid of rational endowment and intelligence.⁴³ The man who does not fear the "*tremendum*" that is God so that he would seek to ascertain His existence and, if convinced, to conform to His demand, the man who is not moved not by the "*fascinans*" that is God so that he would seek to contemplate, to praise, to "enjoy" His sublime character – such a man is simply unreasonable. We call insane whomsoever is guilty of much less than that. Since the Mu'tazilah were convinced that the claim to the truth which the idea of God presents, if it is to be decided, cannot but ensue in the recognition of His existence and of His will which is the morally imperative, they counted "rational fear" tantamount to necessity.

3. *Moral Freedom*

The Mu'tazilah thought that if, as the Qur'an says,⁴⁴ God offered His trust to the angels and to the mountains, and they rejected it with horror, but man accepted it, it must be integral to His will that the worthiest possible fulfillment of that trust is that which is done by man. Certainly the angels and the mountains, heaven and earth, actualize divine will. But they do so with the necessity of natural law. Great as their realization of the divine command may be, it is not as great, therefore, as man's for whom the possibility of doing otherwise is always open. Man, the Mu'tazilah asserted with the Qur'an, is greater than God's angels;⁴⁵ and this is so precisely because the angels cannot disobey, cannot not-do God's bidding, whereas man can. An obedience freely and deliberately preferred to a possible disobedience is worth far more than one entered into necessarily, without choice. Where the doors of evil are wide open and man nonetheless does the good, his deed rises to another level of being. It becomes the carrier of moral value. Conversely, without the freedom to do otherwise than to obey the divine imperative, without the possibility to realize disvalue, man's

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 74–78.

⁴⁴ Qur'an, 33:72.

⁴⁵ Qur'an, 2:30.

obedience may have all the utilitarian value of which it is capable, but is ethically worthless. That is why the Mu'tazilah regarded moral freedom as an axiom conditioning all their theology and philosophy. And in doing so, they thought they were true to the innermost core of Islam.

But freedom is not all for which they found the faith of Islam to be speaking. They found that the Qur'an also asserted that nothing takes place in heaven and earth except with His knowledge;⁴⁶ that everything that happens, happens by His decree;⁴⁷ that it is He who moved sun and earth, stars and the moon;⁴⁸ that it is He who sends the rain and revives the earth,⁴⁹ who creates the embryo and sends it its food.⁵⁰ Determinism is thus complete in the realm of nature. But nature is not merely the realm of moon and stars, mountains and rivers. Bringing this determinism closer to man, the Qur'an says that it is God who decrees when and how every man shall live or die,⁵¹ when and how every man shall carry out every little business of life.⁵² Thus Islam placed man squarely within the realm of nature. Going still deeper, the Qur'an says that nothing social or communal happens in history without His knowing it;⁵³ that the growth, life and decay of all societies is by His decree ⁵⁴ – in short, that the personal and the social are no less "nature" and completely determined by God than mountains and trees. Finally, going still deeper, the Qur'an tells us that nothing within the hearts of men is entertained or rejected, hated or loved but that it is so by divine knowledge and decree;⁵⁵ that every man's right decision as well as bad decision – even his conversion to or resistance of the faith – is determined by divine knowledge and decree;⁵⁶ indeed, that man's moral life itself, his most personal moments of decision, are public in this sense, viz., that God knows of and has ordered them.⁵⁷ Thus Islam has taught an absolutely complete cosmos, a creation so completely determined that it cannot admit even the smallest possibility of a gap in its ordering and determination.

This is certainly no defence of freedom. What Islam has offered its

⁴⁶ Qur'an, 34:3.

⁴⁷ Qur'an, 3:5; 35:11; 57:22.

⁴⁸ Qur'an, 7:54.

⁴⁹ Qur'an, 6:99.

⁵⁰ Qur'an, 13:8; 41:47.

⁵¹ Qur'an, 3:145.

⁵² Qur'an, 10:61; 34:3.

⁵³ Qur'an, 7:34; 15:4.

⁵⁴ Qur'an, 17:58; 23:43.

⁵⁵ Qur'an, 27:74.

⁵⁶ Qur'an, 64:4.

⁵⁷ Qur'an, 14:27; 39:23; 45:23.

thinkers is an antinomy of freedom; and it is to such antinomy that the Mu'tazilah addressed themselves. Their predecessors, the earlier Muslims, lived and acted as if both thesis and antithesis were true, without feeling the need to explain or to elaborate. Indeed, they could hardly be said to have been aware of the antinomic character of the problem. But when, in the second and third centuries A.H., the new converts, incapable of following the fathers in this total and intuitive commitment, began to question their understanding of the double aspect of man's freedom and to emphasize the one at the cost of the other, a danger point was reached. It was at this time that the Mu'tazilah arose to meet the challenge. To them, the Islamic tradition owes its breakthrough towards an explanation of the antinomy; and this remains the Mu'tazilah's noblest contribution.

The Mu'tazilah have argued for the thesis as strongly as they did for the antithesis. For determinism, they argued with Mu'ammār that all the accidents of a body (motion and rest, color and taste, heat and cold, moisture and dryness, etc.) are acts of that body by nature;⁵⁸ that life is the act of the living and death the act of the dead;⁵⁹ that all the heavenly movements, the motion and rest of the planets, their harmony and distance are their own acts ("acts other than God's" – said by an opponent in emphasis of the non-deterministic nature of the Mu'tazilah view!).⁶⁰ Such judgment was made possible after the Mu'tazilah had already established the nature of things as permanent and unchangeable and linked this permanence with God's eternal knowledge of them. With al-Nazzām, the Mu'tazilah insisted that of the same substance two different effects cannot proceed; that the effects or acts of a substance must be peculiar to its nature, a nature which does not change without a change in the substance.⁶¹ On these Aristotelian premises the Mu'tazilah built the orderly cosmos in which there can be no causal gaps.

When the Mu'tazilah turned their attention to freedom, they found the issue encumbered with a major misunderstanding; and they set themselves first to the task of defining the problem. They distinguished between acts by nature and acts by will, predicating the former to all things, dead and alive, and limiting the latter to man. This caused no mean consternation among their fellow-Muslims who strongly disapproved of any attribution of creative power to nature lest monotheism

⁵⁸ Al Ash'arī, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

be compromised.⁶² Indeed, their insistence that an essential difference separates the acts of nature and the acts of will caused the Mu'tazilah to be misunderstood as saying that there are two creators – God and man – and to be wrongly accused of *shirk*, or association of other gods with God. Actually, the intention of the Mu'tazilah was the very opposite. They had distinguished between the two in order to reserve creation for God and grant to man the lesser capacity of orienting already-created fully-determined, chains of causality. That is what they meant when they asserted man to be not the "creator" of his deeds, but simply their chooser or willer.⁶³

The point is as delicate as it is crucial. The doing of deeds, the production of effects is always the result of *tawallud*, or the engendering of one thing by another – in short, of chained causation or causal *nexus*. There is no effect without a cause, however distant – indeed even inexistent – it may be from its effect. Willing of a thing, on the other hand, is never attached to the object of willing until the willing has taken place. Prior to this, the willing subject may always choose to will that object as much as another.⁶⁴ Thus, al Iskāfī defined the *mutawallad* (determined) act as "every act which occurs without prior selection between it and other alternative acts," whereas the willed act is that which occurs only after such selection has taken place. To "create acts," or actually to produce real effects in space-time as would result from certain causes is man's prerogative, and it is all the power he has.⁶⁵ Effects are produced by their causes according to rule; and their subservience to rule is the orderliness of creation. In this domain man is utterly impotent and is determined as any other creature in the cosmos. To assert man's freedom, therefore, does not mean to assert his capacity to create or to generate anything *ex nihilo*. Such a freedom is utterly impossible for man. God alone is capable of it. It is to the Mu'tazilah's immortal credit that they have separated the problem of moral freedom from this misconceived association of it with an impossible claim. The task of philosophy, then, is not to prove man's capacity to generate (*tawallid*), but to orient the causal chain. To this end the Mu'tazilah offered the following three arguments.

First, they claimed that there is an awareness of man's capacity to

⁶² Al Khayyāt, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52, 60–61.

⁶³ Al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 80.

⁶⁴ "Al Nazzām said; 'The subject's capacity to act is always the capacity to do and not to do that act.'" (al Shahrastānī, *op. cit.*, p. 66).

⁶⁵ "Man can do no more than to will; all events are the acts of bodies by nature." Thus Thumāmah Ibn al Ashras, Mu'ammār, as well as al Jāhīz are reported to have said. (al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 137).

bring about a certain effect in response to felt needs – such as the capacity to move one's body or to put it at rest⁶⁶ – and that this awareness is given. It is a datum inseparable from man's conscious life. Secondly, moral obligation, which is the presupposition of every "do" and "don't," of every "ought" and "ought-not," is equally another given datum of human awareness. The greatest part of human life on earth takes this factuality for granted. For, it is impossible to feel obliged, or to expect any man to feel so, unless obligation is real; and it is nonsensical to command or to obey, to deserve merit or demerit, without the implication that the command or obedience is the subject's responsibility. Without obligation, the difference between the imposition of duty (*taklīf*), arbitrary caprice (*taskhīr*), and the impossible work (*ta'jīz*) falls to the ground.⁶⁷ Thirdly, even if we disregard the strictly moral and religious obligation (*taklīf shar'ī*), the Mu'tazilah asked, is not our whole daily life woven around obligation and responsibility regarding the most common things? Are not these data at the base of the greater part of our feelings and emotions? Is it not the sophist only that denies them and does so while contradicting himself by feeling, demanding and holding others responsible, as we do?⁶⁸ Now obligation is impossible without freedom. As Kant was to put it, "*du kannst*" is a necessary presupposition of "*du sollst*." For the Mu'tazilah there could be no rational doubt regarding freedom. Its assertion is supported by incontrovertible data of the moral consciousness. Its denial is a constructionist claim devoid of reality.

In addition to these arguments, the Mu'tazilah marshalled such verses of the Qur'an as they could find to support the claim for freedom. "We have shown man the path; and he may follow it with gratitude or deviate ungratefully;"⁶⁹ "Say, the truth is from your Lord; whoever wills, may believe therein, and whoever does not, may not;"⁷⁰ and others were utilized.⁷¹ But these verses, we must admit, must be seen in the light of the other verses which support determinism. Together, they constitute evidence for the antinomic nature of freedom rather than for freedom *simpliciter*. It is in the moral overtone of the Qur'an as a whole, rather than in any such particular verse, that evidence for moral freedom should be sought.

⁶⁶ Al Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al Iqdām fi 'Ilm al Kalām*, ed. by A. Guillaume, Oxford, 1934, p. 79.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Qur'ān, 76:3.

⁷⁰ Qur'ān, 18:9.

⁷¹ Qur'ān, 6:152.

The foregoing proofs, whether they are regarded as psychological in nature or as varieties of the *reductio ad absurdum*, all point to the incontrovertible fact that the Mu'tazilah subordinated everything in their system to moral considerations; that the cornerstone of their whole faith, Islam – its be-all and end-all – is the purely ethical question of man's direction of his own life on earth. The self, in their system, is nothing, unless it is free to act by will. To use Qur'anic imagery, the self is called upon to grasp and to realize a divine trust. But this trust is not in a vacuum; neither is it imposed in abstraction from man's intricate involvement in nature, in society and history. These are the theater of the self's activity, the *matériaux* of its operations. For the self to implement the divine trust, it can and should only stand in the midst of the infinite causal chains of nature. There, acting as the focus at which the causal chains of reality converge, the self reorients, by its free decision, their course and destination without diminution of or addition to their causal efficacy. The self's theater, for the Mu'tazilah and for Islam, is an orderly one; and her decision makes all the difference between the realization and non-realization of the absolute on earth.

5. *The Place of Self in the Eternal Order*

The Mu'tazilah held that God is absolutely just and that His ordering of creation is no less so. His will is the good; it realizes itself necessarily in nature, but only commands its realization by man. Man, equipped by nature to discover divine will or the good, is capable of grasping it, and consequently, of falling under its moving power and appeal. Revelation has come to serve as a prop and guide, and its doing so constitutes a challenge which rational man cannot ignore. He must henceforth investigate revelation's claims; and truth being one as God is one, a genuine application of man's rational faculty cannot but confirm the propositions and judgments of revelation. Having grasped the good, or divine will, man is obligated to realize it; but he is free to do so, or not to do so. Whereas man's realization is a positive contribution to the total value of creation, his non-realization is a real privation and positive loss to that total. Once done, every human deed belongs to history and its net contribution cannot be undone. This is an eternal order which admits no tampering – whether in man's favor or against him. Otherwise, God's justice and righteousness and the order of the universe itself are gravely endangered.

God, however, does not work in vain. To do so would be contrary to

His nature, once His will is identified with His essence-*in-percipi* as well as with the good. That the good and evil deeds of men remain with all their disparity in eternal juxtaposition is not compatible with justice. Indeed, such a claim spells nothing short of disaster for morality, namely, the final futility of the moral life. A system of rewards and punishments is indispensable to offset the disparities of actualized good and evil. And this system must be instituted after a reckoning, which Islam calls the Day of Judgment. The system itself is the order of paradise and hell. This order is not "the kingdom of God" in the Christian sense, in which the final realization of the absolute, ever denied on earth, is to take place. The absolute, in Islam, is possible of realization here and now, within space-time. Rather, the "other world" is a system of rewards and punishments for man's success or failure to achieve that absolute. According to the Mu'tazilah, it is necessitated by the acknowledgement of the factuality of moral obligation as well as of the freedom of the subject which the former implies and which is equally given as a fact of ethical consciousness. Islamic history has also told us that many men have succeeded in such realization and have deserved the eternal reward.

The Mu'tazilah followed this reasoning of Islam and adapted it to their system of thought. According to them, the soul, being by nature different from the body-*cum*-life, does not suffer the same fate as the latter and is therefore not destroyed at death. It must, at least and above all, survive the body in order to meet, as the real author of human deeds, its deserved justification or rejection. But an analysis of reward and punishment quickly convinced the Mu'tazilah that the soul cannot stand to be judged, rewarded or punished without the body. Hence, they held resurrection of the body necessary in order that the soul may enjoy the only blisses or suffer the only hardships it knows.⁷² This is not to say that reward and punishment are all bodily; but that even the spiritual ones are inconceivable without the substratum that the body furnishes for the soul. A disembodied soul, though its existence is not dependent upon that of the body, is nonetheless not one which we know as capable of enjoying rewards or suffering punishments. It cannot apprehend these without the body. The body must therefore be resurrected, rejoined to the soul and empowered to sustain itself in eternal life.

It is hence obvious that the Mu'tazilah built their doctrines of the

⁷² "... The joys of reward and sufferings of punishment are impossible unless the soul reenters its body ..." (al Khayyāt, *op. cit.*, p. 37).

indestructibility of the soul, of the resurrection of the body, of the Day of Judgment and of paradise and hell on the grounds of rational ethics, as Immanuel Kant was to do a thousand years later.⁷³

Another conclusion to which the Mu'tazilah's rationalism led them was that only those persons who have earned rewards or punishments would be resurrected and entered into either paradise or hell. The others who, either for lack of adequate endowment or of causal efficacy, had not disturbed the net total of the value of creation – such as infants, the mentally deranged or retarded, and the incapacitated – would not be resurrected and would not share in either paradise or hell.⁷⁴ “Those whom God had not put under the obligation to know Him . . . are not responsible (*mukallafah*),” Thumāmah said; and “... their fate is dust.”⁷⁵ This is certainly a hard position to take in the light of God's great compassion and mercy; and not all the Mu'tazilah pursued the point to Thumāmah's merciless conclusion. Al Jubbā'ī, for instance, invented “the abode of peace” to accommodate this third class belonging neither to paradise nor to hell; and al Nazzām discarded the idea of class in paradise, extending God's mercy, the vision of Him and the heavenly joys, equally to all its inhabitants.⁷⁶

We may therefore conclude that the Mu'tazilah were not only Muslim philosophers, but the philosophers of Islam. They condensed the faith to its essential principles and applied their mental energies to establishing them in thought. Their theory of the constitution of the self as a tripartite entity was a corollary of the principle of the ideal self-existence of a pattern for ethical activity (the Ought, God's command or will), the fulfillment or otherwise of which demands a soul-subject other

⁷³ As he did in his second critique, namely, *Critique of Practical Reason*.

⁷⁴ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶ Al Baghdādī, *op. cit.*, p. 161; al Shahrastānī, *Nihāyat al Iqdām fi 'Ilm al Kalām*, p. 80. The story is told that al Ash'arī asked Jubbā'ī to tell him regarding the fate of three brothers, two adults, one virtuous and the other vicious, and an infant. Al Jubbā'ī answered that the virtuous will go to paradise, the vicious to hell and the infant to the abode of peace. Al Ash'arī rejoined: If the infant sought to join his virtuous brother, would he be permitted to do so? Al Jubbā'ī answered: No, because the virtuous brother reached paradise by his moral achievement and desert of which the infant had none. Al Ash'arī asked; What if the infant rejoined to God, “You have taken away my life too soon, before I could do Your will and earn what my brother has earned.” Al Jubbā'ī replied that God would answer thus: “I knew that if you lived you would not have done My will or earned any desert. I took away your life too soon because I was merciful to you.” Al Ash'arī asked: What if the condemned brother, overhearing this conversation, said, “You knew that I would not realize Your will and would earn punishment in hell. Why were You not merciful in my case so as to have taken away my life before I earned my punishment?” Al Jubbā'ī had no answer. Such were the difficult problems posed by their opponents to the Mu'tazilah, and there was no solution to them once their inflexibly hard line of reward and punishment was taken.

than the body-*cum*-life which is its carrier. Their theory of rational cognition is a corollary of the principle of such knowability and the moral responsibility for its achievement. Their theory of moral freedom is the corollary of the realizability of the divine pattern as well as of the malleability of the human and other *matériaux* of space-time for such realization. Finally, their principle of the place of the soul in the eternal order is the corollary of the principle of the world order as one of absolute justice, the moral aspect of the monotheistic principle itself, of *tawhīd*, without which the whole system may be as well ordered as clockwork but, in final analysis, futile and in vain, incapable of touching the person in his most individual moment. For it is this very person, this I and this body-*cum*-life, that is the real and individual self of the person, and that will and must some day stand in front of all being and reality to render account of itself and to receive, according to that absolute justice, every atom of reward and punishment it has earned.⁷⁷ And nothing less than that will save man from the doom of vanity, futility and cynicism.

⁷⁷ "When Earth is shaken with her (final) earthquake,
 And Earth yieldeth up her burdens,
 And man saith: What aileth her?
 That day she will relate her chronicles,
 Because thy Lord inspireth her.
 That day mankind will issue forth in scattered groups to be shown their deeds.
 And whoso doeth good an atom's weight will see it then,
 And whoso doeth ill an atom's weight will see it then."
 (Qur'ān, M. Pickthall's tr., 99: 1-8).

UNITY: APPEARANCE AND REALITY

*In the light of the Sufi Doctrines of "Wahdat-ul-Wujud" of Ibn 'Arabi
and "Wahdat-ush-Shahud" of Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi*

MIRZA QADEER BAIG

The conception of unity in Islam comes mainly from the Qur'an. The Qur'an says that God is one and there is nothing like Him. He is sufficient unto Himself and He is beyond the needs of the worlds, yet God is nearer to man than man's life line. The nature of this nearness and of His being beyond the beyond is discussed by the Sufis at great length. Abu Bakr Kalabadi (died 496/995, Muslim/Christian) the author of one of the earliest authentic treatises on Sufism recorded a summary of the belief of the earlier Sufis in the Unity of God.

The Sufis are agreed that God is One, Alone, Single, Eternal, Everlasting, Knowing, Powerful, Living Hearing, Seeing, Strong, Mighty, Majestic, Great, Generous, Clement, Proud, Awful, Enduring, First, God, Lord, Ruler, Master, Merciful, Compassionate, Desirous, Speaking, Creating, Sustaining, that He is qualified with all the Attributes wherewith He has qualified Himself, and named with all the Names whereby He has named Himself; that since eternity He has not ceased to continue with His Names and Attributes without resembling creation in any respect, that His Essence does not resemble the essences, nor His Attributes the attributes; that not one of the terms applies to the created beings and indicating their creation in time, has currency over Him, that He has not ceased to be Leader, Foremost, before all things born in time, Existent before everything, that there is no eternal but He, and no God beside Him, that He is neither body nor shape, nor form, nor person, nor element, nor accident, that with Him there is neither junction nor separation, neither movement nor rest, neither augmentation nor decrease, that He has neither parts nor particles, nor members nor limbs, nor aspects nor places that He is not affected by faults, not overcome with slumber, nor altered by times nor specified by allusions that He is not contained by space, nor affected by time; that He cannot be said to be touched or to be isolated, or to dwell in places; that He is not compassed by thoughts, nor covered by veils, nor attained by eyes.¹

The later Sufis developed the doctrines of unity in great detail. Here we intend to examine the two leading doctrines:

(1) of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud*: the unity of existence propounded by

¹ Kalabadi – *Kitab al Ta'arruf li Madhab ahl al Tasawwuf*, tr. by A. J. Arberry, the Doctrine of the Sufis, pp. 14 and 15.

Muhy-ad-Din Ibn 'Arabi, also known as the Great Shaikh (born at the town of Murcia in Spain in 560/1164 and died at Demascus in 638/1240), and

(2) of *Wahdat-ush-Shahud*: the unity of Appearance, propounded by Shaikh Ahmad of Sarhind, also known as the renewer of faith after one thousand years (born Sarhind in India in 971/1564 and died there in 1034/1624).

According to Ibn 'Arabi there is nothing in existence except the One Real Being – God. *Al Haq*, the Truth, and *Al Khalq*, the creation, are two phases of the same Reality. To treat the creation or the world as something separate from God would be duality and would lead to polytheism; the apparent duality of *Al Haq* and *Al Khalq* is not the duality of beings but the duality of aspects of the One Real Being. For *Al Haq* is the inner aspect and *Al Khalq* is the outward aspect of Reality. In other words, *Al Haq* is the One in a state of transcendence and *Al Khalq* is the Many in a state of immanence of Reality.

If you assert (pure) transcendence you limit God,
And if you assert pure immanence you define Him,
But if you assert both things you follow the right course,
And you are a leader and a master in Gnosis.²

To explain the relation of the two phases of Reality Ibn 'Arabi holds that there was no time when Reality of the One Being was non-existent and then came into existence. There was the One Being all the time in a state that could not be defined by names or attributes; the most that could be said is that it was the state of (*al'ima*) blindness. It was the state of beginning without end and end without beginning. In the next stage, which is the first stage of the mode of knowledge, the Names and Attributes acquire distinction and difference. If the distinction of Names and Attributes is implicit and brief, it is regarded as the First Determinate, if the distinction of the Names and Attributes is explicit and in detail, it is regarded as the Second Determinate; but both these stages are merely conceptual.

This is the display of being in an epiphany containing in itself all the active, necessary, and divine manifestations as well as all the passive, contingent and mundane manifestations. Ibn 'Arabi regards this as the state of First Emanation, the First Intelligence, the First Determinate, the Reality of Muhammad, the Reality of Realities. At the same time Ibn 'Arabi insists that the Names are identical with the Attributes and, similarly, the Attributes and the Names are identical with the Essence.

² Ibn 'Arabi, *Fusus al Hikam*. P. 76.

Thus he maintains that the Knower ('*Alim*), the Knowledge ('*Ilm*), and the known (*Ma'lum*) are the same. But all these states of Essence, Attributes and Names refer to the aspect of transcendence of Unity. In the following states belonging to the aspect of immanence, Being is manifested in different souls and spirits, next comes the determination of ideas whereby Being is manifested in the world of thought and imagination. This state also includes passive manifestations the characteristic of which is the potentiality of receiving impressions. The last state is the descent in the world of senses, the world of outward manifestation, the creation possessing sensible existences.

God was the Hidden Treasure, He wanted to be known; so He revealed Himself to Himself and the creation followed. This act of creation which occurs eternally and continuously according to Ibn 'Arabi, is nothing but a descent of the Creator Himself into the being of things. Ibn 'Arabi quotes the Qur'an to illustrate the act of creation:

When God intends the creation of a thing

His command is: "Be," and it becomes.

(The Qur'an, 36:82)

The question arises what is it that God commands to be, when it becomes? If a thing capable of receiving the command already exists, then is it proper to call it the creation in the true sense of the term? Conversely, could any non-entity be the object of command at all? Ibn 'Arabi obviously faces a difficulty at this stage because it would seem that no non-entity could be the object of the command to be; or, if an entity already exists to receive the command then the question of creation does not arise at all. To escape this difficulty Ibn 'Arabi propounds a theory of the Fixed Prototypes (*A yan al Thabita*).

The Fixed Prototypes are the ideas of God's future becoming – in the mind of God Himself – the contents of His knowledge of Himself. It was the Fixed Prototypes that received the command to be (*kun*) and the creation started coming into being (*Fayakun*) accordingly. But the Fixed Prototypes themselves do not assume the shape of concrete manifestations. They are mere ideas in the Mind of God. As ideas, they do not come out of the Mind of God, leaving a blank there. What actually takes the form of existence is the reflection of the Fixed Prototypes, the contents of the knowledge of God of Himself. It is clarified through a simile: a reflection may be seen in a mirror but it cannot be claimed that the object reflected in the mirror has actually assumed existence in the mirror. The object is merely reflected in the mirror and nothing more. Hence the creation as such is merely nominal, unreal, objectively

non-existent and God alone exists. God is manifested in all things and is yet above all things. He is everywhere and yet above everywhere. There is nothing but God, nothing in existence other than He, there is not even a "there" where the essence of all things is one. Again, "My eyes see naught but His face and my ear hears no other than His speech."

To sum up, Ibn 'Arabi insists that his doctrine is in accordance with the Qur'an and quotes the following verse to support his belief:

He is the First, He is the Last,
He is the Outward (Manifest)
He is the Inward (Hidden).
(The Qur'an, 57:3)

During the later tenth/sixteenth (Muslim/Christian) century at the time of Shaikh Ahmad, the theory of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* had taken almost complete control over the heart, mind, and soul of the Sufis in India. Shaikh Ahmad himself was brought up in the traditions of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* and it was under their influence that he wrote to his spiritual guide:

Alas this Shari'a is the religion of ignorant men. Our religion is infidelity and unbelief.

Belief and unbelief are the locks and face of that beautiful fairy. Belief and unbelief are the same in our way.³

Later on a new kind of experience took hold of his soul and a sense of duality between God and Universe arose. He found that the world has a being of its own, not as the Real, but a semblance or shadow of the Real. This sense of duality caused him to doubt his previous experience when he found the world to be one with God. All the previous knowledge leading to Unity (*Ittihad*), Comprehension (*Ihata*), Penetration (*Suryan*), Nearness (*Qurb*) and Union with the Essence (*Ma'yyat-i-zatiyya*) began to disappear.⁴

This new experience undermined his confidence in *Wahdat-ul-Wujud*, but his previous experience and knowledge kept him from rejecting it and going to the extreme.⁵

This was for him a transitional period, during which he pondered much over the problems raised in his mind by his new experiences. At last it was revealed to him that all the previous stages were "the theatre of adumbrations and limitations of Immanence" and the real object

³ Shaikh Ahman, *Maktubat*, Vol. I: 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* Vol. I: II.

was beyond and beyond and again beyond and beyond those stages.⁶ He felt disgust for the contingent and temporal and turned away from it towards the Incomparable Being.⁷ He realised that God had no relation to the world, whether known (*Ma'lum ul Kaifiyat*) or unknown (*Majhul-ul-Kaifiyat*) except as the Creator of the World, and that the World was mere Creation (*Makhluq*). Similarly man had no relation of union, identity, comprehension or manifestation with God except that of servitude. He became thoroughly convinced of the truth that God and the universe were not one and felt that he must promulgate that truth irrespective of opposition. He was fully aware of the fact that he was living in a society where he would be a lonely voice, asserting that God and the Universe were not One. Moreover, this assertion was against his own previous beliefs and also against the known way of the previous Sufis whom he still held in great esteem. Yet it was something he could not help making. He was convinced of the truth of his experience to the extent that he regarded silence for fear of opposition as dishonest and contrary to his convictions. The stage of servitude and obedience could not tolerate such considerations.⁸ No doubt, there were 'Ulama who were already in opposition to the Sufi belief of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud*. But their opposition was based on outward knowledge through logic and argument (*Nazar-o-Istadlal*), whereas Shaikh Ahmad differed from the believer of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* on the basis of intuition and mystic experience (*Kashf-o-Shahud*). Shaikh Ahmad held that the 'Ulama looked only to the dark side of this theory and rejected it outright, whereas he looked to the bright side of it. He regarded *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* as true, but imperfect and incomplete. He held that adherence to *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* was a stage for Sufi development and therefore not condemnable. Only to stay in this state was not good, and to be contented with the cognitions (*Mu'arif*) of this stage was not suitable.⁹ Analysing the states of the adherents of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud*, Shaikh Ahmad divided them into three groups, and examined their conditions and experiences. Some Sufis took such intense meditation and such extensive exercises that the idea of Unity overpowered their faculties and they took the maxim "There is no god but God (*La Ilaha Illal Lah*)" as meaning: "There is nothing in existence except God (*La Mawjuda il lal Lah*)."¹⁰

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* Vol. II: 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.* Vol. I: 291.

Shaikh Ahmad declared that that kind of *Tawhid* (unity) was achieved through deception in ideas, imagination, and meditation. It was the creation of one's own imagination. The idea of unity became firm in the mind of the adherent. Such a person was not endowed with a state of spiritual experience (*Sahib-i-Hal*) but only with knowledge (*Sahib-i-'Ilm*). The second group of adherents experienced *Tawhid* through their love of God (*Zauq*) and the strong desire of the heart to know God (*Jazbah*). Those Sufis, according to Shaikh Ahmad, reached the state of unity either through the grace of God or through their own efforts based on the love of God. In their case, the love of God overpowered their faculty of vision and they became oblivious to every object other than the Beloved. As they were unable to see anything except the Beloved, they did not recognise any other object in existence. That aspect of *Tawhid* was derived from the state of spiritual experience (*Ahwal*) and was above the scope of imagination and conception. If the attention of such people of the heart (*Sahib-i-Qalb*) were diverted towards the Universe, they witnessed their Beloved in every particle and regarded objects as manifestations and mirrors of the Beloved. If, through the grace of God, they were guided to the higher stages leading towards the Converter of Hearts (*Muqalibbul Qulub* – God) and progressed further, then the cognition of unity belonging to the previous stage started to disappear. It was after they attained this stage that they realised the mistake of their previous experience and found the previous cognition to be unsuitable to their present state to the extent that some of them rejected the previous experience and condemned those who adhered to it, while some did not bother to confirm or reject the previous experience and became indifferent to it in their higher stages.¹¹

Yet there were some other Sufis who realised the Unity after reaching the state of passing away (*Fana*) and absorption (*Istaghraq*) in their spiritual experience (*Mashhud*). Their object was to remain eternally non-existent in their *Mashhud*. They regarded regaining consciousness or returning to the self as infidelity (*Kufr*). They wanted to be always under the burden of the Existent and did not rest for a moment, because rest could be obtained only in a state of unconsciousness (*Ghaf-lat*). Eternal absorption (*Istaghraq*) recognised no negligence and kept the believer always restless. It was in this state of restlessness that Shaikh-ul-Islam Harwi used to say that, if someone were to make him unconscious of God for a moment, God would forgive all the sins of that

¹¹ *Ibid.*

person for it.¹² It was in this state of restlessness that Ibn 'Arabi experienced the whole Universe disappearing and another universe taking its place at every moment and asserted that the process of annihilation and creation goes on forever.

Again it was, perhaps, in this state of restlessness that 'Iraqi experienced:

In the mirror of the Contingent, he appears with a different face every moment. Sometimes he comes in the form of Eve. Sometimes he goes out in the shape of Adam.¹³

Shaikh Ahmad maintained that rest was necessary for human existence, it was essential that those of the Sufis who were passing through the stage of eternal absorption and were always living under the burden of Existence should come out of the condition of continuous restlessness caused by this state. They could find rest only when they became oblivious of the burden of existence and eternal absorption. So God diverted the outward self of those Sufis to something different according to their various capacities, in order that their eternal absorption in Existence be restrained and they find rest. It was for this reason that some of them became very fond of music and dancing, some were diverted to writing books and recording the mysteries of esoteric sciences, some were led to keep themselves busy in performing good deeds, while others were made to acquire the knowledge of *Tawhid*, appreciate Unity in Diversity, and see the One in the Many (*Wahdat dar Kasrat*).¹⁴

So although Shaikh Ahmad did not agree with the followers of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* and regarded their esoteric sciences as imperfect, he did not condemn them for their adherence to this doctrine. He was perhaps the only critic of *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* who had experienced it on the same basis – intuition and mystic experience – as that on which it was experienced by the Sufis. He had realised the experience of Unity in all its fullness and knew that the Sufis who passed through the stages of *Tawhid* could not help declaring their experiences, though this gave offense to the 'Ulama and made the Sufis the object of condemnation.

He illustrated the experience of those Sufis by the analogy of the stars which usually disappear from vision at sunrise. If someone were to assert that at that time the stars did not exist, he would be wrong be-

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ 'Iraqi, Fakhruddin, *Lama'at*. Ms. British Museum. F. 135.

¹⁴ Shaikh Ahmad, *Maktubat*. Vol. I: 291.

cause the assertion was against facts. But as he did not see the stars at that time, he denied their existence. The light of the sun made the stars invisible. The same was the case with those Sufis, who were so overwhelmed by God that everything other than He became invisible to them. Shaikh Ahmad insisted that all their utterances were due to the *vision of the Unity of God and the World* and not to the existence of that Unity.

Turning to the teachings of Ibn 'Arabi, Shaikh Ahmad rejected the very premises which necessarily lead to *Wahdat-ul-Wujud*. He held that the Names and Attributes are not identical with the Essence (*Zat*) of God, nor is the World an emanation of the Names and Attributes of God. According to Shaikh Ahmad the Names and Attributes exist over and above the *Zat*. They are neither identical with nor do they form a part of the *Zat*. God is perfect in Himself.

Verily God is sufficient unto Himself and needs none of the worlds.¹⁵

According to Shaikh Ahmad, God is beyond all Names and Attributes (*Asmau Sifat*), all modes and relations (*Shuyunu I'tibarat*), all projection and introjection (*Buruzu Kumun*), all that is realisable and explicable (*Mawsulu mafsul*), all intuition and mystic experience (*Kashfu Shahud*), all that is empirical and rational (*Mahsusu Ma'qul*), and even beyond all that is conceivable and imaginable (*Mawhumu Mutakhayyul*). In short:

He, the Holy Lord, is beyond the beyond, again beyond the beyond, again beyond the beyond.¹⁶

Existence (*Wujud*) and Necessity (*Wujub*) are two Attributes of God and are over and above the *Zat*. God exists through His *Zat* and not through the Attribute of Existence. God is necessary through His *Zat* and not through the quality of being Necessary (*Wujub*). In God, the *Zat* and the Names and Attributes are not identical, nor are the Names and Attributes identical with each other. Indeed God comprehends everything and is everywhere, but the nature of His comprehension (*Ihata*) or coexistence (*Ma'yyat*) with the phenomenal World is beyond our understanding.

Similarly, although He possesses the Attributes of Existence (*Wujud*), Life (*Hayat*), Knowledge (*'Ilm*), Power (*Qudrat*), Will (*Irada*), Hearing (*Sam'*), Seeing (*Basar*), Speech (*Kalam*), and Creation (*Tak-*

¹⁵ *Ibid.* Vol. III: 26: 100, 110.

¹⁶ *Ibid.* Vol. III: I.

win), His Attributes, too, are beyond our understanding and do not admit any consideration of How and Why (*Bi Chunnu Bi Chigun*). God exists, but He exists by His own Essence (*Zat*) and not by virtue of the quality of Existence (*Wujud*), which is additional to His *Zat*. Similarly, He is Knowing ('*Alim*) by His own Self, He is Powerful (*Qadir*), Willing (*Murid*), Hearing (*Sami'*), Seeing (*Basir*), and Creator (*Khaliq*) through His own Self and not by virtue of these Attributes, which are additional to His *Zat*. The attributes are the effect (*Azlal*) of His *Zat* and not identical with it.¹⁷ Likewise, the world is the effect (*Zil*) of the Attributes and not identical with the Attributes or the Being.

So Shaikh Ahmad and Ibn 'Arabi differ on the basic premise of the doctrine of *Tawhid*. The former holds that the *Zat* of God is ineffable, that the Attributes are mere effect of the *Zat*, and that the world is in turn the mere effect of the Attributes; but the latter maintains that the *Zat* is identical with the Names and Attributes, and thus identical with God Himself. Shaikh Ahmad points out that here Ibn 'Arabi is speaking at the stage of illumination of *Zat* (*Tajalli-i-Zat*).¹⁸ At this stage of mystic experience, everything except the brightness of *Zat* becomes oblivious and the mystic feels that he has a direct vision of the Being. In fact it is only when the mystic outgrows this stage that he realizes the mistake involved in the previous experience. Shaikh Ahmad himself had the same experience and entertained the same ideas.¹⁹ As he outgrew this stage, he realized his mistake, confessed it, and published his repentance.²⁰

Further, Ibn 'Arabi holds that the Fixed Prototypes (*A'yan-al-thabita*) are the reality of the world. Here also Shaikh Ahmad does not agree with Ibn 'Arabi that the *A'yan-al-thabita* are the realities of the Contingent. He maintains that when God decided to create the World, He created Existence and also created other Attributes such as Life, Knowledge, Power, Hearing, Seeing, and Speech, within Existence. These Attributes formed the different aspects of Existence, and at the same time all the qualities found their opposite in Non-entity ('*Adam*). Only the *Zat* of God remained beyond all Attributes and all non-entities ('*Adam*). Opposed to Existence is Absolute Non-entity ('*Adam-i-Mahaz*). Similarly, opposed to the Attribute of Life is a kind of non-entity known as death (*Mawt*); opposed to the Attribute of Knowledge

¹⁷ *Ibid.* Vol. III: 26.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Vol. I: 290, Vol. III: 75.

¹⁹ At this stage Shaikh Ahmad wrote to his son that "the reality of God is the Absolute Existence." *Maktubat*, Vol. I: 2.

²⁰ Shaikh Ahmad, *Maktubat*. Vol. I: 26 .

is another kind of non-entity known as ignorance (*Jahl*); opposed to the Attribute of Power (*Qudrat*) is another kind of non-entity known as powerlessness (*Ijz*), and so on. When God wants to create any object of the Contingent, He casts a reflection of a particular Attribute of the Necessary (*Wujub*) upon its opposed non-entity (*'Adam-i-Mutaqabila*) and the object of the Contingent comes into being. For example, God casts the reflection of Existence upon its opposed non-entity of pure Non-existence (*'Adam-i-Mahaz*) and the finite existence of the Contingent comes into being. Similarly He casts the reflection of Life (*Hayat*) upon its opposed non-entity, that is death (*Mawt*), and the life of the Contingent comes into being. He casts the reflection of Knowledge (*'Ilm*) upon its opposed non-entity, which is ignorance (*Jahl*), and the knowledge belonging to the Contingent comes into being. In this way, according to Shaikh Ahmad, the whole process of creation goes on. The *'A'yan-al-thabita* are not the realities of the World, Shaikh Ahmad insists. It is the opposed non-entities (*'Adam-i-Mutaqabila*) and the reflections of the Attributes mingled in the opposite non-entities that form the realities of the objects belonging to the Contingent World. Precisely, the origin or the essence of the World is non-entity. Whatever qualities such as finite existence, life, knowledge, power, etc. are seen in the world, do not really belong to the World, but are bestowed on it by God. Thus Shaikh Ahmad sums up:

So, according to Ibn 'Arabi, the realities of the Contingent are the Names and Attributes which are separated from one another in the rank of knowledge, but according to this *faqir*, the realities of the Contingent are those non-entities which are opposed to the Names and Attributes, along with the reflections of the Names and Attributes which reflect in the mirror of the opposed non-entities and are mingled with each other.

Thus existence (*Wujud*) is the cause of all perfections, and Non-entity (*'Adam*) is the object of all imperfections. To claim real existence for the Contingent, and to attribute all perfections to it, raises it to the rank of the Necessary, which is not befitting to the Greatness of God, and this also leads to infidelity and heresy.

Shaikh Ahmad also insists that it is not right for the believers in *Wahdat-ul-Wujud* to apply the modes and functions of the Contingent to the Necessary. The level of the Contingent has modes and attributes of its own which are different from those of the Necessary. Even these modes and attributes that belong to the Contingent, can be discriminated from one another and the difference of their various functions is never ending. For example, heating and burning are the properties of

fire and are limited to fire only. Neither of these properties – heating and burning – are possessed by water. In the same way, cold is the property of water and is limited to water, but not to fire. Though both water and fire belong to the Contingent, their properties and particularities cannot be applied to each other. How then can the particular characteristics of modes of being as different as the Divine and the Worldly be applicable to each other?

Shaikh Ahmad holds that each mode of being has separate functions particular to it and not applicable to the other. Necessary and Independent Being has the special characteristics of Wholeness and Divinity, and the Contingent and Dependent Being is characterised by the defectiveness and imperfection.²¹

The first state is that of Lordship and Creative Being and the second of Servitude and being created. The application of the modes and functions of the one state to the other is not only rejected by mystic experience but also goes against the Revelation:

God is Holier than the qualities they ascribe to Him.²²

Therefore it is wrong to say that All is He or that there exists nothing but God. It may be noted that Shaikh Ahmad does not maintain dualism. He does not hold that God and the World are two existences independent of each other. He agrees that, as far as God is concerned, He exists independent of anything. The existence or non-existence of the World does not affect God. He is the same as He was before the World came into being:

He is now the Same as He was.²³

Shaikh Ahmad argues further that, although the World has a separate existence, this existence is not real. The origin of the World is pure Non-entity (*'Adam-i-Mahaz*) but existence has been bestowed on it through the quality of existence.

The existence of the World is a gift and is finite. It does not exist independent of God.

Shaikh Ahmad clarifies his meaning by citing an example: if someone lights one end of a stick and, holding the other, whirls it round in a circle, he produces the appearance of a circle of fire which appears to have an existence of its own: but this existence depends on the action

²¹ Shaikh Ahmad, *Maktubat*. Vol. I: 297.

²² The Qur'an. 37: 180.

²³ Shaikh Ahmad, *Maktubat*. Vol. I: 256.

of the man who whirls the stick. The existence of the circle of fire does not become part of the existence of the mover, nor is the existence of the mover affected by the existence or non-existence of the circle of fire. This proves that the origin of the circle of fire is non-entity but the perpetual action of the mover of the burning stick has given it an unreal existence. Similarly finite existence has been bestowed on pure non-entity ('*Adam-i-Mahaz*) by the blessings of God. The origin of the World, Shaikh Ahmad insists, remains pure non-entity which is the case of all defects, impurity and wickedness. Whatever perfections may be seen in the Contingent World are all from the Necessary Existence and other qualities which are the reflections of the Perfection of God. That is why, Shaikh Ahmad explains, it is declared by Revelation:²⁴

Whatever good you have, it is from God – and whatever bad you have, it is from your own self.

Thus Shaikh Ahmad concludes that God is the Light of all Heaven and Earth and whatever is other than He is dark. Shaikh Ahmad does not agree with Ibn 'Arabi that the World has no existence of its own and whatever we see as the world is the fabrication of our own mind (*Mawhum*). If this were so, all the moral commandments of Revelation would be meaningless. How can God bestow reward or punishment on something which is non-existent and which is the fabrication of one's own mind (*Mawhum*)? On the other hand Shaikh Ahmad does not agree with the 'Ulama, who hold that the World has a separate existence of its own. They believe in the duality of existence; one existence belonging to God and the other to the World. The existence attributed to God is primary and eternal, the existence of the World is the creation of the Existence of God but the former is not part of the latter. On this hypothesis, declares Shaikh Ahmad, the existence of the World could in no way share in the perfections and blessings of the Ultimate Existence of God. But the orthodox 'Ulama believe that it does so, and thus their philosophy is illogical and false.

Real Existence belongs to God. One cannot know God except through God Himself, that is through Revelation. It is impossible for man to comprehend God through mystic experience. Therefore, whatever is known of God, except through Revelation, is not perfect and should be rejected.

The only relation between Man and God is that of the creature and

²⁴ *Ibid.* Vol. I: 234, Vol. II: I.

the Creator, servitude and Lordship. The more one realises one's inability to know God the more one, in fact, knows God.²⁵ He is the One who has Himself praised Himself, and the best way to know Him is through His own Words, that is, through the Qur'an.²⁶

²⁵ *Ibid.* Vol. III: 122.

Here Shaikh Ahmad quotes the saying of Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Islam that: "to become conscious of one's own inability to know God is true knowledge; Holy is He Who has not kept any road to Himself open to His creature except by way of realizing its own incapacity to know Him."

²⁶ Shaikh Ahmad, *Maktubat*. Vol. II: I.

9

VARIANTS IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE SELF IN THE ISLAMIC TRADITION

HAROLD B. SMITH

We are accustomed to think that Islam is inflexible, even monolithic in dogma and law. Yet in spite of persecutions and counter-persecutions over the centuries it has exhibited a surprising diversity, what Duncan Black Macdonald used to call a "liberty of variety in unity." Perhaps this catholicity is most apparent in the manifold variants of the doctrines pertaining to the self. The spectrum of expressed ideas ranges from the extremes of determinism where the individual is a mere cipher, a cog in a cosmic machine, without identity or autonomy, to the extremes of monistic mysticism where the reality of the ego is completely swallowed up in the consciousness of an Ultimate.

Perhaps we might use a crescent, symbol familiar to all Muslims, to represent the scheme of thought I wish to elaborate. The center of the crescent, the point of greatest breadth might represent the position of the Qur'an; one curving point might represent the various degrees of emphasis on divine transcendence and the dualism of Creator and creation; the other might represent the movement toward greater emphasis on divine immanence and the Unity of God and the world.

At the extremes, surprisingly, we come to positions that are strangely alike in so far as they affect views of man and the self. At one extreme, God is the only actor; all subsidiary realities depend on his instantaneous recreation; at the other, God *is* all that is. The self in the one is reduced to moments in the activity of God, in the other the self is a particle of the Divine Being destined to be reabsorbed in the whole as a drop of spray that falls back in the ocean.

In between, however, we have a great variety of positions in which the self is recognized as having greater or lesser degrees of independent significance and autonomy. Here we always find a paradoxical dialectic that posits both subservience of the individual self to the will and thought of the Ultimate Being and areas of integral freedom where the

ego has a particular role to play in the whole. The whole figure of the crescent is characterized, as must probably be the case in all religious concepts of the self, by this interplay between views of the individual self and the Ultimate Self. The self of man owes its existence and significance either to a divine act of creation or else to a process of derivation or emanation from the divine.

The Qur'an which in one way or another is the primary source of all Islamic cultural forms posits man as a combination of matter and spirit owing his existence to God. Moulded from mud, symbol of matter, sharing with other animal forms the common property of life, he is distinguished from all the rest of creation in that God breathed into him alone a portion of His own spirit. Since he is created, and created out of mud, he cannot be thought of as being in any way equal to God and can never presume to set himself up against the divine will. In one sense he is of the earth and a dependent creature. Yet the spirit of God, breathed into him, sets him apart from and above all other dependent creatures and gives him a unique affinity with his creator. He is a being capable of rational behavior, judgment, decision, and moral choice. The Qur'an gives weight to this spiritual fact by asserting that God created man to be his representative or vice-regent on earth. He set him on earth to govern all the rest of creation which is made subservient to his will.

In paradoxical statements that leave unresolved the dialectical tension between two extremes, the Qur'an deals with the issue of freedom and predestination. When the thought is centered on God the doctrine of absolute sovereignty is clearly expressed and man seems to be robbed of free choice and responsibility for his actions. Man's evil deeds and good deeds alike are directly caused by the divine will since nothing happens unless God wills it or permits it. Even in matters of faith and disbelief the eternal decrees of God are operative and some are guided to faith and some led to disbelief.

When the focus is turned on man, however, it is made evident that man is endowed by God with freedom and responsibility. It is this particular characteristic that makes him an "individual" with affinities to God who is the supreme moral being. God reveals to man universal moral principles that are the expression of His eternal and holy will. Yet man is a center of latent power in that he is capable of responding to or rejecting God's guidance.

Another dialectic that entered into later speculation about the self was drawn between the transcendence of God who stands off from his

creation as the supremely other and his immanence in the world and the life of man.

Over the centuries these two elements of tension that were left unresolved in the Book of Books, led to continuous debate concerning man, his autonomy, his place in the universe, and his relation to the divine One. From the earliest beginnings of systematic formulation the trend in orthodox circles was to focus on those passages in the Qur'an that emphasized the transcendent majesty of God and the absolute sovereignty of his will and therefore to deny any freedom or autonomy to man. Man's actions are established long before his birth or creation; the die is cast and as al-Bukhari says: "Everyone is guided to that for which he was created."

Al-Ashari's position, thought of as a mediating position between that of the extreme fatalists and the Mu'tazilites who affirmed the individual initiative of man, is nevertheless far on the right. Man cannot create anything; to admit that he has the power to produce acts of his own would be to deny the absoluteness of God's will. He has no initiative. Even when man labors under the impression that he is freely choosing his actions, the actual fact is that God creates in him both the power and the choice and then creates in him the actions that correspond to the power and choice thus created. The creature is merely the locus of God's action. Thus the impression of freedom and responsibility is explained, but in fact denied. In the later scholastic theology of the Asharite school there is the clear affirmation that since God is all, the Eternal Fact and the eternal and only doer, all motion and change is brought about by God's manipulation of atoms. Thus when a man writes with a pen on a piece of paper God creates in his mind the will to write; at the same time he gives him power to write, brings about the apparent motion of the hand and of the pen, and the appearance of writing on the paper. There is actually no sequence of secondary cause and effect. No one of these elements is the cause of the other. In fact, 'Abd al-Qadr al-Baqilani goes to the extreme of suggesting that the apparent motion and change in nature and human activity is the result of continuous and instantaneous re-creation of the world in each moment of time.

In this scheme of things there can be no self, no development, mental, moral, or physical, no continuing entity. Man with all his apparent choices, decisions, purposes, and actions is nothing but a series of isolated moments in God's activity.

This was a position that naturally disturbed the rationalists, the

liberals, and the philosophers. It was rejected successively by the Qadarites, the Mu'tazilites, and even later in part by the formulations of the orthodox Fiqh Akbar II.

In the comparatively modern period we find such men as Mohammed 'Abdu and Mohammed Iqbal who turned away from these extremes of predestination and emphasized the inherent moral autonomy of man. Although it is not my intention to develop the former's thought it may be useful to deal with it very briefly as an introduction to our nearer contemporary Mohammed Iqbal.

Mohammed 'Abdu asserts that although the ignorant may tend to be fatalistic, all thinking Muslims of all sects believe in man's freedom of choice. In his Risalah he states that man is "conscious of his voluntary actions, weighs the consequence of them by reason, assigns value to them by his will and performs them by a power within himself." When the Qur'an speaks of "what ye do" and "what your hands have wrought" it implies responsibility and therefore essential freedom. In the words "To those who exert themselves we show our path" Abdu sees the indication that God's guidance is available to those who take the initiative and make an effort to discover truth, goodness, righteousness. Just as men are governed by special laws of the community in their social life, so they are universally governed by the moral laws of God. Yet just as they are free to obey or disobey the laws of society, so they may respond to or rebel against the moral laws of God. In both cases, however, when they break the law they are subject to the judgment and punishment of the moral authority.

Mohammed Iqbal goes even further in asserting the sovereignty of the individual self. Basing his argument on certain Qur'anic passages – "On the Day of judgment each individual shall come before the Divine Judge singly" (19:95); "No soul shall labour but for itself, and no one shall bear another's burden" (6:164); and "For its own work lieth every soul in pledge" (74:41), he develops a concept of the self (or ego) as private, inviolable, unique, differentiated from all other egos as a center of moral autonomy and responsibility. Each man's pleasures and pains are exclusively his own. Others may sympathize but they do not share. God himself cannot feel, judge, or choose for a man when more than one course of action is open to him. This self-directional nature of the finite ego is indeed derived from and proceeds from the directive energy of God. When God, in the act of creation, breathed of his spirit into man, it was this essential and unique characteristic, of His own nature that he imparted to man. God, as Ultimate Ego, permitted, even willed,

the emergence of a finite ego, capable of private initiative and in so doing He limited the freedom of His own free will. In support of this assertion Iqbal again quotes the Qur'an: "Say: the truth is from the Lord: let him who wills, believe, and him who wills, disbelieve." (18:28) and "if you do good ye do it to your own souls, and if ye do evil, it is also for your own souls." (17:7).

The drive of all organic life is towards the realization of selfhood and this reaches its highest fulfillment in man: "Only that truly exists which can say 'I am.' It is the degree of intuition of I-am-ness that determines the place of a thing on the scale of being." Iqbal rejects strongly the idea that the self of man is a mere fragment of the Eternal Mind, constantly striving to be re-absorbed in it, and thus losing its own intrinsic individuality. "The end of the ego's quest is not emancipation from the limitations of individuality; it is rather a more precise definition of it."

The self is not given in its fullness, although its latent possibilities are set. The destiny (*taqdir*) of a person is not "unrelenting fate working from without like a task master" it is "the inward reach of a thing, its realizeable possibilities" which may actualize themselves "without any feeling of compulsion from without." The Qur'anic verse, "All things we have created with a fixed destiny," would then mean that each creature is endowed with a "fixed potential" which it is "free to realize or not."

Iqbal believes that the self develops and grows into full fledged individuality as it contends with a concrete environment, as it affirms itself against a world that often seems bent on stifling the self that is striving for realization.

The life of the ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego
invading the environment and the environment invading the ego.

Build a nest on the high mountains
That thou mayest be fit for life's battle
That thy body and soul may burn in life's fire.

If man should give up the struggle and strife, then his self would atrophy and his latent potentialities would remain undeveloped and the "spirit within them would turn into stone and be reduced to the level of dead matter." "Earth is not a tortured hall where an elementally wicked humanity is imprisoned for an original sin;" it is rather "a stage where man carries on a continuous experiment in living. As he does so

his individuality grows into a personality and he begins to participate in the creative life of his Maker."

Iqbal with Mohammed 'Abdu seems to draw the outline of man as a dual natured person who is both finite and free, subject to necessity, yet in some ways able to transcend his limitations. Though capable of shaping and directing the forces of nature, he is at times thwarted and battered by them. It is then that he builds vaster worlds of the spirit in his own inner being and is enabled to rise above the forces of nature. There is a margin beyond which he dare not go, however. Although he is free, he must recognize that the Ultimate Ego does set ultimate limits to that freedom. If he ignores this, becomes proud and self-sufficient then he falls. "Walk not proudly on the earth, for thou canst not cleave the earth, neither shalt thou reach the mountains in height: all this is evil, odious to your Lord." (17:30).

In concluding our brief survey of Iqbal's thought, we might well note what he has to say about immortality. Only those individuals who, following God's guidance have reached the high point of self possession which is perfect manhood, can hope to "maintain their individuality in contact with the Infinite Ego." The way is open to man to belong to the meaning of the universe and thus become immortal.

Since the life of the universe comes from the strength of the self
 Life is in proportion to this strength;
 When a drop of water gets the self's lesson by heart
 It makes its worthless existence into a pearl.
 When life gathers strength from the self
 The river of life expands into an ocean.

(Secrets of the Self)

If we turn now to the other horn of the crescent which emphasizes the immanence of God in the world, we will note that the extreme position is expressed by some of the early mystics of Islam. The view they present, although still informed by the theistic tradition of Islam, comes very near to the views of monistic pantheists. They emphasize so strongly the immanence of the Ultimate Reality that they come to the position that the world and man are actually unreal and the only reality in the world is God veiled in the illusory forms of multiplicity. They affirm that the pilgrimage of the gnostic is toward substantial identification with Divinity. The ecstatic cries – "I am He," "I am the Ultimate Reality," "beneath my cloak there is naught else but God," – spell out, as Zaehner has made clear, the absolute undifferentiated oneness of God and the "destruction of man's humanity (his *bashariyya*

or *nasut*).” In fact the selfhood of man is completely denied; “the human soul does not become God but is completely annihilated.” Abu Yazid al-Bistami uses the analogy of the torrent flowing into the ocean: “So long as the torrent is alone it bustles along its course and makes loud chatter, but when it draws near to the sea and mingles with it, its bubbling and chatter are stilled, and the sea has no experience of it.”

Without dwelling on this phase of Islamic thought I would like to pass on to Muhiyyadin Ibn al’Arabi, whose system has been dealt with by Professor Baig.¹ As I read the *Fusus al-hikam* in particular, my conclusion is that Ibn ’Arabi has drawn back from the monistic pantheism implied in the fervent expressions of the early Sufis. At no point does he deny the reality of the world and of the inner self of man. God and the world are complementary realities somewhat like the *natura naturans* and the *natura naturata* of Spinoza. The one cannot exist without the other. It is true that the Reality of the Ultimate is primary and that of the world is derived. Nevertheless the latter fulfills a function essential to the actualization or self-manifestation of the former.

The Ultimate Fact or Reality is absolutely transcendent, an absolute unity of which nothing can be predicated. The Essence in its strict simplicity does not manifest itself and would remain eternally unknown and unrealized unless the multiplicity of forms revealed it and externalized it. Ibn ’Arabi is sufficiently imbued with the spirit of Islam, however, not to be content to think of God as inactive Essence, self-contained, limited to its own self-consciousness. The God of the Qur’an is an active God, a God of relationships. This is what leads Ibn ’Arabi to suggest that inherent in this Essence, latent and unexpressed, were an infinite number of relational potentialities exemplified in the Qur’an by the many Beautiful Names. These demanded expression and they could not be expressed unless there was an objective world in interaction with which they would pass from latency (*’adam*) to actuality (*wujūd*). The Eternal Essence as *God* and the world with its multiple forms are interdependent. To be God the Essence needs a world in which all the inherent facets of His intrinsic nature could be expressed and actualized. Conversely, the world in its multiple forms needs God to clothe them in being.

The world when first fashioned was inanimate, unconscious; all the personal and spiritual elements of the divine nature would have still remained unexpressed had there not emerged within the cosmos some

¹ A member of this Conference.

personal form. As Ibn 'Arabi expresses it, without a soul the world was an unpolished mirror which failed to give back full reflection of the divine self-manifestation. What was needed was the polishing of the mirror of the universe. Adam, the prototype of man was, in essence, the polishing of the mirror and the spirit of that otherwise impersonal and inert world. The objects of creation in their multiplicity are derived from the Essence, but make the divine Essence knowable in its specific or particularized characteristics and the material (outward) characteristics that inhere potentially in the Divine Essence. As such he is both a microcosm and a revealer of the Unity of God seen in diversity. The Ultimate Reality is revealed as knower in man who is both known to God, and capable of knowing the manifold specific realities of the universe. The more man knows the more he reveals the all comprehensive knowledge of God. In the same way God is revealed as power, judge, forgiver, compassionate, merciful, supreme actor in so far as man exhibits these characteristics. God and man are like two sides of the same coin: without man and the world which he represents as microcosm, God would be unknown, an unrevealed mystery, in a sense to all purposes non-existent. On the other hand man and the cosmos would remain non-existent unless God endowed them with objective being.

Man, the Perfect Man, or as Seyyid Hossein Nasr puts it, the Universal Man (*al-Insan al-Kamil*) is temporal in body, eternal in spirit, the "Word" (*kalimah*) that divides and unites making all realities distinct, yet combining them into a united whole. He is to God what the pupil of the eyes is to the eye. He is to the world what the seal is to signet ring. He is vice-regent of God on earth: as long as he remains on earth the world will be maintained. If he should disappear then the cause and goal of creation would disappear and the multiplicity of forms would lapse into nothingness. The Perfect Man also serves as model for the spiritual life of all men, for in him have been realized all the possibilities, all the states of being that are inherent in the human person and has come to know, in all its fullness, what it means to be a man.

Potentially every man is Universal Man, but only the prophets and the saints have actually attained that stature; all others who pursue the path and discipline of gnosis do, however, fulfill in part the function of revealer, or exemplifier of some facets of the divine activity. The extent to which the eternal Principle is evidenced in man is dependent on the spiritual station which the individual devotee has attained.

The goal of man is spiritual union with God. This, for Ibn 'Arabi

does not mean loss of individuality and absorption in the undifferentiated oneness of the Divine Essence; it is not, as for Bistami, the stilling of the chatter and bubbling of the torrent as it reaches the sea which then has no experience of it. As Seyyed Hossein Nasr expresses it, "spiritual union which is the fulfillment of love for the Divine Beauty implies that the Divine Nature becomes the content of human nature, and human nature becomes surrounded and immersed in the Divine." (p. 115) Ibn 'Arabi quotes the ancient *hadith*, "He who adores me never ceases to approach me until I love him, and when I love him, I am the hearing by which he hears, the sight by which he sees, the hand by which he grasps, and the foot with which he walks." In the state of union "the individuality of man is illuminated, immersed in the Divine Light." All his thoughts, acts, interactions with his fellows take on new quality; they are as it were shot through with the glory of God. And then, the Lord will say to him; "whoever knows you, knows Me" and conversely, "when you enter my garden you learn to know yourself" in your ideal stature in terms of Me; "thus you know Him through yourself and know yourself through Him."

This union is made possible only by prolonged discipline and prayer. Frequently Ibn 'Arabi refers to the prayer of the heart which is an inner purification. In its most profound reaches the prayer of the heart actually "attracts the Divine into itself." The Lord is still Lord and the servant is still servant, but "God becomes the mirror in which the spiritual man contemplates his own reality, and man in turn becomes the mirror in which God contemplates His Names and Qualities."²

In discussing this union Ibn 'Arabi, at least in the *Fusus*, seems for the most part to avoid the word *fana* (passing away into God – annihilation). He uses instead the word *baqa* (remaining, survival) more frequently as for instance in this passage that suggests personal immortality:

"The Divine Reality does not bring about the destruction of this human organism through what is called death. Death is not cessation of existence; it is only separation. For God takes man to Himself. And when He does, then He will fashion for him a vehicle (*markab*) unlike this earthly vehicle, one befitting the abode to which he has been transferred, that is the House of Survival (*Dar al-baqa*'). Since harmony reigns there he will not die again ever." (p. 246 f.).

² p. 116. Professor Nasr points out here that "the significance of prayer in all its modes and in its theophanic function should make it clear that whatever Ibn 'Arabi's doctrine of the 'transcendent unity of Being' may mean it has nothing to do with the philosophical monism with which it has often been identified." (note 78).

In his book, *The Meaning and End of Religion*, Wilfred Cantwell Smith draws a fundamental distinction between what he calls faith and cumulative tradition. Faith is the living experience that is new and unique with every man; the cumulative tradition is the body of formulations in which the living experience is recorded. Any study of religious phenomena must start with the cumulative tradition, but, to be sound, must try to go beneath the formal records to the faith and experience that give rise to them. Looking at these samples of the cumulative tradition of Islam, I think that we will note that they are indeed individual. It might be worth while to attempt to find a common frame of reference from which they all start. Here as in all high religion, when a man asks: Who am I? he is forced to take account of at least two other levels of reality. That of the world of nature where all forms, material and animal, function according to basic necessity, to a pattern over which they have no control. Looking at himself over against this world of nature, man notes a level of reality that escapes, in part at least, the rigid boundaries of natural form. He knows himself as enjoying greater spontaneity, greater freedom to move in alternative directions, to think, to plan, purpose and act to bring about the realization of conceived goals. He experiences the capacity to mold, modify, or use for his own ends the forces and forms he finds in the natural world. On the other hand he comes up against a limit to these human freedoms. There are areas where his freedom is curtailed by necessity, where he is himself part of the natural world of process. Faced with this area of his own inadequacy he becomes aware, perhaps only vaguely and in flashes of a level of meaning that transcends his own, where purpose, choice, freedom are felt to be unlimited, uncurtailed. He also faces the necessity of explaining the processes of nature, including those of his own person, as well as the activities of his own self. He posits, therefore, an Ultimate, a Ground of Being, an Absolute Principle which gives rise to all these external and inner realities of which he is conscious. At times, by analogy with the impersonal processes of nature, he thinks of this Ground of Being as an "It;" at times, by analogy with his own personal activities, thinking, purposing, planning, he thinks of this Ground of Being as an "I," but since it seems to be outside and over against himself he transforms this I into a Thou or He. In each case he tends to capitalize the It, the Thou, the He to do justice to the degree of ultimacy, absoluteness, unlimitedness that he ascribes to the impersonal force, or the personal self of this Ground of Being.

Hemmed in between these two dimensions of reality which in a sense

enclose him, man asks again the question: "In terms of all this, who then am I?" In answering this question he tends to gravitate between two poles, the pole of self-affirmation and the pole of self-negation.

In self-negation he may go all the way and deny categorically his freedom of thought and action. He may see himself as nothing more than one item in the processes of nature, ruled by rigid necessity, a mere thing among things. He then abdicates all effort, settles down in apathy, or reacts in terror and despair. His self-negation may take other forms. He may become so overwhelmed by the transcendent Majesty and sovereign Will of the God beyond him, that he ceases to think of himself as an inviolable center of purpose and activity. He sees himself as a creature whose act and thought is conditioned, determined, dictated by the will of God. Or again he may see himself as a passing thought in the mind of God, a mere phase of the Universal Consciousness, abandon all sense of intrinsic individuality and long to be submerged in that Universal Consciousness as the drop of spray loses itself in the vastness of the ocean.

Crowding the far reaches of the other pole, the individual ego may deny those areas of necessity that make him part of nature, reject as fervid imaginings of diseased minds the intuition of a center of meaning beyond himself and affirm that the only reality is found in the inviolable center of his own being. He may then cry out: "I and I alone am the measure of all things."

These two extreme positions are enticing because they tend to cut the gordian knot of uncertainty and paradox. Yet they have their weaknesses. In the very words self-negation, we find a paradox. How can a no-self deny itself. You cannot say, "I am a mere thing," "I am the Divine Reality," "I am but a moment in the activity of God" without using the term "I am" which is basic to self-affirmation. Furthermore this position leaves one entirely oblivious of or indifferent to the world of things and men that no self hypnotic exercise can fully discard as unreal.

The drive of self-affirmation also involves a piece of legerdemain, for it denies to others around oneself the right to the same self-assertion. It may lead to ruthless disregard of the intrinsic self-hood of others. At best it is a lonely position and leaves one exposed to the "revenge" of things and men. Magnificent as it sometimes seems to be, this position can only lead to the experience made famous in Bertrand Russell's words "living within the framework of unyielding despair."

Within most religious traditions I think we can note a pulling back

from these extremes. In the Islamic tradition this is definitely the case. If a man is to know who he is, he must clearly recognize the reality of the world, the reality of himself as part of, yet transcending this world, and the intuition of an area of meaning that transcends both the world and himself, or rather undergirds them. It is possible that religiously, if not logically, *the soundest position is to live within the paradox, recognizing it without trying to resolve its dialectical tensions*. This is where the Qur'an stands. At any rate if he moves towards the pole of self-affirmation, the thoughtful seeker will do so with qualifications. He can affirm himself within a framework of meaning that is greater than he. I believe Mohammed Iqbal has done this. If he moves towards the pole of self-negation he will do so with qualifications, and preserve for himself and other selves an area of real meaning even though it may only be reflected meaning. I believe that Ibn al-'Arabi has done this.

If I may add a final word of personal conviction I would say that the most satisfying position I know is one where a man can so affirm himself within the meaning given to his life by the God who is beyond him and within him, that he truly possesses himself and can then in full freedom give himself in commitment and dedication, in complete self-forgetfulness, and without counting the cost, to the life and needs of those around him. In the sovereign act of self-giving, I believe, man is most akin to God, and as he moves beyond it he receives himself back enriched and fulfilled and knows in truth who he is.

IO

IS THERE A SOUL OR NO SOUL? THE BUDDHA REFUSED TO ANSWER. WHY?

ARCHIE J. BAHM

I have been requested by Professor Raju to represent an Oriental point of view. Hence, I will refrain from presenting a Western viewpoint.

Why Buddhism? Many times I have been asked: How did you become interested in Buddhism? As a teacher of Oriental Philosophy for a couple of decades, I have been faced with certain problems in explaining and defending oriental views. When many conflicting views, all attributed to the Buddha and all seemingly substantiated by appeals to authoritative scriptures, appeared, the desire to find out what the Buddha really believed arose, persisted and grew. Opportunity to find out occurred with the awarding of a Fulbright Research Scholarship to the University of Rangoon in 1955-56. After visiting courses conducted by U. Thittila, famous Theravāda teacher, in the Department of Pali and Abhidhamma, I devoted myself to reading thirty volumes of the Pāli Piṭakas in English translation in the University of Rangoon libraries. These Piṭakas constitute an amazing collection of various remembered discourses and include many different and conflicting views. The *Abhidhamma* philosophy of orthodox Theravādins, which appears in developed form in the third Piṭaka, does indeed have demonstrable roots in the two earlier Piṭakas. But other views also occur, and my readings led me to conclude that Gautama himself was not a Theravādin and that his own views could be discerned among the quotations, provided certain principles of criticism were warranted.¹ It is this view, which I call "Gautamavāda" to distinguish it from Theravāda, Sūñyavāda, etc., that will be presented in what follows.

No more important, no more profound, question has appeared in the history of philosophy, Western or Eastern, than "What am I?" Is there a self, and what is its nature? Strangely enough, the answer

¹ I have summarized these principles in my "*Philosophy of the Buddha*," pp. 159-162, a research report on my Rangoon studies.

given by one of the world's wisest and most influential men is too often disregarded as no answer. When, after his Enlightenment, Gautama, the Buddha, was asked, "Is there a soul or is there no soul?" he refused to answer. Why did he refuse?

His reason can be understood only in the context of his basic philosophy. His main concern, which is also our main concern, had to do with happiness, or, stated negatively, with unhappiness. Life's most important question is how to be happy, or to avoid unhappiness. When compared with this question, all other questions fade into relative insignificance. The reason why one wants to know whether there is or is not a soul is that he believes having such knowledge will help to make him happy. But Gautama concluded that no amount of knowledge will make us happy so long as we fail to take a certain attitude toward it; and once we attain this attitude, or once we achieve genuine happiness, then knowing less rather than more will make little difference to us.

What, then, is happiness?

Happiness, we believe, consists in getting what we want, in satisfying our desires, in fulfilling our wishes. Thus happiness presupposes having wants, desires, wishes. Without desire, we cannot experience satisfaction. Hence, we think, having desires is necessary to happiness. However, there is another side to the story. Desires may also end in frustration. Frustration is felt as evil, or as unhappiness. Unhappiness consists in feeling frustrated. Hence, the way to avoid unhappiness is to avoid desire. If we have no desires, then they can never be frustrated, and then we will experience no unhappiness.

So long as life is plagued with miseries, people tend to be more preoccupied with elimination of unhappiness than with attainment of happiness. In fact, we normally believe that, if only we can eliminate unhappiness, then we will be happy. Although Hindu civilization is too rich and complex to warrant reducing it to a simple generalization, much of its religious and philosophical literature manifests a prevailing mood: Desire is the source of unhappiness; therefore complete happiness can be attained only by elimination of all desire. The goal of life, Nirvāṇa, is depicted as a perfectly desireless state. Ultimate reality, whether the Nirguṇa Brahman of the Advaitins, the liberated soul of the Jains or Sāṃkhya-Yogins, the *anatta bhāvaṅga* of the Theravādins or the *śūnya* of the Mādhyamikans, is idealized as absolutely freed from all desire.

When Gautama continued to be unhappy, despite a profusion of princely luxuries, he abandoned his home, family and kingdom, and

sought wisdom for seven years. He tried to eliminate desire by all of the standard methods then known: meditation, trances, fasting, self-mortification, and the like. But all of them failed. He still had desires. He also recognized, and grappled with, a predicament: whoever desires to eliminate desires still desires. Consequently, he concluded, there is no way whereby a living being can eliminate desire completely. The more we desire to eliminate desires which cannot be eliminated, the more we frustrate ourselves. Thus, any attempt to eliminate desire completely leads to unhappiness just as truly as attempts to promote desires which cannot be satisfied.

Gautama's great insight, which led to his being called "The Buddha," "The Enlightened One," consisted in his discovery that happiness involves not elimination of all desires, but only of those which will be frustrated. Desires may be said to be of two sorts, those which will be satisfied and those which will be frustrated. Desires which become satisfied do not, thereby, cause unhappiness. Only frustrated desires constitute unhappiness. Therefore, in seeking happiness, one should try to have only those desires which can be satisfied. The philosophy of Gautama can be summarized as a single psychological principle: "Desire for what will not be attained ends in frustration; therefore, to avoid frustration, avoid desiring what will not be attained." ²

Gautama's philosophy is sometimes called "the middle way." It is a middle way – a way between too much desiring and too much stopping of desiring. If you desire what you are not going to get, you will be unhappy. If you desire to stop desiring more than you can stop, you will be unhappy. Thus, the ideal condition is one in which you neither desire more than you are going to get, nor desire more cessation of desiring than will occur. In order to be completely happy, you must desire, or be willing to have, whatever you are going to get. And part of what you are going to get is more desiring and more frustration. Whoever, upon experiencing frustration, has the additional desire to be freed from such frustration, when he cannot be so freed, wants thereby still more of what he cannot have, and thus makes himself still more unhappy. Such a person has departed from the middle way.

This middle way turns out to be the way things are, or are going to be. The middle way is the way between wanting things to be more than they are and less than they are, with respect to any way that they are. One who follows the middle way may not be perfectly happy, but he

² *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1958, p. 15.

will be as happy as it is possible to be. Whoever does not follow the middle way makes himself more unhappy than is necessary.

What does all this have to do with whether or not a soul exists? After many persons had heard about Gautama's wisdom in dealing with such a fundamental question as happiness, they sought to have him answer various other questions which troubled them. Questions such as "Is the world eternal or temporal?" "Is the world finite or infinite?" "Is the soul the same as the body or different from it?" "Is there life after death?" were among those much discussed by the monks in the brotherhood, led by the three Kashyapa brothers, with whom Gautama associated much of the time. Let us consider the question, "Is there life after death?" for a moment, to see how Gautama dealt with it. Hindus, then and now, regard reincarnation as a matter of common sense. Yet, in the absence of clear evidence, doubts and debates persisted. Whenever someone approached him for an answer, Gautama would say, "That is not an important question." When they pressed him farther, he would proceed with a demonstration such as the following. If you desire a next life and there is a next life, you get what you desire, and are happy. If you desire a next life and there is no next life, your desire will be frustrated. If you desire no next life and there is no next life, you get what you desire, and so you should not be unhappy. If you desire no next life and there is a next life, your desire will be frustrated, and you will be unhappy. So the important thing is not whether there is or is not a next life, but whether you are willing to take whichever way it comes.

Is there a soul or is there not a soul? To this question, Gautama persistently refused to give an answer. Why? Partly, of course, because we do not know. Some argue that a soul exists and that it is eternal. Some claim that no soul exists. The evidence is not clear. But partly, also, because this is not an important question. The important issue in life is how to be happy. If you have a soul, you merely make yourself unhappy by wanting not to have one. If you have no soul, you cause yourself unhappiness by wanting one. What difference does it make whether you have a soul or not? You still are what you are, no matter whichever is the case. What does make a difference, the difference between happiness and unhappiness, is whether you are willing to accept whichever condition turns out to be the way things are.

People who want answers to questions that cannot be answered, or who want fuller answers to questions which can be only partially answered, suffer from what Gautama calls "greed for views." Greed for

knowledge beyond our ken results in unhappiness just as truly as any other kind of greed. Is there a soul or is there not? Do you know the answer? If you do not know, do you want to know more than you can know? Do you really want to make yourself unhappy?

Now you have, in a nutshell, Gautama's view. No more important, no more profound, answer to the question. "What am I?" has been given in the history of philosophy, Western or Eastern. His answer, namely, that this is not an important question, is itself an important answer. It helps us to keep in perspective the nature and function of philosophic quests. Let us remember that, as scientists, we seek to know, but that, as philosophers, we seek wisdom. No man is wise until he is happy. Knowledge alone does not bring happiness. If metaphysical quests draw us farther and farther into a maze of unanswerable questions, they deprive us of wisdom. If we can, somehow, attain wisdom apart from metaphysical inquiries, then they are superfluous indeed. If we cannot, then of course we are foolish to suppress them. But we risk being both unwise and unhappy when we ignore Gautama's view that the most important question about the nature of self is not "What is it?" but "How can it be happy?"

Unfortunately, men do want to know more than they can know and do insist on formulating theories about the nature of self which cannot be completely tested. This is as true now as in Gautama's day. Each time I expound Gautama's view, someone will say, "But how do you know that we cannot be sure about whether or not a soul exists?" Gautama's reply on one occasion to this typical question is recorded as follows. Vacchagotta sought a clear-cut answer: "'Now, master Gautama, is there a self?' At these words the Exalted One was silent. 'How, then, master Gautama, is there not a self?' For the second time also the Exalted One was silent. Then the Wanderer Vacchagotta rose from his seat and went away. Not long after the departure of the Wanderer, the venerable Ānanda said to the Exalted One: 'How is it, lord, that the Exalted One gave no answer to the question of the Wanderer Vacchagotta?' 'If . . . I had replied to him: "There is a self," then, Ānanda, that would be siding with the recluses and Brahmins who are eternalists. If I had replied that it does not exist, that, Ānanda, would be siding with those recluses and Brahmins who are annihilationists.'" ³

Despite Gautama's repeated efforts to explain why he refused to take sides, those who heard him persisted in misinterpreting him. Occasional-

³ *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, Vol. IV, pp. 281-282. Translated by F. L. Woodward, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1965.

ly he cried out about such misrepresentation: "There are some recluses and Brahmins who misrepresent me untruly, vainly, falsely, not in accordance with fact, saying: 'The recluse Gautama is a nihilist, he lays down the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of an existent entity.' But this, monks, is just what I am not, this is just what I do not say, therefore these worthy recluses and Brahmins misrepresent me untruly..."⁴ Another discourse reports his attitude: "Some recluses and Brahmins there are who hold and affirm that there is no such thing as the stilling of continued existence, while others again assert the contrary. What think you, sirs? Are not these two schools diametrically opposed one to the other?" "Yes, sir." "In this case a man of intelligence says to himself that he personally has neither seen what those affirm who deny that existence can be stilled, nor discovered what those others affirm who assert that it can; nor does he feel it proper, without knowing or seeing for himself, definitely to commit himself to one side or the other, as representing the absolute truth where all else is error."⁵

But, as happens so often in history, misrepresenters, whether being so intentionally or unwittingly, prevailed. At least three major schools of Buddhism, Theravāda, Yogācāra and Shin, affirm contrary views while attributing these views to Gautama himself. Theravāda Buddhism denies existence and continuity to a self through its basic doctrines of *anattā* (no-soul) and *aniccā* (impermanence). Yogācāra Buddhism merges individual with cosmic consciousness (*viññāna*) which, in effect, is an eternal world-soul perpetually preoccupied with transient appearances. Shin Buddhism believes that each individual soul will dwell eternally in the blissful company of Amida Buddha in a Pure Land from which none will remain excluded. Thus, the history of Buddhist doctrines of the self, expressed by persons attributing their views to Gautama, has consisted largely of a series of repudiations of Gautama's refusal to answer the question: "Is there a soul or is there not a soul?"

Some of these repudiations are much more subtle than others. For example, Mādhyamika Buddhism identifies self with *śūnya*, that which neither changes, nor does not change, nor both changes and does not change, nor neither changes nor does not change. *Śūnya* is that which is the negation of all negation, or that which is indifferent from all things

⁴ *Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. I, p. 180. Translated by I. B. Horner, Luzac and Co., Ltd., London, 1954.

⁵ *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. I, p. 295. Translated by Lord Chalmers, Oxford University Press, London, 1926.

even though they appear different from each other. Hence the self is indifferent from that which is indifferent from all else. Such a doctrine has a surface similarity with Gautama's view. It neither affirms the existence of a self nor denies the existence of a self. Yet it does affirm the negation of all negation, whereas this affirmation itself appears to be a kind of taking sides in a way which Gautama refused to do. His own principle, if applied here, would neither require him to affirm nor deny this principle of four-cornered negation.⁶ Gautama's middle way is not the way between neither *x*, nor not-*x*, nor both *x* and not-*x*, nor neither *x* nor not-*x*; rather it is the way between desiring too much and desiring too much to stop such desiring. It consists in a willingness to accept things as they are, however they are; it does not require that one either affirm or deny the principle of four-fold negation, the affirmation of which is essential to the Mādhyamikan view.

The persistence of refusal to take Gautama seriously has appeared again and again. It is said as follows: Some say that the Buddha denies the existence of self, but he merely denied the conceptual way of knowing the self and he really affirmed the existence of transcendental experience. This objection is Vedāntic. It insists, it seems to me, that Gautama was really a Vedāntin who intended to affirm the existence of a timeless awareness transcending ordinary experience and refused to affirm (after traditional Brahminical fashion, *neti, neti*) particular predicates, whether positive or negative, of ultimate reality because ultimate reality is by nature non-particular. I believe that the objection no matter how generously disposed toward Gautama in trying to accommodate Gautama's sayings within the Vedāntin perspective, is mistaken at this point. I can recall no discussions in the early Pāli Piṭakas which would lead one to infer that Gautama "merely denied the conceptual way of knowing" the self. If one accepts as true the Advaita view that ultimate reality, *Nirguṇa Brahman*, cannot be known conceptually and then includes Gautama among those who held the true view, one may then deduce that Gautama must have intended to "merely deny the conceptual way of knowing" ultimate reality. But such deduction presumes the assumption that Gautama accepted a metaphysical view which he then refused to admit to his companions. Contrariwise, it seems to me, this view is much like those of the "Brahmins who are eternalists" and "Brahmins who are annihilationists" which Gautama explicitly refused to affirm.

⁶ See P. T. Raju, "The Principle of Four-Cornered Negation in Indian Philosophy," *The Review of Metaphysics*, June 1954, pp. 694-713.

Gautama's reply to Theravādins, Yogācārins, Shins, and Mādhyamikans, recorded, in advance, many times in the Pāli Piṭakas, may be illustrated by two final quotations.

Long lists of theories ⁷ debated in Gautama's time were reduced, for convenience, to a set of ten: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Is the soul the same as the body? Is the soul one thing, and the body another? Does one who has gained the truth live again after death? Does he not live again after death? Does he both live again, and not live again, after death? Does he neither live again, nor not live again, after death? To each of these questions Gautama answered: "That too, Potthapāda, is a matter on which I have expressed no opinion." "But why . . . ?" "This question is not calculated to profit, is not concerned with the *dhmma*, it does not redound even to the elements of right conduct, nor to detachment, nor to purification from lusts, nor to quietude, nor to tranquilization of heart, nor to real knowledge, nor to insight (into the higher stages of the Path), nor to *Nirvāṇa*. Therefore is it that I have expressed no opinion upon it." "Then what is it that the Exalted One *has* determined?" "I have expounded what pain [frustration, *dukkha*] is; . . . the origin of pain; . . . cessation of pain; . . . what is the method by which one may reach the cessation of pain." "And why . . . ?" "Because that . . . is calculated to profit . . ." ⁸

On another occasion when Gautama had remained non-committal regarding the foregoing ten questions, Vaccha asked: "To each and all of my questions, Gautama, you have answered in the negative. What, pray, is the danger you discern in these views which makes you scout them all?" "To hold that the world is eternal – or to hold that it is not, or to agree to any other of the propositions you adduce, Vaccha – is the thicket of theorizing, the wilderness of theorizing, the tangle of theorizing, the bondage and the shackles of theorizing, attended by ill, distress, perturbation and fever; it conduces not to aversion, passionlessness, tranquility, peace, illumination and *Nirvāṇa*." "Is there any view which you have adopted, Gautama?" "The adoption of views is a term discarded for the truth-finder, who has had actual vision of the nature, origin and cessation of things material – of feelings – of perception – of plastic forces – and of consciousness. Therefore it is that, by destroying, stilling, suppressing, discarding and renouncing all

⁷ See my *Philosophy of the Buddha*, pp. 110–121.

⁸ *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I, pp. 254–255. Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids, Oxford University Press, London, 1899, 1923.

supposings, all imaginings, all tendencies to the pride of saying I or mine, the truth-finder is delivered because no fuel is left to keep such things going." "When his heart is thus delivered, Gautama, where is an almsman reborn hereafter?" "Reborn does not apply to him." "Then he is not reborn?" "Not-reborn does not apply." "Then he is both reborn and not reborn?" "'Reborn and not-reborn' does not apply." "Then is he neither reborn nor not reborn?" "'Neither reborn nor not-reborn' does not apply to him." "To each and all of my questions, Gautama, you have replied in the negative. I am at a loss and bewildered; the measure of confidence you inspired by our former talk has disappeared." "You ought to be at a loss and bewildered, Vaccha. For this doctrine is profound, recondite, hard to comprehend, excellent, beyond dialectic, subtle, only to be understood by the wise. To you it is difficult – who holds other views and belongs to another faith and objective, with a different allegiance and a different master. So I in turn will question you, for such answer as you see fit to give. What think you Vaccha? If there were a blaze in front of you, would you know it?" "Yes." "If you were asked what made that fire blaze, could you give an answer." "I would answer that what made it blaze was the fuel . . ." "If the fire went out, would you know in what direction the fire had gone, whether to east, west, north or south, could you give an answer?" "The answer does not apply." ²

Is there or is there not a soul? Gautama refused to answer. Why? The real reason why people ask such questions is that they are unhappy and believe that finding an answer will make them happy. But happiness is not to be found in having questions answered one way or another especially when we cannot be sure which answer is correct. It is to be found in the willingness to accept as satisfactory whichever answer happens to be true, no matter what the answer is. Hence, efforts spent in trying to answer unanswerable questions "are not calculated to profit," are not conducive to happiness. Answers to such questions, no matter how subtly and intricately argued, "do not apply" to life's most important question: "How can I be happy?" The answer to this question cannot be found by any investigation into whether or not a self exists.

⁹ *Further Dialogues of the Buddha*, Vol. I, pp. 342–344. See also *The Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. II, pp. 162–163.

I I

SANKARA'S INTERPRETATION OF THE SELF AND ITS INFLUENCE ON LATER INDIAN THOUGHT

A. K. SARKAR

Before the advent of Śaṅkara (8th century A.D.), there was a long tradition of efficient philosophical deliberations in India. Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Self will not be properly understood without a reference to this context. Hence in this paper, I should like to mention briefly some of the main philosophical trends which Śaṅkara became heir to, and against which, or in the background of which, Śaṅkara developed his own philosophy.

The term, Self (*Ātman* or pure consciousness), in association with another equally ambiguous expression, *Brahman* (pure existence or infinitude), came to be used in the philosophical literature of the Upaniṣads. These terms are only convenient expressions to replace in a better way the results of the Vedic search for a transcendent experience behind and beyond the apparent presentations of nature. The Vedic thought, though highly complex in its final stages, was not free from some ambiguity. The Vedic sages called transcendent experience by various general names as *Ṛta* (Law), *Viśvadevas* (God of gods), *Prajāpati* (Creator) or *Puruṣa* (Supreme Person), finally replacing all these by the philosophic-monistic expression of *Tad-Ekaṁ* (That One), which stood for the reality as *One* though it can be expressed as *Many* (Agni, Yama or Mātariśvan).¹ The Upaniṣadic thinkers indicate an advanced stage in the expression of the character of the transcendent experience when they called it *Ātman* (or Self), which being an inner principle, can be grasped with more certainty and immediacy of experience than the outer principle of *Tad-Ekaṁ* of the Vedic thinkers.² Once the transcendent experience was realized as something inner, the Upaniṣadic

¹ Ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Princeton University Press, 1957, pp. 16-27.

² Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, George Allen and Unwin, 4th Imp., 1958, Ch. 1. Specially pp. 33-35; and Sharma, C., *Indian Philosophy* (A Critical Survey), Barnes and Noble, 1962, Ch. 1.

thinkers had the freedom to express it in various other ways as *Turīya* (the Fourth), *Om* (the Soundless), *Amātra* (the Measureless), *Sivam* (the Auspicious) or *Sāntam* (the Peaceful), contrasting each of these expressions from the orders of the presented experience, analyzed as waking, dream, and deep-sleep in various Upaniṣads, viz., the *Māṇḍūkya*,³ the *Byhadāranyaka* and the *Chāndogya*.⁴ The Upaniṣadic thinkers also identified *Ātman* (inner experience) with *Brahman* (outer experience), indicating in it a supplementary character, thus enriching the notion of the transcendent experience further. The transcendent experience was also expressed as *Satyam-Jñānam-Ānantam* (Truth-Knowledge-Infinite), and as *Sat-Cit-Ānanda* (Existence-Consciousness-Bliss), understood dialectically by way of distinction from their opposites.⁵ For example, the expression *Sat-Cit-Ānanda*, refers to *Sat* (Existence), not that it is positively so, but it is so to contrast it with its opposite *Asat* (non-existence); it is *Cit* (Consciousness) not that it is positively so, but to distinguish it from its opposite *Acit* or non-consciousness, it is so; similarly it is *Ānanda* (Bliss) only to distinguish it from its opposite *Nirānanda* or absence of Bliss.

The transcendent experience was taken as *Advaya* (non-dual) in contrast to all dualistic experiences of the body, life, death and rebirth. This continuous tendency towards some kind of development in the aspect of deep meditation or critical analysis, was challenged by the Cārvākas in 700 B.C., who argued from the presented order of perceptual experience or from a popular standpoint,⁶ and by the Buddha, in the fifth century B.C., from a deeper psychological standpoint.⁷ The

³ Sw. Nikhilānanda, translated and annotated by, *The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* with Gauḍapāda's *Kārikā* and Śaṅkara's Commentary, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955, and *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* by Sw. Sarvananda, Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1956, pp. 1-17.

⁴ For details of the Principal Upaniṣads, vide the writer's paper, *The Place of Yoga in the Principal Upaniṣads in Research Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences*, Vol. 1, No. 2., 1964, Kedar Nath Ram Nath, Meerat City, India.

⁵ Hirianna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 57-58.

⁶ Radhakrishnan and Moore, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, p. 233 and Ch. VII.

⁷ According to Hirianna, the Buddha continued the Upaniṣadic tradition in its real spirit and was completely detached from any metaphysical mode of reflections. Observe the following quotations: "If the Buddha did not know the truth, he would not have considered himself a Buddha or the enlightened." (*Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 138) also, "... We are not to look for any metaphysics as such in the teachings of Buddha." *Ibid.* For the Buddha's belief in the denial of the Self, Vide, *Ibid.*, pp. 138-147.

E. A. Burtt in his *The Compassionate Buddha*, A Mentor Religious Classic, 1955, gives the reason why the Buddha considered the metaphysical arguments as irrelevant.

According to Murti, The *Upaniṣads* and Buddhism belong to the same spiritual genus, but they differ as species, and the differentials are the acceptance and rejection of the *Ātman*, vide, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, George Allen and Unwin, 1955, p. 20. The present writer, however, differs from Murti's method of interpretation of the Buddha's position and of the four Buddhist schools. For the writer's view about the Buddhist schools, vide, *Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought in The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*, 1954.

Buddha's attitude was post-metaphysical and post-theological in the line of the Vedas and the Upaniṣads, but he was more radical in the sense that he discarded the Upaniṣadic interpretation of the transcendent experience by means of the unifying vision of Ātman or the infinite substance of Brahman, as but only theoretical statements. The transcendent experience to the Buddha was *Nirvāṇa*, a dispassionate condition, freeing oneself from the transient universe (*saṃsāra*) of sorrows and propensities.⁸ His was a de-conceptualization of experience in a different aspect from the Upaniṣads. Directing all to a practical method of *śilā* (conduct), *saṃādhi* (meditation) and *prajñā* (insightful experience), the Buddha avoided discussion, remaining silent deliberately, though he had a full knowledge of metaphysical reflections from nihilism (*ucchedavāda*) to eternalism (*śāśvataavāda*).⁹

The Buddhist school of the Vaibhāṣikas cancelled the abstract unity (*Ātman*) or substance (*Brahman*) of the Upaniṣads by postulating momentary intuition flashes (*dharma*s), thus presenting the transcendent *many* as against the transcendent *one* of the Upaniṣads. The momentary flashes in association with the causal process describe the *saṃsāra* (the sphere of sorrows and passions), and in dissociation from the causal process, they describe the *nirvāṇa*, by the triadic method of the Buddha.¹⁰ Nāgārjuna would deny these basic *dharma*s, *saṃsāra*, *nirvāṇa*, and even *the Buddha*, if they are conceived as discrete theoretic constructs, in favor of his transcendent undifferentiated insight (*prajñā*), which silences all intellectual propensities (*dṛṣṭi*).¹¹ Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu in the fourth century A.D., refer to a transcendent meditative experience, respectively expressed as either Advaya (non-dual) or Vijñāna-Mātram (Mind-only), which cancels the Ālayavijñāna (the transcendent habitat of propensities), the supporting basis of the presented universe of causality (*saṃsāra*). The incentive to a positive yet negative transcendent meditative order of experience, as discerned from Nāgārjuna to Vasubandhu, came from the strenuous discipline prescribed by the great Buddhist thinker Aśvaghoṣa of the first century B.C., who suggested a de-conceptualization of experience (*Tathatā*) by

⁸ Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Royal Asiatic Society, 1923, pp. 25–53.

⁹ Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha* (translated from the Pali of the Digha Nikāya) Sacred Book of the Buddhists, Vols. III and IV, 1899–1921.

¹⁰ Neither X, nor non-X, nor both.

¹¹ Writer's paper, *Nāgārjuna: On Causation and Nirvāṇa* in Dr. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume, The Darshana International, Moradabad, India.

a total elimination of *particularizing consciousness* through a series of meditations.¹²

It remained for Śaṅkara to start his investigation and reinterpret the Upaniṣadic doctrine of the *Ātman-Brahman* (Self-Substance) from a new point of view. His is not a repetition of the Upaniṣadic doctrine of a basic unity (Ātman or Self) or a basic substance (Brahman), but it is a discernment of a positive character insightfully, distinguished at once from the Upaniṣadic notion and from the reactionary trends of the Buddha and the Buddhist thinkers. Śaṅkara revolted specially against the new school of Buddhist thought initiated by Dignāga (in the fifth century A.D.), who sponsored a transcendental phenomenological mode of experience of a point in pure sensation. Dignāga refused to interpret the point of pure sensation in any intellectual form, because intellectuality by its imaginative constructs bifurcates the presented universe into two halves.¹³ Dignāga's interpretation of perceptual experience, in a sense, is as revolutionary as Whitehead's revolt against the bifurcation of nature in the perceptual sphere into *apparent* and *causal*, in the background of contemporary western thought. In this context, Śaṅkara's position will be clarified later in this paper.

Śaṅkara's interpretation of the Self, in the background of the Vedic-Upaniṣadic and Buddhistic thought, or in the background of his immediate Vedāntic predecessor, Gauḍapāda, whom he regards as the teacher of his teacher, is a novel orientation of the Self-Substance notion of transcendent experience. Hence, it has a great influence on the subsequent thought-process of India through his followers or through his opponents of wide varieties. Śaṅkara's position is an important event in the history of Indian thought.

Like the thinkers of the Upaniṣads, the Buddha and his followers, and Gauḍapāda before him, Śaṅkara detaches himself from all meta-physical proneness, and draws attention to an insightful yet practical psychology. For realizing the transcendent experience of the Self, Śaṅkara demands that there should be a psychological disposition to attain freedom and a clear sense of distinction between the experience which is real and the experience which is unreal, accompanied by the

¹² Vide writer's paper on *Aśvaghoṣa's Tathatā* (Suchness) in *Philosophical Quarterly*, Amalner, India, October, 1962, for details.

¹³ Referring to Dharmakīrti, a famous disciple of Dignāga, Rahul Sankrityayana, in his Preface to Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārtikam*, Kitāb Mahal, India, 1943, says that Dharmakīrti "was the central figure around whom all the creative minds of India revolved." For details about Dignāga's doctrine of perception, vide Stcherbatsky: *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. Leningrad, 1932.

practical disciplines implied in hearing (*śravaṇa*), reasoning (*manana*) and meditation (*nīdīdhyāsana*).¹⁴

To Śaṅkara the basic transcendent experience is a detached psychological experience which is direct and immediate, a *presence* which is never contradicted; it is self-shining, untouched by transition; when expressed, it is a *witness* (*śākṣi*) not witnessed (*dṛśya*), a *seer* not seen; and this psychological position has been well brought out in *Dṛk Dṛśya Viveka* (Discourse on the Seer and the Seen), a work attributed to Śaṅkara.¹⁵ Śaṅkara's other expression for this self-shining experience is *svayamprakāśa*.¹⁶ Without this basic experience, the presented orders of experience, viz., the waking, dream and deep-sleep, which come and go, cannot be distinguished; it is an experience which is continuous, and uncanceled by any of the above states; it is a *non-presented presence*. To meet all possible objections of the Buddha and the Buddhist schools, Śaṅkara interprets the basic transcendent experience (*Turiya*) of the *Māṇḍūkya* Upaniṣad, not as a unity or a substance as is often suggested in the Upaniṣads in general, but as a flash (*prakāśa*) which is not momentary (*kṣanika*) but continuous (*śāśvata*) because its *presence* is not presented or cancelled. The Vaibhāṣikas had a notion of the transcendent flash or particular (*dharma*) as a postulate for supporting all transient causal experience, or dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*); Dignāga had a notion of a transcendent flash as objectified in a point (*kṣaṇa* as *svalakṣaṇa*) of pure sensation; Śaṅkara's transcendent flash of experience, in contrast, is neither a postulate of the Vaibhāṣikas nor is it an objectified point of Dignāga; it has no before and after, it is self-sufficient, having a positiveness or undifferentiatedness in its uncontradicted immediate presence on account of which it is a flash or self-shiningness. Hence it is not a *principle* of Gauḍapāda to separate the transcendent experience and the presented experience of waking, dream and deep-sleep; the former is an experience *with* the presented, in its *self-shiningness* and not in its separation.

Śaṅkara examines two orders of experience: a transcendent experience which shines by itself (*svayamprakāśa*) and a lapsed experience which is equally direct and immediate to which Śaṅkara gives such general expressions as *Māyā*, *Avidyā* or *Ajñāna* (nescience). Neither of these experiences are derived from one another and they are present as

¹⁴ Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 379–81.

¹⁵ Text with English Translation and Notes by Swami Nikhilānanda, Sri Ramakrishna Asrama, 1955. The other name by which this treatise is known is *Vākyaśudhā*.

¹⁶ Vide for details: *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, Ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, Ch. XV.

beginningless (*anādi*); hence they are to be treated as being together. But whereas the transcendent experience is steady and self-shining, the lapsed experience is in continuous modification and has an end (termination). The lapsed condition in its modification is an inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) with the dual functions of veiling (*āvaraṇa*) and superimposition (*adhyāsa*) or projection (*vikṣepa*). These processes, Śaṅkara thinks, veil the real, and superimpose the unreal on the real, as experienced in 'seeing' a snake on a rope as the basis, or a piece of silver on a shell as the basis. The *antaḥkaraṇa*, therefore, functions as bringing about a change, which is only a change in appearance (*vivarta*). Śaṅkara distinguishes three orders of experience, the basic transcendent experience, the lapsed psychological condition (not in function), and the lapsed condition as inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*) with its function of veiling (deep-sleep) and superimposition (dream and waking). *Jīva*¹⁷ or the living organism, according to Śaṅkara, is an involved process from the lapsed psychological condition to the *inner sense* with its dual functions, with additional processes issuing out of the superimposing function which when further modified flows into the processes of intellect (*buddhi*), mind (*manas*), remembering (*citta*) and the sense of I and mine (*ahaṁkāra*).¹⁸ The further process of *antaḥkaraṇa* into the stage of ego is continued up to the different sense-organs and the body which is in a vast environmental process beginning with the ether – the habitat of sound – to gross substances of the world at large. This story of psychic-cosmic evolution in individual and collective aspects, is worked out in detail by Śaṅkara's follower Sadānanda of the *Vivaraṇa* school in the 15th century A.D.¹⁹

The above view of evolution, which rests on Śaṅkara's analysis of immediate experiences in continuous modification, can be contrasted with the dualistic view of the Sāṃkhya system, where there are two orders of disconnected experiences, viz., the pure consciousness (*puruṣa*) and the pure existence in equilibrium of triadic energies (*prakṛti*).²⁰ It can also be contrasted with the complex western mode of analysis of evolution from a basic process before the material order, understood in a variety of ways, viz., in Bergson's basic *Time* in its evolution,²¹ or in Alexander's *Space-Time Matrix*²² in evolution, or in terms of other

¹⁷ The psycho-physical individual.

¹⁸ For details, vide, Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 342–61.

¹⁹ *Vedāntāsāra of Sadānanda*, With Introduction, Text, Translation and Comments, by Swami Nikhilānanda, Advaita Ashrama, Himalayas, 1941.

²⁰ Viz: those of *Sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

²¹ *Creative Evolution*, Macmillan & Co., 1920.

²² Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, 2 Vols., Macmillan & Co., 1927.

complex hypotheses of some transcendent elements operative with the basic physical or spatio-temporal characters as in Morgan²³ or Boodin.²⁴ All these theories of evolution prevalent in the West are however superseded by Whitehead's understanding of evolution from a complex cosmic-psychic view of processes as expressed in individual perceptual experience with transcendent suggestions.²⁵

Śaṅkara, in the background of the Vedic-Upaniṣadic-Buddhistic-Vedāntic current of thought, solved many problems then prevalent, but he also created some new ones. The *Vivaraṇa* school of Padmapāda²⁶ and the *Bhāmāti* school of Vācaspati Miśra²⁷ raised the intellectual problem of the *location* of the lapsed experience. According to the former, the lapsed experience is *located* in the transcendent experience, while the latter argues that it lies in the *Jīva*. But I think that this mode of reflection of these Śaṅkarites is obviously an abstract problem which does not follow from Śaṅkara's psychological analysis of experience. If the lapsed condition is a distinct psychic experience, how can it lie in the transcendent self-shining experience? It cannot also lie in the *Jīva*, which as already indicated, is a posterior evolutionary stage preceded by the *lapsed condition* and the *inner sense* with its dual functions. Though Śaṅkara himself did not want to enter into any metaphysical arguments, his followers from the days of Śrīharṣa (12th century A.D.) raised various metaphysical problems, and displayed their dialectical skill in their attempts to solve them in defense of Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara, by referring to the transcendent self-shining persistent experience as ultimately real, sets up a problem, for, in one's day to day experience one finds the reality of the finite selves, presented orders of experience from waking to deep-sleep, and the activity involved in one's life-process. Śaṅkara, however, tries to solve the problem by suggesting that the finite selves, etc., have only a practical reality but they have no ultimate reality. He lived his life with conviction, according to his final ideal. His real-unreal complex demonstrated through *Māyā-Avidyā* is a better logical supposition than those that were preva-

²³ *Emergent Evolution*, William and Norgate, 1927.

²⁴ *A Realistic Universe*, Macmillan & Co., 1916.

²⁵ *Adventures of Ideas*, A Mentor Book, Sixth Impression, 1964.

²⁶ Venkataramiah, D., Translated into English by: *The Pañcapādikā of Padmapāda*, Oriental Institute, Baroda, India, 1948.

²⁷ *The Bhāmāṭi of Vācaspati on Śaṅkara's Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (Catuṣsūtrī)* Ed. by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, The Theosophical Publishing House, India, 1933, with a foreword by Radhakrishnan; also Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 340-341.

lent in the philosophical systems of his time.²⁸ It is for this reason that Radhakrishnan, a renowned neo-Vedāntist of this century, defends not only Śāṅkara's view of ultimate experience but also his way of life in accordance with it. He defends Śāṅkara as a logical theist, logical empiricist and a social idealist.²⁹ Raju ³⁰ defends Śāṅkara and the prominent contemporary Indian neo-Vedāntins including Radhakrishnan as metaphysical idealists, in the specific sense of the Indian tradition. Raju, in this context, distinguishes his standpoint from the contentions of Dasgupta,³¹ who interprets the Indian idealist thinkers from the days of the Upaniṣads to Śāṅkara, as mystic idealists, because the Indian idealists, according to Dasgupta, are in no sense similar to the Western Idealists from Plato to Hegel.

Simultaneously with the pro-Śāṅkarite schools, one can observe in the history of Indian thought, that there run several opposing currents of philosophic thinking which brought objections against Śāṅkara's notion of transcendent experience as pure unchanging consciousness, where there is no place for supreme personality, finite personalities, activity or manifesting quality. Leaders of such opposing currents may be found among the theistic Vedāntins, and the followers of Śaivism, Śāktaism,³² Sufism ³³ and other emergent syncretic systems which develop chiefly after Rāmānuja (11th century A.D.). But in spite of the rebellious attitudes expressed in their deliberations, no one can ignore the dominance of Śāṅkara's influence in all these opposing currents.

Rāmānuja, in opposition to Śāṅkara, suggests that the transcendent pure subject is also a person having a consciousness. As a person it is always qualified by *matter* and *finite souls* which form its body. Rāmānuja does not identify the supreme self with knowledge or consciousness. As a principle, the supreme self is an eternal self-conscious subject, but it is also a self-luminous substance possessing *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* (basic attributive knowledge).³⁴ Hence the Self is not the pure con-

²⁸ Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita*, Luzac and Co., 1938, Chs. I and II.

²⁹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1930.

³⁰ *Idealistic Thought of India*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953, vide Preface and Chs. III-VIII.

³¹ *Indian Idealism*, Cambridge University Press, paperback, reprinted 1962, also vide: Otto, *Mysticism East and West*, Meridian Books, 1957, for a comparison between Śāṅkara and Eckhart, a German mystic of the 13th century.

³² Sharma, *Indian Philosophy* (A Critical Survey), Ch. XX.

³³ Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 375-394, and Spiegelberg, *Living Religions of the World*, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956, Ch. 16 (Islam and Sufism).

³⁴ Sharma, *Indian Philosophy* (A Critical Survey), p. 332, and Hirianna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, pp. 388-390; Hirianna goes into the details of Rāmānuja's notion of *dharma-bhūta-jñāna*; he interprets it as subsidiary or attributive *jñāna*, an accompanying

sciousness, but only the eternal substratum of consciousness. All the individual souls are real spiritual substances dependent on the supreme person or subject. They are atomic in nature, and, therefore, in liberation, they do not merge in the supreme person but remain distinct as its parts (*aṁśas*). The supreme person is not a creator but is operative over its parts by a basic qualitative process which is knowledge. By interpreting knowledge as a pure quality associated with the supreme self in which it has its basis, Rāmānuja refutes Śaṅkara's doctrine of reality as pure subject which can never become an object. According to him, Śaṅkara's doctrine of *Māyā-Avidyā* is an aberration, because Śaṅkara failed to distinguish between the transcendent self and its accompanying quality, *knowledge*, which is its basic character (*viśeṣaṇa*). After Rāmānuja refuted Śaṅkara's position in his *Śrībhāṣya* by advocating his doctrine of *Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda* (Qualified non-Dualism), his famous disciple, Vedānta Deśika, in the 13th century, added to Rāmānuja's scheme of refutation the hundredfold arguments by his *Śataḍūṣaṇī* (Hundredfold Refutations).³⁵

Rāmānuja introduces the transcendent reality as subject and also as a substratum supporting a basic self-effulgent knowledge which reveals the differences – finite selves and the entities of the objective universe – as *parts* of the real viewed as an organism, but Madhva, in the 13th century A.D., interprets the *differences* – (1) between the supreme self and the finite selves (2) between the supreme self and matter, (3) between any two finite selves themselves, (4) between the finite selves and matter, and (5) between any two individual material entities³⁶ – as *manifestations*, but not as parts, of the supreme self, and hence, they are dependent on the supreme self.

character associated with the subject but proceeding towards an object to reveal it. Hence it is not the subject itself, but it is its accompanying character functioning to reveal its parts, which are within it. He interprets such basic knowledge in the case of the supreme self and also the finite self. In the case of the supreme self, the basic knowledge remains with it continuously and functions as revealing its parts; in the case of the finite selves, it endures even in the deep-sleep, but it does not function then or does not show itself, as knowledge is known always along with an object. In an aspect, the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* of Rāmānuja, corresponds to the *antahkaraṇa* of Śaṅkara, which also is supposed to go out towards objects and assume their *form* before giving rise to knowledge. But while the *antahkaraṇa* in Śaṅkara's view is physical (*jaḍa*), requiring the aid of *sākṣi* for enlightenment, i.e., to be converted to knowledge, the *dharma-bhūta-jñāna* of Rāmānuja is a basic ever-present phenomenon and function, revealing the parts or objects. In the case of the finite selves it requires the mind or the senses as aids for determining its appearance in particular ways, as color or as an inner state or feeling. In the case of the supreme self it is operative spontaneously and without any medium.

³⁵ Srinivasa Chari, *Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita*, Asia Publishing House, N.Y., 1961, and Hiriyananna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, p. 385; according to Hiriyananna, Vedānta Deśika was also known as Venkaṭanātha.

³⁶ *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and Moore, p. 508.

Nimbārka in the 14th century, emphasizes the *identity* and also the *differences* within the supreme self and substance, advocating his *Bhedābheda-vāda* (Theory of Difference and Non-Difference). Vallabha, in the same century, interprets the character of *manifestation* of the supreme self and substance as unchanging change (*avikṛtapariṇāma*), refuting Śaṅkara's *vivarta* (change in appearance), and the *Sāṃkhya*'s *pariṇāma* (actual transformation). Vallabha develops the notion of manifestation (*āvirbhāva*) in relation to its opposite, dissolution (*tirobhāva*), and advocates Pure Non-Dualism (*Suddhādvaitavāda*), dispensing with Śaṅkara's non-dualism and change in appearance (*Māya-Vāda*).³¹

What is obvious in the theistic Vedānta from Rāmānuja to Vallabha, is the realistic and objectivistic interpretation of the transcendent reality as *subject-substance* in togetherness, having *parts* or *manifestations* which are *real*. The *two-order* theory of experience of Śaṅkara, with the admission of the transcendent experience as finally real, was denounced by the exponents of the Śaiva-siddhānta of South India, the Śaivism of Kashmir in North India and the Śāktaism of Bengal in North-East India. All these schools in revolt declare the supreme *subject-substance* as Śiva in place of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa of the theistic Vedāntins who were Vaiṣṇavites. They interpret the *differences*, viz., the finite selves etc., as manifestations of Śakti, a force dependent on the supreme *subject-substance*. In the later centuries, however, if we go deep into their later developments, we find that the Śaiva-Siddhānta of the South was greatly influenced by Rāmānuja as evident in the thoughts of Nīlakanṭha of the 14th century. The Śaivism of Kashmir was greatly influenced by Śaṅkara. This is manifest in Abhinavagupta of the 10th century, to whom, the finite selves, though a manifestation of Śiva's *śakti*, become identical with the supreme self or Śiva in final experience. The Śāktas of Bengal develop the notion of Śiva and Śakti in relation, and suggest that Śiva is latent Śakti (*vimarśa*), while the Kālī is Śakti in manifestation (*prakāśa*); obviously one can see the influence of Vallabha in the Śāktaism of Bengal.³⁸

In Bengal, the Vaiṣṇava cult too attains a further development in the neo-Vaiṣṇavism of Caitanya and his followers, chiefly Jīva Goswāmī of the 16th century. All these neo-Vaiṣṇavites are influenced by Rāmānuja and Vallabha, and they modify Śaṅkara's *supreme subject*

³⁷ Sharma, *Indian Philosophy* (A Critical Survey), pp. 363–368.

³⁸ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, pp. 724–755, speaking of Śāktaism, Radhakrishnan often refers to Sir John Woodroffe's works. Woodroffe (also known as Avalon) is a specialist in the field of Śāktaism and Tantraism.

by their theory of Śakti, denouncing Rāmānuja's notion of differences as qualitative expressions. Jīva Goswāmī, for example, suggests that Śakti is "inconceivable" (*acintanīya*), thus advocating the doctrine of *Acintyabhedābheda* or indiscernibility of identity and difference. In Jīva Goswāmī one can find an extension of Śaṅkara's transcendent indeterminate consciousness, which, as an initial stage, leads to a concrete determinate consciousness. According to Jīva Goswāmī, the basic identity-consciousness is only an intellectual intuition, a negative ideal, an indefinite bliss of an indeterminate homogeneity of consciousness. It is a stage immediately after the vanishing of *Avidyā* and immediately before the definite unification of bliss and consciousness, a synthesis that can be accessible to a loving consciousness, which unfolds determinate consciousness or concreteness and unity in spiritual realization. This new insight of Jīva Goswāmī is a modification of Śaṅkara in a realistic aspect, for which modification the Vaiṣṇava cult of Bengal became a novelty; its chief exponent in this century is Mahendranath Sircar.³⁹

Jīva Goswāmī realizes the transcendent love-consciousness which is a concrete determinate consciousness beyond the initial indeterminate transcendent consciousness of Śaṅkara. A similar kind of transcendent love-consciousness in the form of a divine mother is realized by Rāmākrishna, a village Brahmin of Bengal in the late 19th century. His realization is in an aspect of neo-Śāktaism, and he incorporates in his practical day to day life the strict principles of Tantraism,⁴⁰ infused in him by Bhairavi Brāhmanī, and the Vedāntic culture of Śaṅkara as transmitted by the itinerant monk, Totāpuri. Through his simple and innocent life, Rāmākrishna established the tradition that the transcendent experience of love for the divine mother can be obtained, not by learning or analysis of difficult principles, but by an individual effort and purification in one's life in relation to others. He used to associate with all types of people and assimilated the best from all. He realized practically the best principles of Christianity and of Islam. It may be mentioned here that Śiva and his consort Kālī, together, represent the fundamentals of Śāktaism and Tatraism.

Radhakrishnan, in whom the philosophic consciousness is fully developed in the line of the Vedic-Upaniṣadic-Buddhistic-Śaṅkarite tradition, presents the triadic principles of the *Absolute*, *God* and the

³⁹ *Comparative Studies in Vedāntism*, Oxford University Press, 1927, also Sharma, *Indian Philosophy* (A Critical Survey), pp. 368-369, and Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 170-173.

⁴⁰ A philosophy based on the *Tantras*.

World, in his, *An Idealist View of Life*.⁴¹ For Radhakrishnan, the Absolute is the habitat of infinite possibilities, the already accomplished field of continuous realization, the ground of all experiential basis, which the Indian mind through detachment has realized through the centuries. God and the World, in togetherness, as presented field of experience, are taken as one of the possibilities experientially discernible in the present circumstances, not on any dogmatic ground, but because such a field of experience cannot be ignored. Interpreting the presented universe as one of the possibilities out of innumerable possibilities, and the Absolute, the habitat of infinite possibilities, as a basic philosophic *ground* of reflection and also the *end*, Radhakrishnan seems to interpret the fundamentals of both Indian and Western thought with wonderful detachment and effectiveness. As Radhakrishnan expresses the Indian attitude through his triadic principles, he seems to include the reflections of the far east Asian ideas of China and Japan in the deep aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Speaking about the Absolute as the ever-present basic spirit, Radhakrishnan carries forward the Indian notion of *reality* in its fully Vedāntic and Mahāyāna aspects, and in admitting it as a field of infinite possibilities, both as a beginning and as an end, he seems to incorporate the fundamentals of the philosophy of evolution in its transcendent aspects, as he finds them in Whitehead among the contemporary Western realists and evolutionists. In referring to God and the World as one of the possibilities, on purely empirical grounds, he admits what the Indian thinkers admitted from the days of the Vedas, but he understands the presented universe and the Absolute, in the way of the Buddhists, in a ground-consequent relationship, interpreting the Absolute in Śaṅkarite and post-Śaṅkarite traditions.

Radhakrishnan suggests that in the presented sphere of experience, God is operative on an *aboriginal* universe, which has to be *formed* finally; when the world will be fully formed, with all its incongruities and insufficiencies removed from it, then, the entire field of presented universe, along with its processes and possibilities, God, finite spirits and matter, will lapse into the Absolute. The idea of lapse reminds one, in different ways, of the Indian philosophers, Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara. But Radhakrishnan at the same time is deeply conscious of the reality as presented, and he, along with the opposite group of thinkers from Rāmānuja to Tagore, upholds that the presented sphere of the universe is *real* for all practical purposes and as long as it is not

⁴¹ George Allen and Unwin Ltd., Fourth Impression, 1951, especially Chs. IV–VIII.

fully formed. In the present circumstances the *lapse* is not real, but, to think of it as a possible event in the future, is not an unreasonable supposition to Radhakrishnan. Philosophy has to provide for a basis and also for a possibility of experience. Radhakrishnan's Absolute is both basis and possibility.⁴²

Radhakrishnan is critical of Whitehead, because Whitehead does not admit that at the final stage of evolution there is an end or termination of all possibilities. Whitehead has a notion of a perpetual process or evolution, he has the notion of a final unrestricted process towards *peace*, and he also believes in perishing and persistence. But he is not interested in a final experience and tries to remain in a relative sphere. Quite naturally Radhakrishnan's idea of the *lapse* of the process, when the final plan is worked out, does not fit in with Whitehead's scheme of the evolutionary universe.⁴³ Radhakrishnan distinguishes between the Absolute as basis and the Absolute as possibility, and in between he finds a place for the God and the World as presented experience. Hence, in his scheme there is a place for *lapse*, but the *lapse* does not lead to a *void* or *vacuity*. Hartshorne finds difficulty in accepting Radhakrishnan's view.⁴⁴ But, it may be pointed out here that both Radhakrishnan and Whitehead are understandable from their respective traditional backgrounds.

Influenced as he is by Śāṅkara and the general Indian tradition, Radhakrishnan could boldly assert at the sessions of the Sixth International Congress in 1926,⁴⁵ that we were not too much in need of analysis of particular problems like those of essence or existence, sense or perspectives, or of a pragmatic insistence on methodology and on the futility of metaphysics, thus pointing a critical finger to the recent

⁴² Radhakrishnan, *The Spirit in Man in Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, George Qllen and Unwin Ltd., Revised Second Edition, 1952, for his view of God (religious experience) and Absolute. According to Radhakrishnan, "Even as the world is a definite manifestation of one specific possibility of the Absolute, God with whom the worshipper stands in personal relation is the very Absolute in the world context and is not a mere appearance of the Absolute." (p. 498). For critical comments and appreciation of Radhakrishnan, vide, Raju, *Idealistic Thought of India*, pp. 331-350.

⁴³ *An Idealist View of Life*, p. 331, Radhakrishnan is critical of Whitehead in the following way: "... God, in Whitehead's scheme, is affected by the process of reality. His nature finds completion only in terms of the world process. In any state he has a past which is irrevocable and a future which is not yet. What happens to God when the plan is achieved, when the primordial nature becomes the consequent, when there is an identity between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, to use Spinoza's expression, is not clearly brought out." For details about God and the Absolute, vide, pp. 331-345.

⁴⁴ C. Hartshorne, *Radhakrishnan on Mind, Matter and God in The Philosophy of Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan*, Tudor Publishing Company, N.Y., 1952, pp. 315-322, and *Reply to Critics*, by Radhakrishnan, pp. 796-798.

⁴⁵ *Radhakrishnan: Comparative Studies in Philosophy*, Editorial Board, Rev. Inge and others, Harper & Brothers, 1950, Introduction.

developments of Western philosophy in its aspects of realism, evolutionism and pragmatism, including phenomenological and existential modes and the anti-metaphysical trends of the logical positivists and analysts which were in the offing. In this context, Radhakrishnan wanted to suggest "a spiritual view of the universe broadbased on the results of the sciences and aspirations of humanity."⁴⁶ In Radhakrishnan one can clearly mark the vibrations of a real and dynamic universe and an idealistic background of a self-supporting and self-shining light of experience – an assimilation of the major philosophical trends of both the East and the West. This spirit, in Radhakrishnan, has been fully grasped by the Editors of the work dedicated to Radhakrishnan on his sixtieth birthday, when they, in appreciation of Radhakrishnan, from different cultural backgrounds, call him a liaison officer between East and West.⁴⁷ In his several works on philosophy and religion, Radhakrishnan fosters a comparative study of the East and the West. His life and career are a symbol of the synthesis of the ideals of action and spiritual life.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

I 2

PERSON AND MORAL LIFE

*(A Presentation of the Nature of Person and the Essence of Moral Life
in the Philosophy of Prajñāpāramitā)*

K. VENKATA RAMANAN

I

The *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras* are the largest and perhaps also the earliest among the scriptures basic to Mahāyāna Buddhism, the Buddhism of the Great Way. The ultimate reality of the undivided being and the way-faring by non-clinging constitute practically the heart of these *sūtras* (aphorisms). They form the foundation of Māhāyāna, which developed and upheld the absolutist line of Buddhist philosophy.

Nāgārjuna was the earliest among the systematic exponents of the philosophy of *Prajñāpāramitā* and was certainly the most important among them. He was the founder of the Mādhyamika tradition, the School of the Middle way, in Buddhist philosophy. *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra* is a work that is traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna and is a stupendous commentary on the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*. It is an excellent exposition of the essentials of the philosophy of Mahāyāna carried out with an extraordinary vigor of the logic that elucidates the non-ultimacy of the conditioned. Its pervading spirit is the sense of the beyond. Its unfailing attitude is the non-exclusiveness that is marked by a keen discernment with regard to the distinctive nature and value of every specific entity. Non-clinging is the key to the philosophy of Mahāyāna and the ultimacy of the limitless, the undivided, its central truth.

What follows here is a brief presentation of some of the reflections on the nature of person and the essence of moral life, found in the *Śāstra* (science; the book dealing with it).

II

In Buddhist terminology the center of personal life is called *viññāna* (consciousness) in order to connote that it is a self-conscious principle.

For Mahāyāna, *viññāna* is not a substance, it is an activity. Its activity consists in self-expression through self-formation. The person as an organism (that is also sometimes referred to as *viññāna*) is the work of *viññāna* – the I – as an active creative center, conscious of itself as an individual. Every one has his or her own likes and dislikes, tastes and interests and aspirations. At the center of it all, there is the urge to carry them out, guided by one's understanding, by way of giving expression and thus giving shape to oneself. The urge for self-fulfillment through self-expression is the impulse that is basic to the whole being of the self-conscious individual. The *Sāstra* observes that the fundamental import of the I, the sense of self, is the limitless, the full and undivided, in other words, the real. The self-formation or self-expression that the self-conscious individual carries out is impelled at root by this sense of the real; it is this that provides the meaning for all that one does as a person.

An essential bearing of this meaning of the sense of the I is that the limitless is a fact of awareness, not only within the reach of every one, but also as a fact of which every one is directly aware, although dimmed and even ignored owing to one's preoccupations with the concrete and the definite, the determinate and the specific. This is the true object of the seeking of every self-conscious individual although the seeking is misconstrued and clogged under the perversions of ignorance and passion. The limitless, also called the *prajñā* (intense consciousness), is the very essence of the individual. To refer to it as glowing beneath the encrustations of ignorance and passion, in the Mahāyāna it is called the seed of *bodhi*, the seed of wisdom, meaning that one's awareness of it can grow by directing one's attention to it and by understanding and appreciating its significance. That the *prajñā* is the essence of oneself has also the further import that the way to reach it is to realize it as not other than but as the very ultimate, real nature of oneself, that it is the very bedrock of one's being as a person. There is here one further import that the limitless is the ultimate nature not simply of any one specific thing, but that an entity in being a specific entity is itself in its ultimate nature the *prajñā*.

III

The life that the individual lives as a person is a life of self-expression, self-fulfillment through self-formation – ever impelled by the sense of the real, the unconditioned or the limitless and ever supported by the I,

the sense of self, and ever seeking to realize and to express the unconditioned on the plane of the conditioned. But it is a brute fact that man is usually ignorant of the meaning of his existence and of his nature as a person. This ignorance is not a mere absence of knowledge. It is a misconception. The fundamental import of the sense of the 'I', the sense of the real or the unconditioned, comes to be applied wrongly to the body-mind complex which the self has worked out for itself. This is *satkāya-dṛṣṭi*, the mistaking of the conditioned as unconditioned. This is to seize the relative as absolute, to cling to the determinate as limitless. This wrong notion comes to be extended to whatever the self seizes hold of or gives rise to as its self-expression, seeking to fulfill the basic urge. The sense of 'I,' the self-conscious intellection, thus becomes the false sense of self and the desire and the interestedness in the objectives of oneself thus turn out to be the passion, *trṣṇā*, which is the root of seizing and clinging, *grāha*.

Exclusive absorption – the interestedness that takes the form of a blindness with regard to the very nature or implications of the object of interest – issues in misconception and ends in clinging. Conflict in understanding and suffering in life, both have as their root the seizing of the conditioned as unconditioned, claiming limitlessness for the limited. This is the root form of mistaken *dṛṣṭi* or error; this is the error of misplaced absoluteness. *Śūnyatā* (voidity), which means the method of criticism, the method of bringing to light the relativity of the relative and stands also for the relativity itself, is the remedy for all false *dṛṣṭis* (views, perceptions). This clinging, seizing, functions by jumping from one extreme to another, and in this the correlatives of the natural polarity of intellect are seized as extremes; thus one ends in dead-ends. The dead-ends in understanding are the outcomes of seizing the relative as absolute. In the *Śāstra* the different links in the cycle of the life of the ignorant are considered as consisting of three basic forces: *kleśa*, *karma* and *vastu*, i.e., (1) afflictions of which passion, the desire misconstrued, that issues in clinging, is the foremost; (2) the deeds that spring from passion; and (3) the resulting forms and elements of personal life. The course of personal life that is conditioned by ignorance is a life of continuous conflict and suffering. Its conditioning factors continue with reinforced strength as long as one continues to live under ignorance and misconception. Of suffering in life then, the root, again, is ignorance, the false sense of self, the seizing of the limited as limitless.

IV

The false sense of self (*satkāya-dṛṣṭi*) must be clearly distinguished from the sense of the I (*viññāna*) which is non-clinging. The sense of the I is the self-conscious intellection. It is the reflection of the real in the mind of man. In its pristine form it is man's awareness of the unconditioned; it is the sense of the real or unconditioned as the ground of one's being as a person. But the false sense of self is the sense of the I misconstrued under ignorance; it functions by clinging, by seizing; it is the error of mistaking the relative for the absolute, misconstruing the determinate as the limitless. It is the root of passion; it is what breeds conflict and suffering.

The I or *viññāna* is a limiting as well as a widening force. It functions by analysis as well as synthesis. Personal life as a life of creativity is meaningful and possible only in the context of one and many, identity and difference, unity and variety. But it is necessary to note that every line of life, every distinctive nexus of functions is, by virtue of the very fact that it is a course of existence or a complex of functions, is not ultimate, not unconditioned. Its being is the being of a conditioned entity with a relative self-being. This is the mundane truth. The appraisal that things are conditioned, limited, is a judgment possible only on an awareness of the unconditioned, the limitless, the *prajñā*. The unconditioned as the import of the I and as the very essence of oneself is an object of which a self-conscious individual is directly aware. That the unconditioned is the ground of the conditioned is also the mundane truth. But he usually apprehends it only vaguely and under the distortions of ignorance. Dogmatism which is an instance of the error of misplaced absoluteness as well as skepticism, which is an attitude of unwillingness to commit oneself to any specific view as ultimate, is alike a phase of man's awareness of the limitless, but distorted and misconstrued.

The limitless or the ultimate (*paramārtha*) must be clearly distinguished from the limited or the conditioned (*vyavahāra*), and their true natures must be appreciated. This is not to draw a line of absolute division between the two; that would amount once again to misconstruing the limitedness of the limited as absolute and to conceiving the limitless as the limited. The relative is so not only by being essentially related with all the rest; the being of the relative as relative, the conditioned as conditioned implicates its deriving its being from the unconditioned, the absolute. This means that the conditioned or the

relative is not exclusively so, and the limitless has no other to itself. In essence the conditioned or the relative is not other than, nor apart from the absolute. The conditioned is itself the unconditioned in its ultimate nature.

To judge the determinate as unreal is to reject the notion of any falsely imposed unconditionedness with regard to it. The determinate is not itself rejected as a non-entity; and its true nature as a conditioned entity with a relative self-being is appreciated in order to see that it is conditionally originated. The aim is to open up the way to investigating the different conditions that have originated it and have been sustaining it. It is also to see the distinctness of its structure and function and appreciate its uniqueness of being. A clear and constant discrimination with regard to the conditioned and unconditioned is essential for the understanding to grow in width and veracity; it is also essential for one's appreciation of the uniqueness and value of every specific entity.

V

In his ultimate nature the person, the self-conscious individual, is himself the unconditioned, the undivided; but his being as an individual, as a person, is a being of continual self-conscious activity. He is wholly constituted of deeds and their consequences. His being is a continual remaking of oneself, which one accomplishes impelled by the sense of the undivided and in the context of the world of which he is a member and with which he is essentially related. Even a perfect person is not an exception to being conditionally originated. Personal life, the life of the self-conscious individual, is a continual endeavor to actualize, express, bring to manifestation the limitless on the plane of the limited. Here the limitless comes to be conceived as the different values that are sought to be realized in different ways that are in essence the canalizations of the basic urge; they are sought to be expressed, brought to manifestation on the different planes and different aspects of personal life.

The sense of the limitless is firmly upheld by man in the very midst of his achievements and hardships, delights and tribulations, although in the case of the ignorant it functions under error and clinging. The common man lives his moral life under a constraint or a necessity. Freedom, which is man's experience of his ultimate nature as the limitless brought to bear upon his deeds and his will, is in the case of the

common man fraught with the limitations of egoistic interests and blind impulses.

The striver on the path, the *bodhisattva*, is awakened to the falsity in the false sense of self and to the perversions of seizing and clinging. He seeks, through complete extinction of ignorance and passion, to bring to perfection his sense of his reality as the limitless. With effort and insight he fares on the way. The different *pāramitās* (kinds of perfection) are the different values that he sets up for realizing. The highest among them, the very basis of them all, is wisdom (*prajñā*). The different phases of his wayfaring are summed up as *prajñā* and *punya*, wisdom and moral worth, the two feet of the farer on the way. The destination of his wayfaring is Buddhahood which is perfection in personality. This he seeks to realize in order to be able to help all beings out of conflict and suffering.

The perfect person is a person of perfect wisdom and unbounded compassion. He is one who has fully realized freedom of being. It is through deep understanding and skillful striving that one comes to realize fully the freedom that is intrinsic to one's being. Freedom is an accomplishment. Removal of hindrances which is its negative side is an essential condition for its function as creativity, which is a spontaneous expression of one's fullness of being. In the case of the perfect person moral life becomes the life that he lives fully and freely. Sympathy in his case is a free expression of his sense of his undividedness with all beings. In everything he does he brings to expression fully and freely his comprehension that the *advaya-dharma*, the undivided being, is the ultimate reality. The highest kind of knowledge that the perfect person has achieved is the knowledge of all forms, the *sarvākārajñatā*, the knowledge of the distinctive way of every line of life, the distinctive nature of every kind of existent and the unique value of every specific being. His all-embracing sympathy impells him to enable each to live a life of his own, and help each to realize, in his own way the truth of his being. This is the *upāya*, the skillfulness of the wise. This is his forbearance, the *anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*, the ability to bring to bear upon every event the truth of the ultimacy of the limitless.

VI

We may sum up these reflections of the *Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra* on the nature of person by distinguishing three kinds of persons:

(1) The ignorant: he misconstrues his nature as a person and mis-

takes the relative for absolute, comes to seize the conditioned as unconditioned; he thus lives a life that is self-enclosed, under the false sense of self and is full of conflict and suffering;

(2) The striver on the path to perfection: With an awakening to the true nature of conditioned, he sets foot on the way to remaking himself by extinguishing ignorance and passion in all their ramifications; by putting an end to seizing and clinging, he seeks to realize freedom and fullness of being and to help every one to fare on the way.

For both of these, life is a continual striving in response to a basic impulse which is the urge for self-fulfillment through self-expression, self-formation. But the one is entrenched in ignorance bound by clinging and heading towards a continued and reinforced conflict and suffering. The other is awakened to the truth of things, especially the conditioned nature of the conditioned; with the sense of the limitless as distinguished from the limited he marches towards an ever growing comprehension of the limited in the light of the limitless and seeks to realize perfection in personality. The former is almost blind to the sense of one's essential relatedness with rest of beings, while the latter increasingly appreciates this as the truth that has its root in the ultimacy of the undivided being. Moral life in the case of the former is a life that is lived under a constraint or a necessity; in the case of the latter it is the life that is lived more and more in harmony with the true nature of one's being.

(3) The perfect person: He has wholly extinguished ignorance and has accomplished fully the remaking of himself; he is altogether constituted of wisdom and compassion. He has achieved freedom, while at the same time he sees clearly his essential relatedness as a person with the rest of beings and sees also with unfailing vividness the conditions that bring about conflict and suffering. In his case, personal life is a life of free creativity and of untrammelled expression of his fullness of being. His very sense of his undividedness with the rest of existents impels him to work for the world, which in his case, as a person free from coercions and constraints and aware fully of his reality as the limitless, becomes a free and full expression of the unconditioned on the plane of the conditioned, of the limitless on the plane of the limited.

THE SELF AS DISCOVERY AND CREATION IN WESTERN AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

TROY ORGAN

Two inscriptions were carved on the facade of the temple of Apollo at Delphi: "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess." These admonitions were not unrelated. Man was advised to know himself – yet in his knowing he was to avoid extremes. One extreme was the attempt to go beyond his finitude, to act as though he were a god. "Hybris" – the term used to designate this extreme, meant an outrage against the nature of things. Originally it denoted the offspring of the union of a wild boar and a domestic sow. The other extreme was the attempt to act as though he were not a member of society. The Greeks held that man is a city animal. He who lived outside the polis was called a private being. "Idios" was the term for such a being. At Delphi, then, the Greeks were reminded of their natural and social contingencies: "Know yourself, but in your knowing don't become a hybrid or an idiot!"

Self-knowing is one of man's most pervasive behavioral characteristics. The humanities may be defined as the ways of self-knowledge. Cassirer in *The Nature of Man* identifies religion, history, and philosophy as three forms of self-knowing: "In all the higher forms of religious life the maxim 'Know thyself' is regarded as an ultimate moral and religious law . . . History . . . is a form of self-knowledge . . . Self-knowledge is the highest aim of philosophical inquiry." ¹ Glicksberg thinks that all literature is self-knowing: "The struggle of man to define himself, to know himself, is the story of literature virtually from the beginning of civilization." ² Self-knowledge is an excellent theme for a conference on comparative philosophies and religions. It has been prominent in the thinking of philosophers in both hemispheres: "He

¹ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, Doubleday and Company, Garden City, N.Y. 1944, pp. 18, 241, 16.

² Charles I. Glicksberg, *The Self in Modern Literature*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 1963, p. 50.

who knows others is learned; he who knows himself is wise.”³ “What is the use of knowing everything except the Self? What else is there to know for anyone when Self, itself, is known?”⁴ “I sought for myself.”⁵ “Go not outside thyself, but return within thyself; for truth resides in the inmost part of man.”⁶ “One must know one’s self before knowing anything else.”⁷ “To project feelings into outer objects is the first way of symbolizing, and thus of conceiving those feelings. This activity belongs to about the earliest period of childhood that memory can recover. The conception of ‘self,’ which is usually thought to mark this beginning of actual memory, may possibly depend on this process of symbolically epitomizing our feelings.”⁸ “Who in the world am I? Ah, that’s the great puzzle!” (Alice – one of the best of the philosophers).⁹

While self-knowing has been a motivation of thought in both the East and the West, it must be admitted that for the last five hundred years Western man has found the external world more intriguing than the inner world. There have been many reasons for this propensity of thought in the West: the discovery of America, the revival of classical learning, the industrial revolution, and the political reformations are some of the determiners of Western man’s direction of thought. The twentieth century has been described as a time when man never knew more about the world and less about himself. In India on the other hand there has been since the earliest days of the Indus Valley culture a concentrated study of the inner nature of man. The goal of Indian philosophy is still defined metaphysically as self-knowledge (*ātma-vidyā*) and religiously as liberation (*mokṣa*). Self-cognition is to be attained through discursive reasoning (*pramāṇas*); self-realization (*darśana*) is to be attained through meditative practices (*sādhana*s). There are indications that we in the West are coming to realize the importance of the self. Not only are we discovering “the fragmentary character of world views that ignore the central position of the self,”¹⁰ but also we are stumbling upon the self in the process of knowing the external world. Few have stated this discovery as strikingly as A. S.

³ Lao-tzu, *Tao-Te-King*, xxxiii. Translated by Lin Yutang.

⁴ Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharashi, *Who Am I?* Sri Ramanasramam, Tiruvannamalai, S. India: 1955. Eighth edition, p. 36.

⁵ Heraclitus, *On Nature*, 101.

⁶ Augustine, *De vera religione*, XXIX, 72.

⁷ Kierkegaard, *Journals*, 22.

⁸ Susanne Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key*, The New American Library of World Literature, New York, 1948, p. 100.

⁹ Lewis Carroll, *Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland*, ch. ii.

¹⁰ George Arthur Wilson, *The Self and its World*, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1926, p. 275.

Eddington: "We have found a strange footprint on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the footprint. And Lo! it is our own." ¹¹

But we must not be deceived by the universality of the quest for self-knowledge, since it has many divergent shades of meaning: for Socrates it is the examination of ethical assumptions; for Augustine it is the avenue for attaining saving knowledge of the Christian God; for Śaṅkara a realization of identity of finite self and the cosmic principle; for Descartes the first step to intellectual certainty; and for some modern existentialists a prelude to suicide. There are also differences as to the ease or difficulty of self-knowledge. Ramana Marashi said, "Self-knowledge is an easy thing, the easiest thing there is." ¹² But Kant said metaphysics "is a call to reason to undertake anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge." ¹³ Modern man is often driven to despair because he is afraid either that the self does not exist at all or that the self is a Capekan machine, a Skinneran robot, a Kafkan cockroach, an Ionescoan rhinoceros, or a Sartrean "useless passion."

However, self-knowledge may be defined – as quest for identity, for axiological assumptions, for substratum, for essence, for specific differentia, or for salvation – the quest itself is the distinguishing characteristic of man. Man is the being who is aware of himself. The lower animals exist, and man exists – but man *knows* that he exists. An animal is; man is and knows *that* he is; God is and knows both *that* he is and *what* he is. But man also seeks to know *what* he is. He would be as God. God is Being whose essence is existence. Man is the being whose essence is the *quest* for existence and a being whose essence is existence. Man is the contingent being that attempts to remove contingency from its being. This human propensity was a scandal to the Hebrews. The myth of the Tower of Babel is an expression of their horror at man's efforts to rival God. Sartre calls it the desire of the for-itself to become in-itself-for-itself. He writes: "Every human reality is a passion in which it projects losing itself so as to establish being and by the same stroke to constitute the In-itself which escapes contingency by being its own foundation, the *Ens causa sui* which religions call God." ¹⁴ If the

¹¹ *Space, Time and Gravitation*, The University Press, Cambridge, 1920, p. 201.

¹² *OP. cit.*, p. 34.

¹³ *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Macmillan Co., London, Limited, 1950, Preface to First Edition, A XI, p. 9.

¹⁴ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. Translated by Hazel G. Barnes. The Philosophical Library, New York, 1956, p. 615.

attempt to make God is not a successful venture – and there are empirical evidences as well as rational reasons for concluding that it is not, man has open to him another absolute. He cannot become the Ground of Being, but he can become a non-being. The Stoics used to take comfort from the fact that man can take his own life – or as they said, man could leave by the back door. Today several nations have in storage the instruments of genocide. The day is not far distant when every major nation will possess the means for the total destruction of man. At last man faces squarely the problem of the value of his own existence. This is what Bonhoeffer called “the passionate subjectivity of modern man.” Is the human race worth preserving? Would the world be a better place without man? Can man justify his own existence? The back door exit is now possible for all life on this planet – and maybe soon for any life that happens to be on other planets in our solar system. Against such possibilities the questions “Who am I?” and “What is man?” take on new significance.

Thus far in this paper we have observed that self-knowing is a universal activity of man, that it is the activity that makes man human, and that it is the activity in which man projects himself toward divinity. Now we shall examine some of the philosophical problems inherent in self-knowing. If we were to name the Western philosopher who most vigorously and consistently directed himself to self-knowledge, that philosopher would be Augustine: “I desire to know God and the soul. Nothing besides? Nothing at all.”¹⁵ At first he thought he might find the knowledge he desired in the external world, but he came to see that what he sought was within. As a result of his search he warned Christians against vain curiosity about the external world, and advised them to look within for reality. When he turned within, he first established his own existence by arguing “*Si fallor, sum*” – ‘I exist because only an existing being can be deceived.’¹⁶ Then by appeal to the certainty of his own existence Augustine established the contemplative way of wisdom (*Sapientia*) whose objects are the intelligible ideas received from the Teacher Within, and the secondary or practical way of knowledge of the temporal affairs of earthly life (*Scientia*). Thus Augustine hoped to vanquish the Pyrrhonic skepticism which had taken over the Platonic Academy and the Ciceronian skepticism which had conquered his own mind at one time. And what was the result of the efforts of this man who was called “the master of the inner life”? We can appreciate

¹⁵ *Soliloquies*, i. ii. 7.

¹⁶ *The City of God*, XI, 26.

his inner struggle and the honesty of his reporting of that struggle, but it is not a pleasant sight to watch him shift from *Intellige ut credas* ("You must understand in order to believe")¹⁷ to *Crede ut intelligas* ("You must believe in order to understand")¹⁸ as one or the other suited his purposes. Probably his most honest confession was, "*Quaestio mihi factus sum.*" ("A question have I become for myself.")¹⁹

It is interesting to note that although Augustine attempted to affirm the reality of a substantial self and Hume attempted to deny the reality of a substantial self, both ended on a skeptical note. Hume in his *Treatise* attacked the notion of an existent self with characteristic enthusiasm: "There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our *self* . . . For my part, when I enter more intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other . . . I never catch *myself* at any-time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception . . . I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity." ²⁰ Hume, as some historians of philosophy have suggested, may have noticed the number of times the word "I" appeared in his essay refuting the existence of the self; for he wrote later in the Appendix to the *Treatise*: "Upon a more strict review of the section concerning *personal identity*, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent . . . I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding." ²¹

At this point we should appeal to the poets, playwrights, and novelists. They enter where philosophers fear to tread, for they celebrate rather than argue. One of the best presentations of the status to which Western man is reduced by his failure to know himself is found in Ionesco's play, "The Bald Soprano." Two couples – the Smiths and the Martins – sit in a room engaging in small talk which does not communicate. The weird clock on the wall which strikes at any time does not communicate either. At one point in the play the four characters angrily shout meaningless insults at each other: "Cockatoos, cockatoos, cockatoos . . . Such caca, such caca, such caca . . . Such cascades of

¹⁷ *Sermon* XLIII, iii, 4; vii, 9.

¹⁸ *On The Free Will*, II, 6.

¹⁹ *Confessions*, X, 33.

²⁰ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Appendix.

cacas, such cascades of cacas, such cascades of caca . . .”²² When the Martins fall into bored slumber, the maid addresses the audience: “Elizabeth is not Elizabeth, Donald is not Donald . . . It is in vain that he thinks he is Donald, it is in vain that she thinks she is Elizabeth . . . But who is the true Donald? Who is the true Elizabeth? Who has any interest in prolonging the confusion?”²³ Ionesco is telling us in this play that loss of self is loss of communication – and that loss of communication is loss of self. Where there is nothing to symbolize there are no symbols; there are only sounds to hide from man the terrifying emptiness – sounds that break the awful silence, and meaningless words that eliminate the necessity of thought. A play like “The Bald Soprano” may be regarded as a dramatic expression of the Humean theory of an unconnected world. Things have no relation to other things – logically, causally, ontologically, axiologically. Nothing means anything. Events necessitate no other events. The only cohesion among things is that which man supplies – if he is interested in supplying any. Both existentialism and language analysis are resultants of the Humean philosophy; but whereas the existentialists prefer to talk to take their minds off the meaninglessness of the world, the analysts prefer in the words of Wittgenstein “To say nothing except what can be said, i.e., the propositions of natural science . . . Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent!”²⁴

John Macmurray in the Gifford Lectures of 1953–54²⁵ attempts to solve the problem of the self by taking the self out of the epistemological context of subject-object and putting it in the activity context of agent-object. But Macmurray’s thesis that the self is actor rather than “spectator of all time and existence” does not do justice to man’s humanness. Self-knowing is the *sine qua non* of man. Only the human animal is self-aware. In the words of Teilhard de Chardin, “It is generally accepted that what distinguishes man psychologically from other living creatures is the power acquired by his consciousness of turning in upon itself. The animal knows, it has been said; but only man, among animals, knows that he knows.”²⁶ Furthermore, contends Teilhard, qualitative distinctions among men are made upon the basis

²² Eugene Ionesco, *Four Days*. Translated by Donald M. Allen. Grove Press, Inc., New York, pp. 39–40.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1933, p. 189.

²⁵ *The Form of the Personal*. Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957, 1961.

²⁶ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Future of Man*. Translated by Norman Denny. Harper and Row, New York and Evanston, 1964, p. 158.

of self-knowledge: "The great superiority over Primitive Man which we have acquired and which will be enhanced by our descendents in a degree perhaps undreamed-of by ourselves, is in the realm of self-knowledge; in our growing capacity to situate ourselves in space and time, to the point of becoming conscious of our place and responsibility in relation to the Universe."²⁷ We should note here that one of the ideas common to all the six systems of orthodox Indian philosophy is that the difference between animal and man is the difference between mere consciousness and self-consciousness, and also that the difference between man-as-*jīva* (i.e., as limited self) and man-as-Ātman (i.e., as unlimited Self) is the difference between self-consciousness (*ahamkāra* or *ahambuddhi*) and what is sometimes called "super-consciousness" (*caitanyam* or *nirviśeṣacinmātram*). The lower animals are unaware of their own existence. God also is not self-aware, for God has no need of knowing self. The beast is wordless; God is the Word. But man – caught between the beast and God – must know himself in order to be. The beast has no self; God is the Self; man attempts to become a Self. Man in his middle position sometimes longs like Whitman to turn and live with animals, and sometimes he longs like Plotinus to take a flight of the alone to the alone. But neither is possible. Man is an absurd beast with divine aspirations. He is conscious clay, a thinking reed, a bewildering paradox, a mere perhaps. He is the only animal that can make a fool of itself. But when we attempt to define man, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out, we "almost invariably end with some construction of a deity."²⁸

"You must know yourself," wrote Pascal, "even though that knowledge serves in no wise to find the truth."²⁹ I am contending that man must know himself in order to be man. But since man fails to know himself, I do not wish to conclude that he fails to be man! It is the *questing*, not the *finding*, that makes man man. And why the failure of the search? Why does he not know himself? There are two reasons for this failure. One has to do with the novel epistemological structure of self-knowing; the other has to do with the ontological duality of the epistemological object. We shall examine the epistemological structure first. The philosophical way of stating the problem would go like this: all knowledge includes a subject, an object, and an act – knower, known and knowing. Whether one follows the argument of the realist that the

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁸ Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*. Doubleday and Company, Garden City, N.Y., 1959, p. 12.

²⁹ *The Thoughts*, 66.

object is unmodified in the act, or whether one follows the argument of the idealist that the object is modified ontologically by the knower in the act, the fact remains that within the total structure of knowing subject and object are distinct. The subject knows the object; the object is known by the subject. But when that which is known is the self, the problem becomes more complex. As some Indian philosophers love to say, the self is like the eye that seeks to see itself. The eye is the seer of the seen, but what happens when the object of seeing is itself the seeing subject? Can the knower of knowing be known? And if something is known in the act of self-knowing, is it really the knower? If I seek to know the I, do I end in knowing the I, or must I be content with knowing "me"?

The subject-object duality in self-knowing is poetically presented in *R̥g Veda*, and is repeated in both the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* and the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*: "Two birds associated together, and mutual friends, take refuge in the same tree: one of them eats the sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merely looks on."³⁰ The ancient commentator Śāyana, explained that the two birds are the vital spirit and the supreme spirit. The interpretation is shared by Advaita Vedāntism, but the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta philosophers tend to treat such passages as referring to a duality within the constitution of man. The tree is the human body: the bird that eats the fruit is the active self that enters fully into the experiences of physical life: eating, drinking, waking, sleeping, breeding, suffering, and dying. The bird that does not eat the fruit but merely watches the activity of the first bird is known as the passive self, the witnessing self (*sākṣin*). It refrains from entanglement in bodily acts. It contemplates the life of physical activity; it does not censure the active self, but when the active self compares its own helplessness with the quiet strength of the passive self it grieves and turns from its life of sorrow and bondage. This duality of the self appears in various forms in the Upaniṣads; for example, in the *Katha Upaniṣad* the two are called *buddhi* (the intellect) and *ākāśa* (the heart as enjoyer): "Two there are who dwell within the body, in the *buddhi*, the supreme *ākāśa* of the heart, enjoying the sure rewards of their own actions."³¹ Whenever the concept of duality of the self is introduced in the Upaniṣads, reference is made to a tension between the selves. The Lower or active self is so closely related to the body that "Whatever body he takes to himself, with that he becomes connected."³² It brings

³⁰ *RV*, I. 22. 8. 20; *MU*, 3. 1. 1; *SU*, 4. 6.

³¹ *KU*, I. 3. 1.

³² *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, 5. 10.

difference to all it touches; it is the doer of the deeds which must be carried out to their fruition. Thus it is the carrier of *karma*. But the higher or passive self is the self that points the way to liberation.

The problem of self-knowing has been concisely and metaphorically stated by the contemporary existentialist author, Simone de Beauvoir in *The Mandarins*: "It's easy to say 'I am I.' But who am I? Where find myself? I would have to be on the other side of every door, but when it's I who knock the others grow silent."³³ To know the self the self must be on both sides of the same door, but – alas – when the self knocks on the knower side of the door there is no one on the other side to open the door, and when there is a self on the other side of the door to open there is no self on the knower side of the door to knock! So what should man do? Some say, "Stop knocking!" But that is the way of the beast. Some say, "Climb over the transom!" But that is the way of God. Others say, "Keep on knocking!" And that is the way of man.

But to return to philosophy! – man tries in two ways to overcome the epistemological dichotomy which is inherent in self-knowing. One way is to confine his knowing to objects of the world of the non-self. This way is to turn from self-knowledge as introverted, unsocial, abnormal, even perverted – a kind of intellectual masturbation. "None of us really wants to observe or know ourselves," writes Otto Rank. "Such observation is not natural to us."³⁴ "I'm neither virgin nor priest enough to play with the inner life,"³⁵ says Antoine Roquentin, the hero of Sartre's *Nausea*. How much of the pursuit of research in the natural sciences is motivated by the effort to keep our attention off ourselves? Subjectivity is eliminated when objective interests take over. Psychology – the *term* still means soul-study! – becomes the study of human behavior that can be quantitatively measured, experimentally tested, and linguistically expressed. The self is left largely for poets, mystics, theologians, and others who seem slightly out of touch with "reality." The ontological imperialism of scientific methodologies is a pressing danger. It is one matter to hold that if something cannot be known by scientific methods it cannot be *known*, but it is quite another matter to hold that if something cannot be known by scientific methods it does not *exist*. Occasionally a voice is raised for the importance of self-knowing in the midst of an objectively-oriented civilization. For example, Peter Viereck wrote in 1958, "Today

³³ *The Mandarins*, The World Publishing Company, Cleveland and New York, 1960, p. 43.

³⁴ *Psychology and the Soul*, Translated by William D. Turner, A. S. Barnes and Company, Inc., New York, 1950, p. 6.

³⁵ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Nausea*, New Directions Books, Norfolk, Conn., 1959, p. 18.

Americans have no outer or geographic frontier left to conquer. This pushes us, instead, to increasingly inward conquests . . . Therefore, let us stop being defensive, stop being apologetic about affirming the dignity and importance of the so-called impractical: namely, the humanistic and the spiritual studies.”³⁶ Since 1958 Americans have found a new frontier – the frontier of space. Once again the inward conquests can be postponed. John Wilkinson of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions of The Fund for the Republic has recently proposed that some parts of the world ought to be kept deliberately “backward” as a refuge for individuals concerned with the inner life who would accept plain living as a condition for high thinking. If we establish sanctuaries for condors and whooping cranes, why not establish sanctuaries for a breed of men in danger of extermination? Wilkinson cautions, “The big problem would be, sooner or later, how to fend off the ravages of administrators, speculators, politicians, and other quantitative folk.”³⁷

The second effort to overcome the subject-object dichotomy is the way of the mystic. The scientist *avoids* the problem of self-knowing; the mystic *transcends* the problem by attempting a form of knowing in which knower and known are merged into a unit. There is no disputing that there are experiences in which the agent feels a unity with the object of his awareness. But is this feeling a form of knowing? I doubt that much meaning is left in the concept “knowledge” when it is divided into two species. “direct knowledge” and “indirect knowledge.” All knowledge is indirect, Knowledge is a salute, not an embrace. It is a representation, a symbolization, a universalization, an analysis. In a sense, knowing is a form of falsifying; for reality is concrete, particular, specific, unanalyzed. Were a Zen master suddenly to throw a bucket of cold water in my face in order to nudge me to *satori*, I would find it an arresting, commanding experience, but I contend that to experience water in this fashion is not to *know* water. Water “known” is not water in the face; rather it is H₂O, or the universal solvent, or a substance that swells when it freezes, or the stuff said by Thales to be the first principle of all things. If these seem to be dry facts rather than wet experience, that is because knowledge is the propositional designation of facts.

The second reason for man’s failure to know the self has to do with the ontological duality of the epistemological object. Perhaps this is

³⁶ “The Unadjusted Man,” *Saturday Review*, Nov. 1, 1958, p. 13.

³⁷ “The Quantitative Society or, What Are You to Do with Noodle?” An Occasional Paper on the Role of Technology in the Free Society. The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1964, p. 7.

not a second reason but another aspect of the same reason. The self-as-known cannot be disentangled from the self-as-knower. From the point of view of the ontological status of the known object this problem is: Is the self-as-object a discovery or a creation? Do I *find* myself, or do I *form* myself? Plotinus, one of the greatest of the Western philosophers of the self, criticized Plato for writing ambiguously on the nature of the self: "Lastly, we have the divine Plato who said many beautiful things about the soul. In his discussions he often speaks of the arrival of the soul in this world. He makes us hope that he will have something clear to say on this matter. But unfortunately he does not everywhere say the same thing and so does not enable one easily to know his intent." ³⁸ But Plotinus himself does not speak without confusion about the self. In particular, the salvation to which he directs his philosophy means both extinction of the individual soul and also the fullest realization of the individual soul. The One is both "not all things . . . not Intelligence . . . (and) not being" ³⁹ and also the One is "the principle that he (a man) possesses within himself." ⁴⁰ When Plotinus is thinking in the context of the Limited, salvation is the loss of what one is; and when thinking in terms of the Unlimited, salvation is the fulfillment of what one is.

In the West we have sought to avoid making contradictory statements about the self by attempting to limit the known self to the status of either a discovery or a creation. We have sought to know the self as an object in the order of things – Descartes said it is "a real thing, and really existent" ⁴¹ and we have also sought to avoid contradiction by denying thinghood altogether – the self, said Hume, is "a bundle or collection of different perceptions." ⁴² One of Hume's better analogies is that of the theatre. The self is a kind of theatre where "perceptions successively make their appearance: pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations." ⁴³ Hume, knowing that the fate of analogies is to be pushed too far, added that the self is not the theatre as building, but only the theatre as spectacle. Not a *thing*, we might say, but an ever-changing array of color and sound. For Descartes the self is a discovered thing; for Hume the self is a created spectacle. The former view over-objectifies; the latter, over-

³⁸ *Enneads*, IV. viii. 1.

³⁹ *Enneads*, VI. ix. 2.

⁴⁰ *Enneads*, VI. ix. 3.

⁴¹ *Meditations*, Second Meditation.

⁴² *Op. cit.*, Section VI.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

subjectivities. The former betrays the Unlimited; the latter betrays the Limited. Again man attempts to make himself into beast or God. But the self is no mere thing, and the self is not Being. It is a thing-aspiring-Being. The self is always infinitely more than it would be if it were only what it is.

The Judeo-Christian tradition is puzzling in this respect. Here man is condemned for his desire to become God. Yet if we are right in holding that the passion for divinity is the essence of man, then man in Judeo-Christianity is condemned for being himself! (In Neo-orthodox Christianity this is the idolatry of the self). Man must either cease to desire to become God – and thus cease to be man, or else he must continue his divine aspiration – and then stand condemned by his religion. But perhaps the Christian view is that by ceasing to desire to become God, the Christian throws himself on the mercy of his God. He loses himself. But he that loses self will find self, whereas he that continues to desire to be God will in his effort to preserve self lose self. Aurobindo has expressed this same doctrine of grace in self-knowing: “A complete self-knowledge in all things and at all moments is the gift of the supernatural gnosis.”⁴⁴ This affirmation of the impotence of man and the placing of man’s salvation upon the grace of God may be good Semitic autocracy, Vāiṣṇava yoga, and Calvinistic soteriology, but twentieth-century Western man has difficulty squaring this view of the self with his democratic presuppositions of the importance of the individual and his educational theories of self-expression and self-development.

In India the conflict between self-as-discovery and self-as-creation may be avoided by the doctrine of *māyā*. From the Limited point of view the attainment of *mokṣa* is a creative achievement by which the finite self through proper techniques reaches an identity with the supreme reality. From the Unlimited point of view *mokṣa* is the removal of confining perspectives which prevent the self from an existential awareness of its true nature. *Mokṣa* from the second point of view is the transcendence of phenomenalism. The two interpretations do not conflict. Works and grace do not cancel each other out. A Hindu myth puts this as follows: a tiger cub once became lost from its mother and was adopted by a flock of sheep who reared the cub as though it were a sheep. One day a tiger attacked the flock and saw the timid cub bleating among the sheep. “What do you think you are?” asked the tiger. “I’m a sheep,” replied the cub. The tiger took the cub to a pond of water and forced the cub to look into the water and to compare reflections. Then

⁴⁴ Sri Aurobindo, *The Life Divine*, The Greystone Press, New York, 1949, p. 864.

it pushed the nose of the tiger cub into the warm bloody carcass of a recently slain sheep. "Now what are you?" asked the tiger. "I'm a tiger," replied the cub.

Man becomes what he is. His is-ness is his becoming. He is a becoming, not a Being. His "being" is becoming-ness. His is-ness is in process such that he never is with the finality of beast or God. He discovers creatively what he is, and he discovers creatively what he can become.

The theory that man is a becoming is subject to modification in the Advaita philosophy. According to these Vedāntic philosophers, the self-that-becomes is the self considered from the limited point of view; whereas from the Unlimited point of view the self is Reality-becoming only in the sense of losing its *māyā*-ness. The self-as-*jīva* is the Self-as-Ātman seen under the conditions of time and space. "Becoming" is the phenomenal description of Being. From a transcendent or non-phenomenal point of view, there is Being, but no becoming. Man "becomes" the Absolute only in the sense that a "snake" becomes a rope when the "snake" is recognized as a rope-mistaken-for-a-snake.

Sartre has expressed the created-discovered issue in this fashion: "The ego is always surpassed by what it produces, although from another point of view, it *is* what it produces. Hence the classic surprises: '*I*, I could do that!' – '*I*, I could hate my father!' – Here, evidently, the concrete totality of the *me* intuited up to this time weights down the productive *I* and holds it back a little from what the *I* has just produced." ⁴⁵ In *Nausea* Roquentin asks, "It is *I* who is going to live this mushroom existence?" ⁴⁶ Again in his essay, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, Sartre speaking of the ego as passive object and as created object says, "However irrational it may be, this union is nonetheless the union noted in our intuition of the ego. And this is its meaning: the ego is an object apprehended, but also an object *conditioned*, by reflective consciousness." ⁴⁷

The self-as-object is both a discovery and a creation. Man *is* his becoming; his becoming is what he is. He is ever in process. Jaspers says he is "that creature which poses problems beyond his powers." In the words of Nietzsche, man is "the animal that is not yet established." I'd add, he is the animal that is never established. Buber holds that man can be defined only in terms of his relation to all being. These relations,

⁴⁵ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*. Translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick. The Noonday Press, New York, 1957, p. 80.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 231.

⁴⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

says Buber, are his relations to the world of things, his relations to the world of individuals, and his relations to the world of Being – call it Absolute or God. Buber speculates that there might be a fourth relation – a very special one: i.e., man's relation to his self. But Buber withdraws from this possibility because, as he says, this relation cannot be completed nor perfected. But perfectionism has nothing to do with the nature of man. Wisely the Christian churches have seldom literally taken the admonition "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." "Man is neither an angel nor a beast," wrote Pascal, "and it is his misfortune that he who seeks to play the role of the angels acts most like a beast."⁴⁸ Man is a great promise – a promise forever unfulfilled, but great in the complete persistence of his incompleteness whether expressed in St. Paul's "I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus"⁴⁹ or in Beckett's "I don't know, I'll never know, in the silence you don't know, you must go on, I can't go on, I can't go on, I'll go on."⁵⁰

⁴⁸ *The Thoughts*, 358.

⁴⁹ Philippians 3: 14.

⁵⁰ Samuel Beckett, *The Unnamable*, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1958, p. 179.

THE BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ AND THE BOOK OF JOB ON
THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF

JAMES NORTON

Although I have for some time been acquainted with both the *Book of Job* and the *Bhagavad Gītā* in varying contexts, I must confess that the reading of one did not ever suggest to me the other in any immediately significant way. The common ground between them has not been an obvious one. They were, in fact, first brought together by a matter of academic expediency, an historical accident, rather than by any revelation of a common and innate truth. But once the two had been thrust into juxta-position, the resulting interaction has been a continued source of intriguing challenge and discovery. My mind has not been at rest with them since it happened, a little over a year ago.

If this experience is in any way typical, and the coming into being of this conference is to suggest that it is, then I see reinforced in it that whole new dimension of intellectual growth which has been brought about by the increased interaction between peoples of differing cultural heritage, a dimension in which most of us here must share. I therefore take courage to express what to me have been some of the significant elements of this encounter between these two mighty works, particularly as they impinge upon the problem of the self.

There are, of course, very obvious similarities between the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job*. They are both religious works of no small importance, both comprising a part of the sacred writings of their respective religious traditions. That is to say that they are both considered as having authority in questions dealing with the reality and activity of God. But also, significantly, they are both poetic compositions of such stature as to be among the classics of world literature. They express a totality or completeness of man's experience in such human terms as to be understood by all men. They reveal to him a fuller dimension of his experience. It was Matthew Arnold who wrote at a time when he

was as richly alive to the poetic quality of the *Bhagavad Gītā* as he was to Western literature:

The grand power of poetry is its interpretative power; by which I mean, not a power of drawing out in black and white an explanation of the mystery of the Universe, but the power of so dealing with things as to awaken in us a wonderfully full, new, and intimate sense of them and our relations with them.¹

Both works have the power of so dealing with the self, of so revealing something of ourselves, that we cannot read either without being profoundly moved. They both speak in this way to the universe of man.

But it is at precisely this point that the similarities cease. For their universality is really in their particularity, not only in the uniqueness of the experience of each poem itself, but more obviously in the situation upon which the poem is based and the theological understanding in which it is expressed. The experience of Arjuna, the hero of the *Bhagavad Gītā* is not that of Job. Nor, by any stretch of the imagination could it ever become so. In our day of cultural determinism, it is popular to attribute this distinction to the integrity of each of the two cultures involved. Arjuna is not a Hebrew but an Indian,² and could therefore never be expected to think and act like a Hebrew. There is a certain sense in which this must be true. Certainly a knowledge of the distinctive characteristics of Indian and Hebrew culture is essential before we can even hope to understand what these works are saying. The very language itself is perhaps the most basic of cultural determinants. But this basis is both too general and too narrow. For there is a very important, even vital, sense in which neither Arjuna nor Job is typically Indian or Hebraic. Job, certainly, and we have centuries of Rabbinic concern to prove it, is not what one would call a representative Hebrew. And Arjuna is also in some very significant ways totally unique. It is, in fact, on the basis of the uniqueness of their own personal integrity in their particular situations that both of them belong to the universe of man.

The contrasts which separate these two works and which identify the uniqueness of each are legion. But I will consider only three, to indicate the levels on which the disparity exists. First, the poetic character of each work reveals an entirely different tone and mood. A vivid illustration of this difference is to note that the *Bhagavad Gītā* begins with the air filled with the blasting of war trumpets and the cries of

¹ Aryan.

² In an essay on Maurice de Guérin, quoted in S. Nagarajan, "Arnold and the *Bhagavad Gītā*: A Reinterpretation of *Empedocles on Etna*," *Comparative Literature*, vol. 12, no. 4, Fall, 1960, p. 341.

mighty heroes drawn up in proud military array, building up among themselves enthusiasm for battle and a spirit of victory; whereas the poetic dialogue of *Job* begins with five people, one of them "afflicted with sores from the sole of his foot to the crown of his head,"³ sitting among ashes for seven days in silence. What is more, they develop in opposite directions. The *Bhagavad Gītā* takes on a feeling of calm, of serenity almost, as one by one Arjuna's doubts are resolved without any show of passion, even involvement. We are brought again to a tone of epic majesty in the vision of Chapter XI. But then the work continues in a tone of passionless discourse, oblivious of battle, reaching in the final verse of Chapter XVIII a haven of quietness and peace.

Thinking on me, devoted to me, worshipping me, revering me, you will come to me, I promise you truly, for you are dear to me. Abandon all laws, turn to me as your refuge. I will deliver you from all evil. Have no care. (81.61-2).⁴

Job, on the other hand, develops through a dialogue of intense and violent interaction, where the comforters, beginning in a tone of saccharine, pastoral concern, soon enter into the heat of accusation, only to be turned aside by the acrimony of Job's attack.

As for you, you whitewash with lies; worthless physicians are you all. (13:4).

How different from Arjuna's moment of doubt and despair is the cry of a tormented and angry man who will not be comforted.

I loathe my life; I will give free utterance to my complaint; I will speak in the bitterness of my soul. (10:1).

Not even in the voice out of the whirlwind, another figure of turbulence, when YHWH speaks to restore a cosmic order to things do we find such majestic sublimity as in Krishna's confident counsel to Arjuna in Chapter II:

Nay, but as one layeth
His worn-out robes away,
And, taking new ones, sayeth,
"These will I wear today!"
So putteth by the spirit
Lightly its garb of flesh

³ The *Book of Job*, 2:7. All of the passages from the Old Testament are taken from the R.S.V., with the exception of Job 42:6, where I have substituted the words "am grieved" for the R.S.V. "repent" as a more appropriate translation of the Hebrew *nācham*. (See Terrien, *Job, Poet of Existence*, p. 240).

⁴ R. C. Zaehner's translation, from *The Comparison of Religions*, Beacon Press, 1962, p. 133. All of the other translations, unless otherwise identified, are based on the text in Harvard Oriental Series, vol. 31, edited and translated by Franklin Edgerton, Cambridge, 1952.

And passeth to inherit
A residence afresh.

(II. 22, Arnold's translation)

Not only are the experiences of the poems themselves quite different, but also the issue involved is not conceived in the same way. It is true that both are confronted with a question of justice. The Sanskrit word *dharma* is in this instance an equivalent term. But the problem derived from the concept is not the same. Arjuna, a righteous man, is trying to find a way to fulfill his *dharma*, to be just, in a situation where one value is opposed by another. Being a brave warrior in the face of battle, a good thing, is opposed by honoring one's relatives and teachers, another virtue. There is nothing in the statement of these values which determines which is better than the other, and thus the problem. Krishna in dealing with it reinforces the concept of justice itself; first by explicit assertion in Chapter IV:

For protection of the good, and for the destruction of evil doers, To establish a basis for justice, I come into age after age. (IV. 8).

And also by manifesting himself in a resplendent vision in Chapter XI. Here, he appears to give Arjuna an absolute basis upon which to choose the higher of the two virtues. He can now act with confidence of being right. Justice in this situation is explained; it is not itself called into question.

Job, on the other hand, is thrust into a position where justice loses its content. He, a righteous man, is suffering, suffering for no punishment which he deserves, for no sin which he has committed. The very violence of his outbursts is to reveal the impossibility of any choice involved in this situation. In his suffering, justice is denied, and there can no longer be any recourse to it.

Behold, I cry out: 'Violence!', but I am not answered: I cry aloud, but there is no justice. (19:7).

Thus on the question of justice it is not a matter of one work answering the other or of giving a deeper insight into the other. They simply are not asking the same question. The *Gita* gives a divine basis for accepting a scale of values within an established system of justice (*dharma*), the *Book of Job* gives a divine basis for living in a world where there is no justice.

Most striking of all of the contrasts is in the vision of God which comes at the moment of dramatic climax in each work. I think I can

best illustrate this contrast simply by reading together a short sample of each:

From the *Bhagavad Gītā*:

As I look upon thee touching the sky, blazing with many colors, Thy mouth wide open, Thy blazing eyes expanded, my inmost soul shudders: . . . Looking upon Thy jaws, terrible with their tusks, as into Death's devouring fire, I know no longer where I am and find no resting place . . . All the sons of Dhṛtarāṣṭra . . . rush headlong into Thy gaping fearful jaws, terrible with their tusks. Some of these I see caught between thy teeth, their heads ground to powder . . . As in mad haste moths rush into a flaming fire to their own destruction, so do the worlds rush into Thy mouths to perish there. Devouring all the worlds completely in Thy flaming mouths, Thou lickest them up. Filling the whole world with Thy light, Thine awful brilliance scorches the whole universe. (XI: 24-30, Zaehner's translation).

Compare this vision to the opening verses of the words of YHWH speaking to Job out of the whirlwind:

Where were you when I laid the foundations of the earth?
 Tell me, if you have understanding.
 Who determined its measurements – surely you know!
 Or who stretched the line upon it?
 On what were its bases sunk, or who laid its corner stone,
 When the morning stars sang together,
 and all the sons of God shouted for joy? (38: 4-7).

Poetically, philosophically, theologically, these two works resist each other. One can hold them together only in a state of tension. Any attempt to comprehend one in terms of the other, or to subsume one under the other, leads only to the loss of both. They demand each its own uniqueness.

I begin with this rather extended introduction because I feel that this tension which holds them apart is essential to a significant consideration of the identity of the self as it is expressed by the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job*. It is true that both works are intensely concerned about this problem, and in a very profound and perceptive way. Both Arjuna and Job in their attempt to come to terms with the torment of their respective situations are driven by the immediacy of their anguish to the question: "Who am I?" Arjuna's disconsolate question in the face of interfamily warfare, "Why should I fight?" finds its reply in the assertion: "Because of who you are." He is asked not to identify the nature of man, but rather himself, who he understands himself to be that he may enter into such a battle. Job also is faced with this question in a most personal and intense way: "Who am I that I should suffer so?," but perhaps nowhere more forcefully than in the final scene when YHWH asks out the whirlwind: "Who is this

that darkens counsel by words without knowledge?" (38:2) Job stands then in his most intense affirmation of himself ("Let the Almighty answer me!") (31:35), and is most naked.

But even though this common concern for identity makes a comparison between these two works possible, I feel that the common quest is better understood if the tension which is evident in their juxtaposition is constantly before us. Sensitivity to this tension will lead us to a greater appreciation of the common affirmations which they do make, but even more important, it will drive us to a more profound and hopefully truer analysis of the nature of the self as it is revealed by a consideration of these two consummate expressions of man's search for his own, unique identity.

To turn then to the affirmations which they share, first, both works affirm that the self is rational. In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, Krishna, in answer to Arjuna's despair over entering into battle with his relations and teachers, enters immediately upon the problem on a rational basis. Arjuna is, he argues, the victim of a misunderstanding about the nature of the self, a misunderstanding that can be corrected by a straightforward set of logically related assertions. First is the proposition that the soul is separate from the body. Secondly, he asserts, the soul is indestructible. If Arjuna can accept these two premises, then Krishna expects to convince him that in slaying the bodies of his opponents in war he does no harm to their real selves, their souls. He is expecting Arjuna to be reasonable, and to act on the basis of this reasoning. He spends no more time on the argument itself, but goes on immediately to establish the validity of these two premises, which is developed in the following eleven chapters.

Similarly, the *Book of Job*, as Joel Faks has pointed out in his recent article in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*,⁵ also affirms man's essential power to reason. The development of the dramatic action of the work depends upon the understanding common to all of those involved, of a precise, logical relationship between three propositions:

1. God's justice is such that there can be no suffering without sin.
(A proposition which itself is based upon what is called the prophetic syllogism in Isaiah 1:18-20:

Come now, let us reason together, says the Lord . . .

If you are willing and obedient, you shall eat the good of the land;
But if you refuse and rebel, you shall be devoured by the sword).

⁵ H. Joel Faks, "The Enigma of Job: Maimonides and the Moderns" *Journal of Biblical Literature*, vol. 83, part IV, December, 1964, pp. 345-364.

2. Job is suffering.

3. Therefore, Job, all appearances to the contrary, is not a righteous man.

All subsequent commentary has been to affirm the validity of the rational analysis of this situation, and to question the validity of one or other of the premises.

But it is also true that, if both works understand man as reasonable, as someone to be reasoned with, neither sees, in his power to reason, an adequate definition of man. Job's problem exists in the face of reason. He will not accept the conclusion that he is not innocent, no matter what his reason may tell him. He thus, paradoxically, both attacks the opening premise concerning God's justice, thereby standing over and against it, and at the same time appeals to it, so that God might deal with him justly. In this way he is neither explained nor contained by reason, but rather apart from it. Arjuna, also, does not find in the use of reason the indestructibility of his soul. That it be a premise, if he is to fight, is accepted, but reason cannot establish for him this premise. Conviction comes to him only through the vision of the divine form of Krishna; only after seeing it is he prepared to act. Thus both see man as reasoning, but neither sees in his reason the basis of his identity as a self.

The second assertion about the nature of the self in which the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job* share is in terms of man's moral awareness. Both works involve a problem resulting from an accepted pattern of behavior, a moral law, under which they cannot continue to live and maintain their identity as men. Arjuna lives under a moral code determined by the law of *karma*, a system of universal retaliation: for every good act he does there is a good consequence; for every evil act, a misery. His moral problem therefore involves a choice of whether the good consequences of his action are going to outweigh the bad ones according to this moral scheme of things. The resolution of his problem, and what makes the moral teaching of the *Bhagavad Gītā* so important in terms of Arjuna's understanding of himself, is the destruction of this *karmic* order. Arjuna is to act, but with no attachment to the consequences of his action. The moral imperative is taken away from the law and placed upon what he understands himself to be. The real evil is neither to act, nor to act improperly, but to act upon a misunderstanding of himself: to think that he is the recipient of the consequences of his action. Krishna thus proclaims:

Abandoning attachment to the fruits of action,
constantly content, independent,

Even when he sets out upon action,
 He yet does (in effect) nothing whatsoever. (IV 20)
 No action is found (binding) upon
 him who would delight in the self alone
 who would find contentment
 and satisfaction only in the self. (III 17)

Man, in the *Bhagavad Gītā* is thus moral, but moral in the sense that he is free to act with a sense of responsibility only to himself, in his true identity, for what he does. An autonomous moral imperative becomes indicative of what he is as an individual.

The analogy of Job's experience with that of Arjuna is striking. He too is faced with a problem of moral principle, based in this instance upon the teachings of the Deuteronomic Code. And he too refuses to be bound by it. He cannot reconcile his suffering and his innocence in terms of it, and so he abandons it. The affirmation upon which he abandons it, in that remarkable passage in Chapter 9, shows how deeply within himself he feels this deeper responsibility, far beyond what the comforters can comprehend.

If I say, 'I will forget my complaint,
 I will put off my sad countenance, and be of good cheer,'
 I become afraid of all my suffering, for I know that
 thou wilt not hold me innocent. (9:27-8)

Thus a moral imperative becomes for Job also indicative of what he is as a person, something which drives him beyond the bondage of a law to affirm his own identity. It is not affirmed by his tradition or anything else that is exterior to him in the objective reality in which he lives. He is freed from them. Like Arjuna, he is, in Professor Northrop's terms, freed from the kinship, anthropological conception. And at the same time he is freed from anything that is the product of his own consciousness, from his thought. He has in his self-awareness, made intense by the fact of his suffering, nothing to support him. He knows only that he is free:

What is my strength that I should wait?
 And what is my end that I should be patient?
 Is my strength the strength of stones
 or is my flesh bronze?
 In truth I have no help in me,
 and any resource is driven from me. (6:11-13)

Thus, as in the case of rationality, morality, even in affirming man's freedom, is only indicative and not descriptive of the self. Both Job

and Arjuna affirm that man in his self-awareness is both moral and rational. But these qualities of their awareness are not for them an answer to the question "Who am I"? They rather pose the question in a way that resists the possibility of an objective reply.

Although the tension between the two works is immense, the common experience of freedom – Arjuna is free to act without concern for the consequences, Job is free to experience the full dimension of tragic suffering – this common affirmation of their unique identity leads to a third common assertion about the nature of the self. In neither work is man presented ultimately as an isolated, conscious, moral agent, but rather – this is what gives both their religious character – as a dependent being. His individuality derives finally not from who he is, but from whom (or what) he in the last analysis has his identity with. Although the answer to this question differs widely, both works express the ultimate identity of the self not in terms of the defiance of Job, nor in the self-understanding of Arjuna, but in terms of an experience of a transcendent reality upon which their identity as a self depends, a culminating, divine revelation. Neither Job nor Arjuna can answer the question: "Who am I?" apart from the overwhelming experience.

What, then is the content of these revelations? It has been a tribute both to the immensity of the vision of the poets of *Job* and the *Bhagavad Gītā* (how many ever there may have been) and to the imagination of their various interpreters over the centuries, to recognize the number of further interpretations which have been offered to explain them. I am not going to pretend that I have the answer to either. About the only firm assertion I am prepared to make is that they do not, as far as I can see, lend themselves to a mutual explanation. Nor does one explain itself in terms of the other. The content of the revelations and therefore the identity of the self, stand as two separate affirmations.

Briefly, however, what I will attempt to demonstrate is this: what the *Bhagavad Gītā* seems to be saying is that the reality of that which is beyond the self, upon which the self depends for its identity, is affirmed only in terms of its self-awareness. There is nothing outside of Arjuna's own apprehension of transcendence within his self-awareness upon which its reality is affirmed. His vision is, as it were, a welling up of his own inner consciousness, or, what has been called by Dr. Jung, an apprehension of the collective unconscious.⁶

⁶ C. G. Jung, "Answer to Job," *The Collected Works*, vol. 11, *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, pp. 355-470.

The *Book of Job*, on the other hand, seems to be saying that the reality of that which is beyond the self is completely outside of its apprehension as a self. For Job, the reality of God is affirmed not in terms of an apprehended transcendence contained within his awareness of himself, but only in relationship to himself in such a way that God is revealed as being totally other, or in Professor Buber's terms, as the eternal Thou.⁷

Is not, it may be asked, the divine manifestation of Krishna in Chapter XI of the *Gītā* also an encounter by Arjuna of an I-Thou relationship? Many have argued that it is, most notably Professor R. C. Zaehner, basing his recent studies on the commentary of Rāmānuja.⁸ Much as I favor the ideas of both Zaehner and Rāmānuja, I would suggest that in the *Gītā* itself it is not expressed in these terms. Rather what occurs is a process of self-discovery, following not the pattern of devotional poetry so common in Rāmānuja's time, but of a personal meditation characteristic of the yogic and tantric works of the earlier period. These works were not theistic in content, but rather directed their devotees toward the inner realization of that one, perfect soul, or *puruṣa*, which is immortal. What I am suggesting is that Arjuna, the hero, enters into such a meditation, and that his charioteer, Krishna, becomes for him the bearer of a projected self-analysis.

There are several arguments which support this interpretation of the *Gītā*. First of all, in relation to the *Mahābhārata* as a whole Arjuna is definitely the protagonist of the work. Its dramatic role is to tell us about him, his royal splendor, his despair, his understanding and commitment, all as background for his entrance into the battle. Krishna enters the work in a subservient position, as a charioteer, and even though transformed into a divine figure beyond human recognition, he returns to his primary role as Arjuna's companion in battle. There is very little further in the account of the war in the *Mahābhārata* to suggest that he has in his own character any kind of divinity consistent with this vision, even in disguise. In fact his battle antics, and in particular, his plots to deceive Droṇa and to kill Karṇa and Duryodhana suggest the opposite. I would suggest, then, that what occurs in the *Bhagavad Gītā* is the seed of Krishna worship, not its fruit. His subsequent religious significance is based not on his own activity as a tribal hero, but on Arjuna's vision recorded here.

⁷ Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958.

⁸ R. C. Zaehner, *The Comparison of Religions and Hindu and Moslem Mysticism*, London, 1960.

The opening chapters of the discourse reinforce this emphasis on the centrality of Arjuna. Krishna's words, which never establish his identity as a person, begin in terms more of introspection than of observation. He does not ask Arjuna why he is upset. He rather puts his finger on the basic emotion which underlies his grief in the face of battle against his cousins, his fear of defeat and death.

"Why have you become fainthearted in the face of peril?" (II. 2) he asks, why are you afraid? That this is Arjuna's real concern is identified also in the final words of the vision of Chapter XI: the ultimate message of this experience is the assuring command:

"Fight! You will conquer your opponents in battle." (XI. 34)

Arjuna thus enters upon a meditation which is presumably built upon his guilt for feeling hesitant in the face of the military array of his adversaries, and begins, quite literally, to pull himself together. As Rāmānuja asserts, in spite of his own theistic concerns, the first six chapters are directed toward the identity of Arjuna's own individual soul. And Professor Zaehner goes on to suggest that the person who is so united as described here by Rāmānuja, the *yogayukta*, or *brahma-yogayuktātma* is "what we would now call an integrated personality, 'integrated' in the Jungian sense of 'harmonized around the immortal centre or "self" of the total psyche.'" ⁹

My suggestion is here that Professor Zaehner did not go far enough. The emphasis in Chapters VI–XII does not change to a theistic one, focusing on the divine nature of Krishna, but rather on the transcendent reality of the immortal centre of the total psyche: the (capital A) *Aham*, the transcendent Me.

With mind attached to Me, son of Prithā,
practising discipline with reliance on Me,
Hear how without doubt thou shalt know Me entirely. (VII. 1)

The seed of all beings am I,
The eternal, be assured, son of Prithā;
I am intelligence of the intelligent,
Majesty of the majestic am I. (VII. 10)
and later:

⁹ There is further evidence: apart from the fact that the *Gītā* is itself the earliest reference to the divinity of Krishna, the earliest evidence outside the *Mahābhārata*, found in Pāṇini, refers to Arjuna and Krishna as sharing jointly in a divine nature. A strong theistic emphasis, although evident as early as the *Svetāśvatara Upanishad*, is primarily a post-epic development, reaching its philosophical fruition in the writings of Rāmānuja in the 11th Century A.D.

I am the soul that abides in the heart of all beings;
 I am the beginning and the middle of beings, and the
 very end too. (X:20)

This I is clearly not to be confused with the *ahamkāra*, the *ego*, or the individual self which is identified solely by the conscious experience. But it is also not the divine person who stands over and against the totality of man's experience. It is too deeply rooted in the universe of human consciousness. What is revealed, if I may use Jung's terms, is "the God-image in the unconscious which has as its special content the archetype of the self."¹⁰ For it is only in this archetypal character of his self that Arjuna sees in the vision of Krishna the immortality of his own soul upon which is based his self-affirming, amoral act of fighting without fear of the consequences.

Several characteristics of this vision support this analysis. There is no doubt that Arjuna has seen what is completely beyond normal conscious perception; that he has seen "splendor, universal, infinite, primal which has never been seen before by any other than thee." (XI. 47) But more important is the presence of a series of conflicting, paradoxical elements, the most dramatic being the grace-fear polarity evident in Arjuna's response to its splendor and terror. "I am thrilled, and my heart is shaken with fear. Be merciful, Lord of Gods, Abode of the World." (XI. 45).

The preliminary description leading up to the vision in Chapters IX and X are also replete with what Jung calls the "essential polarity of the dominant archetype" of the self.

I am the father of this world, the mother (IX. 9)

Both immortality and death,

Both existent and non-existent am I (IX. 19)

and so on.

But perhaps most important of all is the fact that the image of God which is revealed to Arjuna is revealed entirely within the terms of Arjuna's own concern and experience. The God-image finds its expression as a transcendence totally within the situation of the battle, of its anticipation in fear, the introspection, and the eventual spirit of victory which is created. Although we are drawn through such sublime realms as the immortality of the soul and the immense radiance of the transcendent reality, the essential point to which the work continually returns is that Arjuna must fight. The vision has as its ultimate pur-

¹⁰ Zaehner, *The Comparison of Religions*, p. 123.

pose the supplying of a transcendent basis for an ethical pattern that has been agreed upon as a code of honor among the heroes of the warrior tribes of Epic India. This fact does not in any way diminish its magnificent conception of the transcendent upon which the identity of the self is formed, or the sublime beauty in which it is expressed. But it does caution against absolutizing this transcendence. It is affirmed only in terms of Arjuna's awareness of that which is archetypal of himself, or that which stands beyond within his consciousness of himself. About the reality of the archetype apart from man's consciousness one simply cannot say.

The contrast between the visions, in the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job*, of that which transcends in man's experience, of that from which he derives his identity as a self, is nowhere more striking than in the appropriateness of Jung's analysis to the one, and, ironically, the inappropriateness to the other: ironically because he wrote about Job and not about the *Gītā*. For Job seems to resist his analysis at almost every turn, at least to one who sees in the poetic dialogue and in the voice out of the whirlwind a protest against the myth of the prologue as well as the Deuteronomic theology of his time. The poet can no more accept the image of God being blind to the intrigue of Satan than he can the image of His justice defined purely in terms of the Deuteronomic Law. The suffering he knows is too real and intense for him to rest with the assertion that it can be meaningless. I see no other basis for the poem. And thus the Voice out of the whirlwind becomes its own answer to Job, as opposed to the image of the myth as it is to the outcries of Job himself.

What is affirmed by the experience of YHWH speaking out of the whirlwind is, of course, subject to many interpretations, few of which I will be able to acknowledge here. But, in contrast to the *Gītā*, several points stand out in bold outline. First is the obvious fact that the development of the personality of Job leading up to the Voice passage is not done introspectively, but only through his intense interaction with the comforters. It is his argument with them, and his failure to reach any degree of understanding with them, which drives him on to the larger dimension of his suffering, and to seek beyond them his real identity as a person. He does not withdraw further into himself, but rather lashes out more and more against them. Job's growth is dramatic rather than meditative, interpersonal rather than introspective.

This development is important because of the almost opposite contrast between the visions themselves. Whereas in the *Gītā* Krishna

is manifested in a divine form, resplendent in his majestic and terrifying power, in the climactic vision of Job, God is not perceived at all. This is true not only in the technical sense that this vision is not a theophany (as Professor Terrien suggests,¹¹ the vision is poetic and not prophetic) but, more significantly, he reveals himself only through the characteristics of his creation. We hear not what he is, but what he has done:

| | |
|--|------|
| "Who determined its measurement?" | 38:5 |
| "Who laid its cornerstone?" | :6 |
| "Or who shut in the sea with doors?" | :8 |
| "who "commanded the morning since your days" | :12 |
| and "comprehended the expanse of the earth." | :18 |
| who brings "rain on a land where no man is" | :26 |
| and "provides for the raven its prey." | :41 |

The transcendence of God is thus not something which Job apprehends in an immediate, objective way. He does not encounter God in abstract. And even less is this transcendence revealed to him as the content of his apprehension. God remains outside his consciousness, as a being who is completely other than Job can understand himself to be. There is nothing in the vision that suggests the archetype of self. Who is it indeed who would clothe himself with majesty and glory and splendor, and argue with God! (40:2-14)

This separation of God from man's archetypal apprehension does not, however, mean for Job the isolation of God. He reveals himself in such a way as to maintain his distinct identity as God, but not as over and against Job. He does not even sit in judgment on Job for his defiant accusations. He rather reveals himself in relationship with him, questioning him where he is in the very intensity and bitterness of his complaint.

The validity of this interpretation, it is true, depends upon how one reads the irony of God's questionings, and in particular the very significant question in verse 8 of Chapter 40:

Will you put me in the wrong? Will you condemn me that you may be justified?

If we read this not as the defiance of a God of justice, but as a question of one who is hurt by an act of self-justification, is it not possible to hear in it what Professor Terrien calls a tone of deep melancholy? ¹² It reveals surely not God's offended honor, but rather, in the

¹¹ C. G. Jung, "Answer to Job," p. 469.

¹² Sanuel Terrien, *Job, Poet of Existence*, Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, 1957, p. 227.

starkest of outlines, the only real basis of a relationship between God and man: his sorrowful longing, his love for man.

Job's response to this vision in the closing verses of the poetic portion further support this interpretation. In this passage Job expresses an awareness of God which is first of all both completely new and totally alive. There is nothing in his previous understanding which approximates this experience.

I had heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now my eye sees thee. (42:5).

But more significant, this vision becomes the bearer of Job's understanding of who he is. His identity is not destroyed, but affirmed in this experience, only because it is not God in his absolute power which is revealed, but rather God in his relationship to him. He now comes to himself as both distinct and yet totally dependent, as free and yet totally inadequate.

Therefore I despise myself, I [am grieved] in dust and ashes. (42:6).

In this way Job affirms that he is a self, but ultimately only in relationship to that transcendent reality which he can never become identified with, but only related to. He affirms his own identity in this encounter with the eternal Thou.

We find then in the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job* two separate analyses of that transcendent element in self-awareness which determines its own limitation as a self, a separation which I see significantly juxtaposed in the writings of our time of Carl Jung and Martin Buber. And as a consequence, the conception of the self in the two works is quite different.

In the *Bhagavad Gītā*, the self, because of its ultimate identification with that which transcends it, is essentially limitless and free. That is to say that the self is no greater and no less than the totality of man's awareness, both conscious and unconscious. What does comprise a limit upon the self is its inability to transcend, to stand above and in control of all of the conflicting polarities of human experience. If one becomes identified with one element of a polarity, such as joy or grief, or mortality or immortality, then that becomes for him the definition, the limitation of himself. But there always remains the possibility, indeed the goal, for him that he may rise above the pairs of opposites, that he may find his identity by transcending the totality of his experience, to become unmoved by it. He would achieve his true identity as a self then only when he ceases to be himself.

In the *Book of Job*, on the other hand, there is one polarity in the experience of the self which can never be transcended; that is the polarity between God and man. Because God himself transcends man's awareness there is nothing in the awareness of the self which can transcend him. He remains eternally Thou. Therefore the ultimate identity of the self is realized only in a relationship with that which remains transcendent, viz., with God. And the self never exceeds this definition, this limit. To be sure one can define himself in relation to many things less than God, to many Its, or other Thous. To this extent the self is bound by them. One is free only in so far as this defining relationship allows him to be. But the ultimate freedom for the self is found in relationship with God. Only as an I in relation to the eternal Thou can man be totally free, free to live in an absurd world, free to enjoy and free to suffer, and still to be himself.

The idea of the self as it is thus presented in these two works strikes me as having immense significance as two totally consistent and experientially verified answers to the question, "Who am I?" Both have pursued this question to a level of significant affirmation, in terms of which man finds not only a sense of identity, but also a sense of purpose. It is, as it has been manifestly true in both the traditions of India and the West, possible to live with such a self.

But I am still troubled by the tension that exists between them. The integrity of each, and their fullness as a vision of man's identity, is not a source of reconciliation between them. In fact each affirms its own validity to the exclusion of the other. And I am therefore presented with a choice, a choice which, incidentally, knows no cultural bounds. I may choose to follow either Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja, a mystic or a disciple, Jung or Buber. This choice is, ironically, the most intense affirmation of myself. I cannot choose without affirming the identity of myself as the chooser. Faced with it, I know that I am. But the basis for the choice is not made in terms of this affirmation. The choice that I make depends on the answer to the question, "Who am I?" And the answer to this question, in the analysis of both the *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Book of Job*, is not to be found in the self. They are both rather to indicate the wisdom of the author of the *Book of Ecclesiastes*, who long ago observed that "God has put eternity into man's mind, yet so that he cannot find out what God has done from the beginning to the end." (3:11) If it is true that God has put eternity into the minds of men, it would suggest that man is not the measure of all things, not even the measure of his own self.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

PRE-EXISTENCE

KARL H. POTTER

Whatever else they may be concerned with, philosophers on both sides of the world have been and are now committed to the search for freedom. Whereas it is difficult to find common ground for comparison between, say, Western ethical theories about the Good and Eastern theories about *dharma* and *nirvāṇa*, perspective can be gained if we address ourselves to philosophical problems from the standpoint of a common commitment to freeing ourselves from the shackles of uncontrolled circumstances. Though all philosophers have not always viewed this goal as supreme, it is hard to find philosophers who would not admit that it figures high in the hierarchy of human concerns.

It may be said, however, that the search for freedom appears as a universal purpose only because of the unfortunate ambiguity of the term "free;" where some philosophers view the call to become free as an invitation to assert one's superiority over others and over nature, other philosophers view the same call as an invitation to recognize the absolute superiority of God and to accept the pattern he has created. Where one philosopher counsels freedom-seeking through group action for human welfare, others advise introspective contemplation and the separation of one's own concerns from those of his fellows. Where, then, is any universal purpose here?

I think there is a common core in the notion of freedom which is shared by philosophers of both India and the Western world, even though it is evident that the development of that core leads in different directions at the hands of disparate philosophers. This common core can be stated negatively as follows: as long as a person is at the mercy of forces external to himself, so long will he be subject to frustration, despair and unhappiness.

It is, I should think, clear enough that this problem is much on the minds of classical Indian thinkers as well as the philosophers who repre-

sent Buddhist traditions stemming from Indian sources. It may not be as clear that it is equally of concern to Western philosophers. But there would be little reason to doubt the importance of freedom among the life-goals recognized by Western philosophers if we confined ourselves to the great thinkers of ancient and medieval times. It is only in an avowedly skeptical tradition such as Hume's, which insists on positing a limited view of human nature, that a doubt about freedom's claim as an ultimate goal may significantly arise.

In Hume's view, which is extremely prevalent among our leading thinkers nowadays, man is admittedly at the mercy of natural forces and to speak of completely freeing men from their natural limitations is condemned as a silly aim. Whatever freedom man is capable of is wholly a question of guaranteeing the conditions of liberty which characterize a just society, in which no man is completely at the mercy of other men. Freedom, on Hume's view, is merely a lack of compulsion, where by "compulsion" he means force exerted on an individual against his will by another individual or by a group of individuals. Compulsion so construed is thoroughly divorced from the question of man's relation to natural forces; it is assumed that man can only seek to understand the workings of nature and to fit into their patterns to the best of his ability. In particular, on Hume's analysis it is incorrect to speak of being "compelled" by natural forces "against one's will," since it is a primitive mistake to treat natural forces as if they stemmed from another person.

But this very same skeptical tradition of which Hume is a prominent figure is also the tradition which has been accepted as the appropriate philosophy for scientists, who investigate these impersonal natural forces. And the Humean view of limited human abilities has not married altogether well with the implications of actual scientific practice. Through science we can in fact control natural forces beyond the wildest expectation of the skeptics of the past; furthermore, there is little reason to suppose that scientists will reach the limits of their capacities very soon if ever. The fact is that men *are* frustrated by being at the mercy of natural forces, the forces which breed calamity, famine and disease, and that science, far from merely contemplating these forces and counseling us to accept them, provides us instead with the tools to rid ourselves of them. Techniques which, in the hands of clever people, can be utilized to liberate individuals from the control of other individuals can also be used to liberate mankind from subservience to the

patterns of nature. There is, in short, no good reason to accept Hume's view of human nature and plenty of reason to reject it.

Or consider what might be called the "paradox of freedom." The paradox is this: for a man to be free, he must be able to know the outcome of all his actions, i.e., he must know their causal connections, and so they must *be* causally connected; but if causal connections are all-comprehensive then freedom is impossible, since the eventual causal conditions of our actions are out of our control. Thus the very condition for the possibility of freedom seems to preclude that possibility. Hume avoids this problem by arguing that, since freedom requires only lack of compulsion by personal agents, the tracing back of causal connections to origins outside the person's history and thus out of his control creates no paradox. Freedom and determinism are compatible, he holds, since it is no threat to a man's freedom that through birth and other events over which he has no responsibility he is subject to calamity, famine and disease. This puts Humeans into a strange position indeed: setting themselves up as champions of science, they find themselves taking a negative attitude toward the pretensions of science in order to save their philosophy. As a result, an unholy alliance of idealism, irrationalism, non-naturalism and skepticism holds sway in Western philosophy, despite which scientists proceed to go about the practical business of overcoming the forces of nature and winning man a freedom the philosophers deny he can achieve.

The seeds of the Human position were sown among the ancients of the Western tradition, who were never as clear as Eastern sages about the paramountcy of freedom among human ends, tending to limit it in one fashion or another. Yet by and large they were responsive to the longing for freedom from all sources of frustration, wherever those sources were conceived to be located. The contemporary divorce of science from philosophy in the Western world must in the light of this situation be held to be a perverse, but hopefully temporary deviation from the general trend of our tradition.

But even if we reject the Humean solution of the problem of freedom and determinism, the paradox of freedom is by no means solved. We have seen that, unless we wish to deny the relevance of natural forces to human concerns, we cannot construe freedom merely as freedom from constraint by an exterior personal agency. But suppose we construe it, as most Eastern and many Western philosophers have in fact done, more broadly to include freedom from all sources of frustration. The paradox then becomes a serious problem: if freedom is possible, then

determinism must be true; but if determinism is true, then freedom is impossible. How shall we avoid the bind of this *reductio* of human aspirations?

Several lines of solution present themselves. Hume's we have discussed; it is no solution at all. Another is to espouse indeterminism, but if the premises of the paradox are correct, admission of indeterminism entails the abandonment of freedom. A variation along these lines is to admit indeterminism in general but to show that for some special, additional reason it will never undermine man's ability to control his environment and thus become free. I cannot think what this special reason might be, but I am prepared to entertain the possibility there is one. However, in this paper I want to broach a still different line of solution, which I believe has been explored to quite an extent by classical Indian thinkers, and to attempt to suggest what price must be paid for its acceptance.

John Wisdom once offered ¹ an argument intended to show that, from the assumption that there are morally responsible agents together with the acceptance of determinism, it follows that those moral agents have no beginnings in time. His argument has not, to my knowledge, been given much attention in the literature – perhaps rightly, for it is not set forth in much detail. I want to argue that, nevertheless, Wisdom's conclusion has to be accepted, and furthermore that it follows even without bringing in, in any explicit way, the thesis of determinism. As I see it, beginninglessness or, as I shall call it, pre-existence follows from the most plausible analysis of moral responsibility, an analysis with its antecedents in detailed work that has been published in recent philosophical literature.

The view that at any time t , given a moral agent, that agent exists immediately prior to t is a view I shall refer to here as "pre-existence." And I use the term "moral agent" (or just "agent") in this discussion to speak of whatever is properly named by the subjects of verbs used to attribute responsibility, i.e., where we are ready to praise someone for doing or blame him for not doing an action. Exactly what sort of thing an agent is – whether it is a mind, a person, or what – is a question which becomes a good deal more pressing and difficult if pre-existence is true, and I shall allow myself a few closing remarks on that score.

I want to have a clear understanding of the meanings of certain words concerning time and causation. I shall speak of "a time," by which I shall mean a temporal stretch, without gaps, of any duration

¹ John Wisdom, *Problems of Mind and Matter*, Cambridge, England, 1934, pp. 123–126.

whatsoever. And I shall use the following convention: I shall speak of "a time t_1 " and mean by this a particular temporal stretch, and in contexts governed by this choice of t_1 I shall use t_2 to refer to a temporal stretch whose earliest point precedes the beginning of t_1 and which either overlaps or is contiguous with t_1 . Thus t_2 precedes t_1 , and t_3 precedes t_2 , in just this sense, that the earliest time contained within the higher-numbered time precedes the earliest time contained within the lower-numbered time.

By a "simple event" I shall mean an entity whose description consists of a "togetherness" predicate of two places,² the togetherness relating two entities one of which is a time. Thus "red-with- t_1 " describes an event of the simplest sort, providing colors are among one's minimal constituents. But an event may be, and usually is, much more complicated, involving spatial as well as temporal entities. So I shall speak of more complex events on the assumption that for each such event there can be effected an analysis which would distinguish ultimate components related by togetherness relations. The thing to note especially, however, is that as events are understood here, even a simple event may overlap another simple event, since times are allowed to overlap.

Finally, a "causal condition" is an event which is related to another event by being a preceding necessary or sufficient condition of it or part of such a condition. I distinguish "preceding" causal conditions from "non-preceding" ones in this way: a preceding condition is an event whose temporal component contains a time prior to the earliest temporal component of the event considered to be the effect, whereas a non-preceding condition's temporal component does not contain a time prior to the effect's temporal component.

With these explanations in hand, let me now state the argument. Briefly, it is this: that the way we talk about an agent's having an ability to do something, which is necessarily involved in our ascriptions of moral responsibility, should lead us to accept pre-existence, and that we shall find it difficult to find any plausible alternative way of construing moral responsibility.

In focussing the discussion upon the notion of having an ability, I am taking advantage of work done by Arnold Kaufman, who has argued cogently (in my opinion) that having the ability is causally relevant to an agent's performing an action.³

First let us take an example. Suppose it is true that

² Nelson Goodman, *The Structure of Appearance*, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, pp. 178-180.

³ Arnold S. Kaufman, "Ability," *Journal of Philosophy*, 60, 1963, 537-551.

(1) Smith shoots Jones at t_1
 where the predicate is an action-verb, i.e., ascribes responsibility to Smith for his deed. Clearly for (1) to be true,

(2) Smith is-with t_1
 must also be true. And so must

(3) Smith has-at- t_1 the ability to shoot-Jones-at- t_1
 For if Smith lacks this ability we can hardly ascribe responsibility to him. But what does it mean to say that Smith has the ability to shoot Jones?

According to Kaufman's analysis, (3) implies

(4) Smith is in a state such that he succeeds in shooting Jones a certain percentage of the time, given opportunity, if he tries, where Smith's state is (perhaps) to be understood as a physiological condition of Smith's organism.⁴ However, (4) lacks quantification with respect to times – which is all-important for my argument. In our fashion of handling times sketched earlier, (4) can be represented as

(5) There is a state C such that, for any time t_n , if at t_{n+1} Smith is in state C and, given opportunity, tries to shoot-Jones-at- t_n , then he succeeds in shooting-Jones-at- t_n a certain percentage of the time; and Smith is in state C at t_2 .

From (5) we can derive

(6) Smith is-with t_2 .

Furthermore, if "shoots" describes an action in the phrase "Smith shoots Jones at t_1 ," as we are assuming it does, then not only is Smith in state C at t_2 , but it is also true that he can try at t_2 to shoot Jones at t_1 .⁵ If he cannot try at t_2 to shoot Jones at t_1 , his shooting cannot be an action at all, in our sense. So

(7) Smith has the ability to try-at- t_2 to shoot-at-Jones-at- t_1 follows too.

What does it mean to say that someone has the ability to try to x ? The question is whether *trying* is itself an action or not, more properly, whether "tries to x " in the phrase "has the ability to try to x " denotes actions or not. If the things denoted by the term "tries" are actions, then "has the ability to try" can be subsumed under the same analysis

⁴ This requirement that the state be physiological is contested by George Thomas, "Abilities and Physiology," *Journal of Philosophy*, 61, 1964, 321–328. It is not important for my argument whether the state be physiological or not.

⁵ Strictly, it is true if he either tries to shoot Jones at t^2 or fails to try to avoid shooting Jones at t^2 . Although failing to try to avoid something is perhaps a different kind of action from trying to do it, for convenience I shall go on speaking of trying with the understanding that failing to try is to be construed as a kind of trying.

as was offered above. And I think that indeed "tries" is a way of speaking about actions. But some doubts may be felt on this score.

One thing must be said initially, viz., that in any case trying is an *event* in the sense here specified. It occupies time. We say "he was trying to lift the log," "he stopped trying to solve the problem," "he began to try . . .," "he will try tomorrow." What is of course very possibly not true is that trying is a momentary event, or that trying-to- x is temporally discrete from x -ing. That is to say, trying and succeeding may well overlap each other, the latter phases of the trying coinciding with the early phases of success. Nevertheless, trying and succeeding are different events. Where talk of trying is relevant, it will always be the case that the event described by "A tries" preceeds that described by "A succeeds." Thus trying may well be a "Humean cause," *pace* such a writer as A. I. Melden, who seems to think that a Humean account of causation requires temporal discreteness between cause and effect, whereas surely it only requires precedence (in the sense used here).⁶

Secondly, although trying is an action, it is not a kind of action among other kinds. Rather, "trying" is an umbrella-word covering a variety of relevant actions antecedent to a given action and satisfying certain further conditions.⁷ What is it, precisely, that Smith must *do* to be said to be "trying" to shoot Jones? We are not able to say – so much happens so fast, and our criteria of identity are not sufficiently discriminating. Smith must raise his gun and point it at Jones, say – but are these two actions or only one? Or is it merely that Smith refrains from doing something to prevent his gun from firing as Jones walks across his path? In any case the details will vary; the ways of shooting Jones are indefinite. The point remains this: that if we are to be able to say that Smith shoots Jones, we must be ready to admit that there is some preceding event that is a causal condition, and that furthermore this preceding event must happen to Smith, or rather that something *belonging* to Smith must constitute a preceding causal condition. For if the shooting occurs without some event belonging to Smith constituting a preceding condition for it, we cannot in good conscience hold Smith responsible for the shooting; no longer will we think of the shooting as an action of Smith's but as something which merely happened to Smith.

⁶ A. I. Melden, *Free Action*, London, 1961, esp. p. 114, e.g.

⁷ Kaufman mentions what these further conditions might be toward the close of his paper, *op. cit.*

The introduction of the notion of "trying" in Kaufman's analysis of having an ability seems to me to derive its plausibility from the sorts of considerations I have been discussing. We are assuming, for the sake of the argument, that imputations of responsibility make sense. Therefore the condition "if he tries," which enters into the analysis, is necessary, necessary because we are unwilling to charge Smith with shooting Jones unless he satisfies some condition which is a preceding element for Smith's-shooting-Jones. In attributing an ability-to- x to someone, we assume that there is some action which he could perform or fail to perform and which would have the result of bringing about blocking his x -ing. Frequently we are at a loss to say what that action is, if challenged, and often, though not always, we refer in a vague way to such causal condition by talk about "trying."

Suppose, now, that the event of Smith's pulling the trigger qualifies as a case of Smith's trying to shoot Jones. Then (7) may be reformulated in specific terms as

(7a) Smith has the ability to pull the trigger at t_2 where we have ascertained that Smith's pulling the trigger is a particular way in which Smith may try-at- t_2 to shoot-Jones-at- t_1 . It will not matter if one prefers to analyze the situation in a different fashion. One might hold, for example, that Smith's pulling of the trigger was the first segment of the event of Smith's-shooting-Jones, so that the trigger-pull is not a preceding but a non-preceding condition of the shooting. Then, to be sure, not (7a) but, say,

(7b) Smith has the ability to raise his gun at t_2 will constitute that condition which in this particular case is met by Smith and which leads us to say that his shooting Jones at t_1 is not only an event but also an action.

Whichever version of (7) is chosen, the same analysis may be applied to it as was applied to (1). From (7a), for example, we can derive

(8a) There is a state D such that, for any time t_n , if at t_{n+1} Smith is in state D and, given opportunity, tries to pull the trigger at t_n , then he succeeds in pulling the trigger at t_n a certain percentage of the time; and Smith is in state D at t_3 .

And from (7b) we can derive

(8b) There is a state E such that, for any time t_n , if at t_{n+1} Smith is in state E and, given opportunity tries to raise this gun at t_n , then he succeeds in raising his gun at t_n a certain percentage of the time; and Smith is in state E at t_3 .

And from either (8a) or (8b) it follows that

(9) Smith is-with t_3 .

The argument to pre-existence generalizes the regress now instituted. As a result, Smith must have the ability to perform an infinite number of actions in order to perform any action at all. This means, among other things, that Smith can never have come into existence, but must have been around always. For suppose there were an event which was the first event in Smith's history: then Smith's behavior at that first time in his history is not an action, and no subsequent event can properly be called Smith's action, since there is no preceding event satisfying the conditions of statements such as (5) and (8) etc. Thus for Smith to be acting now he must have always been acting. Smith must be beginningless, or else ascriptions of responsibility and attributions of agency to him must be abandoned.

Many criticisms will probably occur to you, and I have time to anticipate only a few. For example, Nowell-Smith recognizes the possibility of an analysis such as the one I have just put forward and objects to it on the ground that it involves the silly notion of trying to try.⁸ Thus he might be supposed to object "according to the account just offered, to act requires having an ability, and having an ability requires having the ability to try. Then the regress you argue for in effect goes on to say that in order to have *that* ability, the ability to try, one must have the ability to try to try, and so on. But no one ever speaks of trying to try – thus the analysis that has been given is absurd."

This objection, however, assumes that trying is a kind of action among others, and it seems to me clear that it is not, as was suggested above. The fact that we do not speak of trying to try is not because it is logically on a par with, say, pulling-the-trigger to pull-the-trigger; rather, we do not use the locution because it is of no help in ordinary communication. Since "trying" covers an indefinite variety of actions, we have no occasion to speak of the causes of such a heterogeneous bunch, except when asking the kind of question we are asking now – and we don't normally think of asking this kind of question in ordinary discourse. In addition, since trying involves some sort of intentionality toward another action, it is not any one of an indefinite number of actions that we try to perform, but some specific kind of action. But "tries" does not describe any specific kind of action, and therefore we do not know what to make of "trying to try," any more than we know what to make of "trying to act" (except in a dramatics context).

A second objection: although "ought" implies "can," that is, "is

⁸ P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics*, Penguin Books, 1954, p. 286.

able," it does not always imply "has the ability to." That is, that Smith shoots Jones implies that he is able to shoot Jones, but not that he has the ability to shoot Jones. Irving Thalberg ⁹ has explored some of the differences between being able and having the ability; without reviewing his arguments, I merely wish to say that it seems to me that those arguments are sufficiently met by building into the analysis of having an ability the statistical qualification that Kaufman does. Thalberg seems to admit as much when he writes: "The number of successful performances, and the ratio of triumphs to miscarriages, which are required before we attribute an ability to someone, obviously depend upon the kind of ability." He goes on to give examples of abilities which do not need a high percentage of success to establish their presence.¹⁰ Indeed, says Thalberg, "In some cases, one success demonstrates a man's powers."

On the other hand, however, Thalberg finds it extremely odd to speak of "the ability to raise one's finger" on the ground that no routine can be specified for doing it. He echoes Arthur Danto, who distinguishes a class of "basic actions" of which raising one's finger is an example. A basic action is one which requires no previous action to bring it about.¹¹ And we may imagine Danto complaining that while on my analysis every action requires a preceding action which is referred to by "trying" locutions, in fact certain actions are of a sort such that it is senseless to speak either of trying to do them or having an ability to do them.

However, this complaint, if it were made in this way, would be misguided. For my analysis does not require that an action be preceded by another action, but rather that an action must be preceded by the agent's *ability* to perform another action. Thus my account can take care of basic actions in the following way. Suppose "Smith raises his finger" is an action. Then it follows from what I've said that Smith must have the ability to raise his finger, and this means he will succeed a certain percentage of the time, given opportunity, if he tries. And this in turn presupposes that Smith has the ability to try. But it does *not* require that Smith actually does try. It may be that, as Danto claims, there would be no sense in speaking of trying to raise my finger in certain (normal) situations. But I think he is mistaken in supposing that it never makes sense. For suppose my finger is bound so that it

⁹ I. Thalberg, "Abilities and Ifs," *Analysis*, 22, 1962, pp. 121-126.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 132.

¹¹ Arthur Danto, "What We Can Do," *Journal of Philosophy*, 60, 1963, 435-445.

cannot move, or suppose it is paralyzed without my knowing it. Here it makes excellent sense to say that one tries and fails to move his finger, and it seems to me furthermore true that if one were under the illusion that his finger were bound or paralyzed, it would make equally good sense to say that he tries and succeeds in moving his finger.

Thus to say that Smith has the ability to try to move his finger is to say, not that he must try in order to move his finger, but that he must have the *ability* to try to move his finger – i.e., that whatever trying would involve in those abnormal cases where it would be in point, Smith must have the ability to do *that*. And I submit that each of the kinds of action that Danto might produce as “basic” ones might turn up in abnormal situations where trying is in point after all.

Nevertheless, I am not completely sure the argument is sound. But supposing for the moment that it is (and I have found no conclusive reason to reject it), what would its soundness signify, and why would it be important?

I am not, first of all, arguing for transmigration. I have no theory to offer about the specific number or nature of agents in the universe or how they are spatially arranged. It is evident, though, that if the argument to pre-existence is sound, philosophers will be forced to develop more imaginative theories about what kind of thing is denoted by the term “agent.” And it is precisely here that Indian philosophy has produced some exciting suggestions.

In the past few years renewed attention has been given in American and British philosophical literature to the problem of personal identity. In these discussions¹² two criteria of personal identity have received prominent treatment – the criterion of bodily identity and the criterion of memory. There are crushing arguments against each of them, and if our argument for pre-existence is sound it is another such. One outcome of this discussion might well be a fresh start on the problem of personal identity, freed from the shackles of assumptions born of religious orthodoxies no longer determinative in our scientific age.

The problem of choosing an appropriate way of describing what an agent is resembles, and may well be the same as, explaining what life itself is. We are still far from knowing how living matter arises, and it is still quite possible that it doesn't arise at all, but has been present all the time, either in the form of a hitherto undetected microscopic element or, what is apparently more likely, as a certain kind of arrange-

¹² See, e.g., Sidney Shoemaker, *Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity*, Ithaca, N.Y., 1963 and papers in recent journals by Shoemaker, Quinton, Flew and others.

ment of elements in themselves not alive. There are indications that this problem is not only one for the biologists but needs conceptual attention as well. For example, in order to project and test hypotheses based upon the latter theory that life is a kind of arrangement or pattern in things, it will be necessary to know how to tell one pattern from another. And of course, if our argument is sound, we need to ask how we can understand either microscopic elements, or patterns of them, in such a way that they exhibit the powers of choice and action which agents must be granted.

In one way or another all Indian philosophers assume that the "choosing" faculty, if it is a faculty, is one of the factors of personality which has beginningless existence. A common, somewhat pre-philosophical account of personality has it that what transmigrates from gross body to gross body is a "subtle" body made up of certain faculties of discrimination and choice. Philosophers work over this and develop more sophisticated versions of it. The Jains, for example, tend to make this subtle body into a non-material nexus which has material particles clinging to it. Sāṃkhya thinkers avoid the frankly materialistic bias of the Jains by endowing this subtle body with the ability to mistakenly identify itself with the seat of consciousness. This seat, or witnessing consciousness, is in reality unable to interact with the psychical elements, which are material; the confusion between the ego or psychic self and the pure or witnessing Self is the source of bondage, and discrimination between them is the proper goal of man. This account leads into the several systems of Vedānta, which develop a variety of theories to explain the nature of this ignorance or bondage in a more intelligible manner than Sāṃkhya is able to.

On the other hand, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers begin with an ontology of abstract individuals which combine to make up both material and non-material products as well as both subjective and objective ones. And the Buddhists, finally, begin with an event ontology and work from the process to its elements; in their system, there is no persisting individual properly speaking, but there are streams of events which are (mistakenly) taken to constitute individuals.

A feature of immense interest in all these views of personality is the notion, which they all share, that consciousness is a different thing entirely from the source of activity or choice, and that it is the latter, psychical features which individuate a person and not his consciousness. Thus the Indian does not use the bodily criterion to identify an individual as the same continuant, but neither does he use the memory

criterion. It is our powers of discrimination and choice, our abilities, which distinguish one of us from the next; it is also the regress of abilities which accounts for the continuity of a personality, for its responsibility as a moral agent as well as for its freedom to improve itself. Consciousness in itself cannot provide these abilities; consciousness merely witnesses all this. Thus in some Buddhistic and Vedantic systems there is only one "store-house of ideas" or Witnessing Self, there being no strong reason to distinguish more. It is this Witnessing Self which is "identical with Brahman" in the Upaniṣadic phrase, according to the "monistic" kind of Vedānta. All Indian philosophers, including Advaitins, admit a plurality of persons, individuated by their respective abilities to deliberate, choose and act upon their choice and, as a result, somehow distinguish themselves as the agents of their actions, the choosers of their choices. This ego-consciousness is different from the pure consciousness, and the discovery of the latter by the individual is something he must strive mightily to achieve. This aspect of Indian thought has led to comparisons with existentialist modes of thought, for it is true that in Indian thinking the act constitutes the individual in the sense that it individuates him and precedes and determines his knowledge of his own nature, of his essence.

Understanding this may lead us, finally, to an interest in another difficult idea of Indian thought, the notion of *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa*, of complete freedom. For the idea here is that, though the personality is beginningless, it is not endless. If we are individuated and indeed constituted by our abilities, and if these abilities presuppose prior abilities to deliberate, choose and act, it is not far-fetched to suppose that one might, since he has the freedom to do so, somehow achieve a state where deliberation, choice and action are not in point – not in the sense that he does not have the ability to act, but rather that he has no cause to exercise his abilities now and hereafter. It would not follow, in such a state, that events would cease to occur or that consciousness would cease to exist. Nor would it follow that the individual as constituted and individuated by his abilities to deliberate, choose and act would not exist. But no longer trying, in this wide sense, he would no longer be aware of himself *as* an individual. In that sense, only pure consciousness would remain; the individual would be freed from the limitations of his psychic constitution.

This is the freedom of which many Indian sages dream. No doubt it may seem shallow or even reprehensible to some of us. Certainly it is important to make clear how or whether this kind of freedom differs

from a reversion to animalic existence, as Indian sages argue it does. My only contention, for the moment, is that the reasoning which leads toward it is not altogether unconvincing in its general aspects, once we are over the hurdle of pre-existence. And so if we are willing to adopt the theory of pre-existence we *can*, as the Indians do, proceed on the assumption that complete freedom from all sources of frustration is possible, unhampered by the doubts springing from Humean skepticism and the paradox of freedom.

If we choose to allow ourselves the hope of complete freedom by espousing the doctrine of pre-existence, what must be done next to make this doctrine meaningful and illuminating? The primary need, as I see it, is for a criterion of personal identity built along the lines the Indians have suggested, using neither self-awareness nor physical attributes as criteria but rather distinguishing behavioral traits of character as the basis of the distinction between one individual and another. This could well be done in terms of a physiological investigation into the behavior of sub-human elements of organisms before and after the development of the bodily characteristics of the human being. We should have to be ready to accept a lot of ideas which are antithetical to our present-day common sense. There would have to be a means for handling the conceptual problem of combining into one individual entities whose behavior satisfies the criteria differentiating them into several entities. To do this we might have to allow for levels of self-hood, so to speak – but they would not be levels of consciousness so much as differences in the scope and incisiveness of the habits exhibited by the different forms that selves take.

I don't think Indian philosophers have explored these particular problems in any very profound way, although a number of suggestive theories can be found, as was noted above. For example, some of the arguments about the size of the self found in Indian texts may yield suggestive insights; likewise the speculative psychology of Buddhism and Sāṃkhya may prove helpful. The Indian theorists who were most likely to investigate the nature of the self were drawn off to investigate the nature of consciousness and the relation of self-awareness to freedom. Or alternatively as in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, they occupied themselves with an intensive examination of reasoning techniques and methodology of inquiry, enabling them to treat their ontological categories in a rather artificial way as if they were counters in a complex logical game. The one large body of literature which might hold real promise for the concerns I'm speaking of is the literature of Jainism, which has re-

mained largely unexplored but which does, according to my extremely limited knowledge of it, involve detailed accounts of the various facets of personality without confusing these patterns of behavior with questions of self-awareness. It would seem that Jainism might well be one of the first places to look for suggestions about personal identity compatible with pre-existence, and the materialistic way in which the Jains conceive the problem might prove helpful in our attempts to project Jain ideas onto a plane commensurate with twentieth-century scientific knowledge and attitudes.

The fact is that we are very far from a happy solution to the problem of personal identity whether we adopt the theory of pre-existence or not. A good deal of the problem turns around difficulties over how to speak clearly about identity through change wherever it occurs. If a criterion of personal identity is difficult to find, so is a criterion for the identity of any persisting physical entity whose states are in flux. And there can be no doubt that practically everything turns on the solution of this kind of problem. If we don't know when we've got one thing and when we've got two, we are unlikely to make much sense of generalities about that kind of thing since we don't know what is, so to speak, essential to it and what accidental. By the same token, we won't know what is "external" to oneself and so will be unable to address ourselves to becoming free from its control.

I conclude, then, on a note of challenge, but one directed not only toward Westerners but also to Indians, not only to philosophers but also to scientists. The problem of identity, and particular personal identity, is fundamental to successful solution of practically everything else, and we are far from having a solution and, I suspect, not sufficiently aware of our deficiency in this respect. The reparation of this failure is not easily achieved, and will, I predict, involve our entertaining hypotheses which will initially strain our credulity. Pre-existence is a hypothesis of this sort; it is not a joke, but deserves serious consideration as we strive to understand what we are.

APPROACHES TO THE I-CONSCIOUSNESS: ITS DEPTHS, NORMAL AND ABNORMAL

P. T. RAJU

1. *Introduction*

In the context of this paper, the self is that which is conscious of itself; it is self-consciousness, a consciousness that is conscious of its own being. If there is self anywhere, it affirms itself as "I;" it is, therefore, I-consciousness. The I-consciousness is the cue to the presence of self. The "I" is never experienced by anyone without the "am;" if the "I" is true, the "am" must be true. There is no "I" without the "am" and no "am" without the "I." There can be only one reality about which the "I" can be asserted, and that is myself. But the "You are" and "He is" can be asserted about many. That is why, when there is doubt about existence, I can doubt the existence of the You and the He, but not about my "I." Bertrand Russell said that consciousness or being known makes no difference to the existence of the object known; but it makes all the difference in the world in the case of the consciousness of the "I." If the "I" does not know itself, it does not exist.

2. *Some Traditional Approaches*

Besides the religious, ethical, psychological, and the modern existential approaches, there are the epistemological; and the traditionally most influential approaches are mainly epistemological. This paper does not deal with the religious, ethical and existential approaches, although they are important, except incidentally. Indeed, they cannot be separated from the others; but we cannot focus on them for want of time and space. Even the traditional epistemological approaches can be given only in summary outline. The psychological will be given in the following section.

If we take a bird's eye view of the traditional epistemological approaches, we find roughly the following positions. We generally think that every knowledge situation involves three factors, the subject, the

object, and consciousness of the object. When I see a rose, I say: "I see the rose" or "I am conscious of the rose" or "I have consciousness of the rose." As "I am conscious of the rose" is not the same as "I am the consciousness of the rose," I distinguish between my "I" and the consciousness of the rose. The consciousness of the rose is, again, not the same as the rose. So I distinguish the "I," its consciousness, and the rose. Thus knowledge is a three-termed relation. But tendencies are found to reduce the three to two terms or even one term. Reduction to two terms is more common and explicit than reduction to one. The "I" is reduced to the process of knowing or of being conscious of something and is denied independent reality. Then the "I" will be there as mere consciousness without affirming itself as "I am." This position amounts to saying that when I say: "I see the rose," I am not affirming myself, but only the consciousness of the rose and the rose. Hume, the analytic philosophies in general, and the logical positivists in Western philosophy, and the Buddhist Vijñānavādins and a few Advaita Vedāntins in Indian Thought are the well-known examples of this position. Even Sartre's division of experience into the *pour soi* and the *en soi*, in which there are only consciousness and its *noema*, and in which the "I" is an aspect of the ego deposited by consciousness,¹ is an example. In their reaction to the Buddhists and being afraid of losing the "I," the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accepted the three factor theory; but unable to establish that the "I" is self-conscious, they treated it as unconscious, thereby removing the metaphysical possibility of the experience and affirmation of "I am."

In the two-factor theory, the "I" is only an appearance or deposit of consciousness, which is truly a process but not a substance, a verb but not a noun or pronoun. Then the "I" is either completely cancelled and is either deprived of its substantiveness, its factuality, or reduced to the physical body. Even if the "I" is reduced to a bundle of dispositions, as Gilbert Ryle does, it can hardly be the "I" even as an agent; it can at the most be a construct of dispositions, even if not a logical construct.

The reduction of the three factors to one is not so overt as that to two. In India, the Vijñānavādins started with reducing the three to two by cancelling the "I," but ended up with reducing the object to a form of consciousness, thus retaining consciousness as ultimate. One

¹ Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, p. 88 (Eng. tr. by F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, The Noonday Press, New York, 1957). Heidegger's phenomenological ontology also is nearly the same, as the approach is phenomenological, at least in his *Being and Time*.

may call the result subjectivism, but it is not subjectivism as the subject has already been cancelled. We may call it consciousness-ism, which is nearly an exact translation of "*Vijñānavāda*." In fact, subjectivism or solipsism is not openly accepted by any philosopher at the epistemological level; even when the mystics asserted: "I am all this," they did not mean the finite "I." The reduction of both the "I" and its consciousness to the object can be found in materialism and the effervescence theory of mind. But it cannot really be used in epistemology, and has not been so used. One may say that my physical body knows itself by throwing up an effervescent consciousness, which is my mind. Then, how is the rose known? My consciousness of the rose is not the effervescent consciousness of the rose, but of my body; and my effervescence is limited to my body and is not extended to the rose. Then my body alone can be known as an object, but not the rose. We have not been given an analysis of the structure of this effervescence with reference to the I-consciousness and the consciousness of the object.

Of the above doctrines – which we may call epistemological triadism, epistemological dualism, and epistemological monism – the last may be left out of consideration, as the other two alone are influential. Of the two, again, epistemological dualism cannot explain the possibility of the recognition of error and illusion. I mistake X for Y and say: "That is a Y." Later I discover my mistake and say: "That is an X, not Y." The consciousness of the X is not the same as the consciousness of the Y. So the latter cannot realize the mistake it committed in seeing a Y. Hence we need a consciousness that can say: "I know that I saw a Y, but it is really X." Such consciousness must be continuous and also self-conscious. Even in "I know that I know," both the I's are asserted and so are self-affirming, continuous, and transparent to each other. When the I affirms itself, it affirms itself as "I am," whether explicitly or implicitly.

One may say, for explaining the possibility of the recognition of error, that the consciousness of the Y is self-revealing and so self-conscious and continuous also and can, therefore, be conscious of the X and of the error. But if consciousness occurs only when it sees an object, then the two consciousnesses, as two occurrences, cannot be the same and continuous. If it occurs without the object and is also self-revealing, then it is the same as self-consciousness and so the "I am." As such it reveals itself always to itself. If such is its nature, how it can be conscious of the other, the object, has further to be explained. We have to have then two kinds of consciousnesses, one that is directed to

the objects and the other that is directed to itself. We may call the former phenomenological consciousness and the latter existential consciousness. The intentionality of the former is outwards and of the latter inwards. I *have* the former consciousness, but I *am* the latter. The former makes no difference to the existence of its objects, their That, both in truth and in illusions, but not in hallucinations and dreams which cannot exist without it; it makes a difference only to the What. But the latter makes a difference to the That of its object, if we call it a That.

Kant indeed accepted the Transcendental "I" or Ego and called it "I think," as Descartes did. But we are not sure whether it is self-conscious, an "I am." As it is a presupposition or postulate, a principle of validity only, a regulative principle, we have to say that it is not a self-conscious "I am." Sartre pointed out that it is not factual.² We are not sure that even the empirical ego in Kant's philosophy is an "I am." Hegel turned this transcendental "I think" of Kant's into the Logos, made it the self-conscious spirit, called it the true self of every man, and asked him to realize his true self. But the "I think" was not asserted as the "I am," but only as the rationality in me, thus reminding us of the view of Plato and Aristotle that the true and immortal self of man is his rational soul, whose immortality is impersonal. In the analysis of the soul given by Plato and Aristotle into the three parts or aspects, we do not find the I. In Kant and Hegel, we find at least the "I think," but in Plato and Aristotle only "Think" without the I. But is the "I am" the same as "I think"? Heidegger takes Descartes to task for investigating only the "*cogitare*" of the ego, leaving the "*sum*" completely out.³

3. *Some Approaches of Abnormal Psychology*

In this section, I consider only the conceptual schemata given by Freud and Jung. I am not a psycho-analyst and am interested in their concepts only as a philosopher. There are psycho-analysts besides Freud and Jung. Existentialists themselves are making contributions to psycho-analysis. Sartre's contributions are well-known; and there are some from the standpoint of Heidegger's.⁴ But this paper has to omit all of them.

² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 71. (Eng. tr. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper and Row, New York, 1962).

⁴ Medard Boss, *Psycho-analysis and Daseinsanalysis* (Eng. tr. by L. B. Lefebre, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1963).

According to Freud, consciousness is the conscious part of personality. Immediately below it lies the Pre-conscious (Pcs) and still below it lies the Unconscious (Ucs). The ego is the coherent organization of mental processes.⁵ The whole of it is not conscious; part of it comes under the Pcs and a very great part under the Ucs.⁶ The ego goes to sleep and exercises censorship in dreams, repressions proceed from it.⁷ The Id is the unconscious ego and includes the repressed ego, which communicates with the conscious ego through the Id.⁸ The conscious ego is really a part of the Id, modified by the external world through Perceptual Consciousness⁹ (Pct.Cs). The pure Id contains only instincts, but the conscious ego contains reason. Then if the conscious ego is part of the Id made conscious and rational by the external world, we have to say that the Id and the ego are the same and have the three levels – the Cs, the Pcs, and the Ucs. Freud's explanation is not very clear, for he says that the Id is the same as the unconscious ego. However, due to conflicts between ideals and actualities, the conscious ego builds up an ideal, the Ego-ideal, the Super-ego, in the Ucs out¹⁰ of and very near¹¹ the Id. The Id is non-moral, the ego moral, and the Super-ego hypermoral.¹² The Id is the reservoir of the libido,¹³ the dynamic psychic energy in man, which Freud in his later works held to be not necessarily sexual.¹⁴ Curiously enough, Freud says that man has two primary instincts, the life instinct and the death instinct. The former is the sex instinct, the latter the ego-instinct.¹⁵ We generally think that the ego instinct is the life instinct, the instinct of the "am," the instinct to be; but for Freud, the instinct to conserve oneself is the instinct to regress to inanimate nature, and so it is the death instinct. Surely, for the abnormal ego, after it is completely tired out by the inner conflicts, the only rest lies in becoming unconscious, inanimate matter.

Freud says that psycho-analysis can build up a doctrine through the analysis of normal and abnormal phenomena.¹⁶ But he does not seem

⁵ Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 15. (Eng. tr. by J. Reviere, The Hogarth Press, London, 1950).

⁶ S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 19. (Eng. tr. by J. M. Hubback, International Psycho-analytic Press, London, 1922).

⁷ S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁵ S. Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, p. 54.

¹⁶ S. Freud, *The Ego and the Id*, p. 47.

to have given us such a doctrine. If all the repressed is in the Ucs, but all the Ucs is not repressed,¹⁷ then one will expect that the unrepressed Ucs must be the ground of the normal. But Freud says nothing about this. So practically, his psychology is limited to the abnormal. He says the the Ucs can be moral,¹⁸ but he mentions only the unconscious guilt. How the Ucs can be the source of such sense of guilt is not explained. The Super-ego can be such a source. But is it normal? It is called hyper-moral!

The fact that, in Freud's psychology, the ego, normal or distorted, is regarded as the result of the integration of mental processes shows that it is not the "I am," not self-consciousness, but a deposit of the processes of the Cs and Ucs. Then Cs or the Ucs cannot be the same as the ego, which is their product. What are the Cs and Ucs? As the Cs is rooted in the Ucs, the latter, in phenomenological terms, cannot be the former's *noema*. Its existence is inferred from its results. We cannot be directly conscious of our Ucs, because it is not there before us, but behind us. Freud may not have cared to raise philosophical questions; but we have to raise them.

Now, are the Ucs and the Cs, out of which the ego-structure of personality develops, impersonal? If there is consciousness, its presence has to be known to and by some one. Who is it? It must be an existential consciousness, an "I am" that follows all the processes and before which the ego is posited. As such, the ego must be different from the "I am." Or the Cs, which is a counterpart of the Ucs, must reveal itself to itself, in which case it must be the self-conscious "I am." If it is not the "I am," then it needs another consciousness, as we have already pointed out, to reveal the ego as a *noema*.

The self-conscious "I am" must be present in both the normal and abnormal persons. The ego is its *noema*. Then why does it get distorted in abnormal cases? We have to say that just as the ego has its identifications with its objects and distorted ego-ideals, the "I am" has its identifications with such egos. Without the identification of the "I am" with the ego, the latter, which is noematic, cannot call itself "I." The "I am" can identify itself with the ego and yet transcend the identification. Only when it transcends its identification with the distorted ego, and then reconstituting the normal ego, identifies itself with it, can cure occur. We shall see later how this identification or immanence and transcendence occur in normal cases and how they are possible.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

One may say that in Jung's psychology also the "I am" is practically absent except in the third person of the persona and the ego. For him also the Cs and the Ucs are the main principles. The ego shares in both of them.¹⁹ But the psyche is the totality of both Cs and Ucs. The ego is, therefore, not the whole of the psyche. Although the ego is partly conscious and partly unconscious, it is the centrum²⁰ of the Cs. We may perhaps say that that part of the ego that is conscious is the centrum of the Cs and that part that is unconscious is the centrum of Ucs. The latter is the personal Ucs. Perhaps the ego with both its conscious and unconscious parts is the I. But the persona, which for Jung is the specific form of the general psychic behaviour to the external world,²¹ is wider than the ego. It is a function-complex and is concerned with the object. It is a "*compromise between the individual and society* based on that which one appears to be."²² It is that which we may call the Me as it appears to others, but not necessarily as appears to my I, and with which my I tries to adjust itself.²³ Beyond the ego lies the collective Ucs and the collective Cs. The archetypes are the invisible roots²⁴ of the Cs and are metaphysical as they transcend²⁵ the Cs. The Ucs is the Great Mother and the Cs, when it has extricated itself from the Ucs is the Great Father, the Logos.²⁶ The libido is the blind psychic energy²⁷ – not the formative energy as in Aristotle – of the Ucs. The Cs is sometimes called the spirit. When the two parts of the total psyche, the conscious and the unconscious, are brought together and made to stand together in a living relation without conflict, the wholeness of personality is attained. This is individuation, true self-realization.²⁸ This is the aim of man, his moral responsibility.²⁹

As mentioned already, the "I am" is absent in the above concepts. Jung's analysis of personality applies to both the normal and abnormal cases. What we call the individual is the total person, and that is the

¹⁹ Jolande Jacobi, *The Psychology of C. G. Jung*, p. 6. (Eng. tr. by K. W. Bash, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1954).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22–23.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

²³ In the position I am developing, which accords in a way with Sartre's the Me, with which the "I am" identifies itself, will be the ego.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 139–40.

²⁹ Here I do not mention the other concepts of Jung's psychology, such as anima and animus, psychological types, and the stages of life as they are unnecessary for our discussion and also for want of space.

self. But the self is not an object of consciousness, the ego alone is known,³⁰ but as the object of a super-ordinate subject. The self is the center of total personality, just as the ego is the center ³¹ of the Cs. It is psychologically justified, not scientifically proved.³² Thus it is like Kant's Transcendental Ego, the validity of which, but not its factuality is known. It is also an ethical postulate,³³ as it ought to be realized. In terms of one's knowledge of the self one controls oneself, creating a *Weltanschauung* ³⁴ in the process. Now Jung has become a philosopher.

Where can the "I am" stand in the topography of the psyche given by Jung? The "I am" is our ordinary experience, more immediate than anything else. If the self is to be realized – the realization is an Ought – is it to be realized as "I am" or as "That is"? If it is the individuation that I am to attain, the self, which is the true individual, must be a higher and deeper "I am" than my present "I am," and must transcend it. Jung says that the ego is known. But by whom is it known? To whom does the consciousness of the ego as a *noema* belong? If there is anything to which it can belong, that thing must be the latent, unrealized, transcendent self, the super-ordinate subject. In phenomenological terms, the ego is a *noema* for it. But the nature of this transcendence is not explained by Jung in this context. The ego remains an ego so long as its own self-transcendence is not realized and recognized. Again, Jung speaks of the Logos – the Father-God – which is the Cs extricated from the Ucs. What is the nature of this extrication? Is it leaving the Ucs back? One can think that such a leaving back occurs when a perverted ego leaves back its perverted Ucs and takes to the normalizing Ucs. But for the normal self, which is the totality of the Cs and Ucs, there can be no such leaving back. The extrication must then mean turning the Ucs into the Cs. When the self asserts itself as "I am," the Ucs must be included in its "am," clearly and transparently. Can we show even analogically that such a transformation is possible? The ego, though a *noema*, is known as an object that asserts itself as "I am." Wherefrom can the ego derive its "I am"? These are philosophical questions.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 172.

³¹ *Op. cit.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

4. *Normal Depths of the I-consciousness*

The view I am presenting in this section, although my own now, is the result of the light which Indian and Western thought throw on each other. In the Upaniṣads, the self is called the *ātman*. It is self-consciousness and its presence is known through the experience of the "I am." The *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* notices various forms of self-identification – we may call them forms of ego-involvement – with the body as in "I am the body," with the life-principle as in "I am the life in the body," with mind as in "I am the perceiver of the rose," with reason as in "I am the thinker," and with something beyond as the ultimate, peaceful, undisturbed, blissful knower of all these "I ams." We have here one field or line of enquiry. Except in the last, which transcends the finite ego in all its stages, the I is known mainly in its identifications but not in its isolation from them. To know the real nature of the I, we want, as a field of our study, an experience in which the comparative freedom of the I from its ego-involvements also is found. Such a field is demarcated by the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. It describes what it calls the states of the I or the *ātman* – the waking state, the dream state, the state of deep sleep, and an ultimate absolute state. Whether the fourth state is true may be a philosophical problem. But the first three states are common to all men. No one who goes through them is called psychotic.

Do the three states disclose to us anything about the nature of the I-consciousness? Do they tell us anything about not only who I am, but also what I am? These states are so normal, such every-day occurrences, that we tend to regard them as subjective, unimportant, not worth philosophical consideration. The depth-psychologists are indeed concerned with the dream state, but not with that of deep sleep, although they have done much to reveal a part of the structure of the Ucs. But they do not seem to have worked with the idea that the Ucs is encountered in its massive form in deep sleep itself. In addition, the consideration that the primitive man takes the objects of dream, including his dream I, as real and that the civilized man does not do so, leads to the disregarding of dream and deep sleep. The philosophy of the self, for the traditional philosophies, became a philosophy exclusively of the waking state.

In the waking and the dream states, the I has its objective worlds. The worlds are separate in the two states, but there is some continuity of the I-consciousness. Its being can, therefore, be considered apart from the worlds. In both the states the objective world is a plurality;

but in deep sleep it is one massive Ucs. But is the "I am" present in deep sleep? I believe with the Upaniṣads that it is. Otherwise, I cannot say that I had a sound sleep. "I had a sound sleep" implies memory which implies an experience. But it is an experience of my having been unconscious. Did I know myself then? The "I am" is always self-conscious; and if it existed then, it must have been conscious of itself. But certainly, I am not conscious also of myself in deep sleep; otherwise, it will not be deep sleep. Deep sleep is the Ucs that permeates all the depths of consciousness, both phenomenological and existential. Yet the "I am" must be there; otherwise, I cannot remember my deep sleep.³⁵

But is there deep sleep at all? Some psychologists say that there is no deep sleep at all. What we call deep sleep is full of dreams, all of which we forget. But if the Ucs is real, then deep sleep must be true. And if by entering the Ucs the abnormal personality obtains pleasure and peace, then the normal personality also obtains the same by entering it in deep sleep. The Upaniṣad calls this state of the I by the term massive consciousness (*prajñānaghana*), an undifferentiated "I am," full of bliss. But it obtains the bliss by surrendering its consciousness to the Ucs. Thus the Ucs is the real Great Mother, as Jung calls it, that consoles and often strengthens the tired personality. Besides, there can be various degrees between clear dream states and deep sleep. If our sleep is disturbed much by dreams, we say that we do not have proper rest and cannot recover from mental and physical fatigue. Such experiences go to show that there must be deep sleep. If it is not true, then there will be no problem of the presence of the I in deep sleep; for in dreams the I is always present.

We dismiss the dream world as unreal only when we come back to the waking state, but not when we are dreaming, except when we are dreaming that we are dreaming. We dream of our selves, other persons, trees, mountains, tiger-hunts and so on; and we have pleasant and unpleasant experiences. We dismiss all of them, as we cannot relate them spatially, temporally, and causally to the objects of the waking state. Again, the objects of the waking state retain an identity and continuity which the dream objects do not have, although some men may have the

³⁵ At this point Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja differ from each other in explaining why the "I am" is not conscious of itself in deep sleep. Śaṅkara says that the "I am" also is submerged in the Ucs (*avidyā*); but Rāmānuja says that only the phenomenological consciousness (the externally directed) disappears, without which the "I am" cannot know itself. The latter explanation is not satisfactory, as the outwardly directed consciousness is not instrumental in knowing the inwardly directed consciousness of the "I am."

same dream several times and related dreams a few times. Except very rarely, we do not, in the dream itself, doubt the existence of the dream objects. That is, we do not often reason, except when we dream that we reason. The combined result of these differences between the objects of the two states is that we dismiss the dream objects and the dream subject also as unreal.

We dismiss the dream objects not because they are mere impressions of the waking state, but because they have no identity and continuity with the objects of the waking state. The dream objects may be due to impressions, but are not impressions. They are not even after-images. What is wanting in the remembered impressions and after-images is what the Stoics called our consent, our spontaneous assertion of their existence as real. During the dream, to be is to be perceived, but not so in the waking state.

But do I dismiss my dream I as having no identity and continuity with my waking I? If there is no such relationship, I cannot remember my dream. For memory to be possible, I must somehow be present in my dream. I dream that I am mauled by a tiger before I shoot it. In the waking state I dismiss the reality not only of the tiger, which has no identity with a physical tiger, but also my dream I, which has a continuity with my waking I. I can remember the dream I and the dream tiger only if they somehow fall within my experience. How are we to explain the self-contradictory denial and affirmation of the identity of the dream I and the waking I?

It can be explained only with the help of the idea of transcendence. The dream I is unconscious of the waking I that is observing the former's vicissitudes. There is something that prevents the former from knowing that it is the latter, but can keep everything of the former transparent to the latter. There are here two "I am's;" but only one of them knows the other without being known by it. This is self-transcendence. Everything that happens to the dream I happens within the consciousness of the waking I, which is immanent in the former and yet transcends it. The dream occurs within the being of the waking I and is enveloped by it. The waking I is there in the dream without knowing that it is there. But the dream I and its objects do not envelop the waking I; they are in it and are only a part of it. *The problem of their relation is not only a problem of knowing, but also of Being.* This peculiar relationship is made possible by the work of the Ucs, which disappears the moment Cs appears. The Ucs divides the two I's and viels the waking I from itself and also from the dream I. That is, the existential

consciousness of the waking "I am" is shrouded and its phenomenological consciousness is retained.

Just as the waking I transcends the dream I, the I of deep sleep transcends the waking and dream I's. It is a single massive self-conscious "I am," pervaded by the Ucs. In it the existential consciousness and the phenomenological consciousness with all its divisions into *noeses* and *noemata* – ego, mind, and senses – become one massive unity. Still just as the waking I observes and can observe all that happens to the dreaming I, without knowing that it is observing as a pure phenomenological consciousness, the "I am" of deep sleep observes and retains everything that occurs in dream and waking states. That is how we have unconscious perceptions and unconscious memories. No experience is lost to it. It is a permanent witness like God. When the waking I drops down from it, either directly or indirectly through a dream state, it drops as a consciousness with all its divisions. So far as we, human beings, are concerned, our total individual personality exists unified in deep sleep, which is not a mere vacuity. It contains all the potencies, all the archetypes – personal, collective, and cosmic – all the complexes and cathexes in a unified unconscious "I am," out of which the waking and dream "I am" originate. It is the "reservoir" (called *Ālayavijñāna* by the Buddhists), the causal personality³⁶ (called the causal body, *kāraṇaśarīra*, by the Advaita Vedāntins) the ground and cause of the waking and dream I's.

Of the three I's, the waking I has the advantage of consciously remembering the dream I and the I of deep sleep.³⁷ It denies its absolute identity with the I of dream, but does not deny that relationship with the I of deep sleep. To the "I am" of deep sleep, the "I ams" of dream and waking states become objective *noemata*, the egos. Even then, as it is immanent in them, each of the egos can call itself I. Without it, they cannot be I's. Between it and the waking I, and between the waking I and the dream I, the Ucs intervenes and separates them in different ways. The potencies and impressions of the three I's interpenetrate through the Ucs. Each higher transcends and envelops the lower. Thus the I-structure – which we may call also the ego-structure – is more complex than what it appears to be. The waking I derives its sense of freedom from its continuity with the highest I. The dream I does not have this sense of freedom, unless one dreams also about his

³⁶ It should be understood as the ground, foundation, root, or seed personality, out of which the waking and dream personalities originate.

³⁷ As the ground of the other two I's, the I of deep sleep may be said to remember them; but it remembers them unconsciously. It is the reservoir of the experiences of both the I's.

freedom. It is partial experience of the transcendent I in my present I and of my continuity with it that enables me to feel that I am free; and the corresponding experience in epistemology is my consciousness that I am conscious of the rose. The transcendental existential consciousness of my waking "I am" supplies the phenomenological consciousness of the dream I. In the waking state, I can draw a distinction between the I and the ego, because of this partial experience of the transcendent I; but in dream, this distinction is not drawn, as the dream I does not have even a partial awareness of the waking I. So in dream there is no awareness of the distinction between the I and the ego.

What is the place of reason in this ego-structure? The dream is understood as the consciousness of its I and its objects and as violating all the accepted laws of space, time, and causality. Indeed, there are dream space, time, and causality; but they are different for different dreams and do not agree with those of the waking state. If they agree, their agreement is a chance. The dream ego does not reason; if it reasons, its reasoning also is a dream, as when I solve a logical problem correctly in a dream. The dream ego does not, and cannot reason, because it has no awareness of its higher ego. To reason is to rise above my particular ego to the level of a higher consciousness. Only when the gates to the higher ego are open, can I reason or rise to the level of rational consciousness, which is immanent in my present I, but also transcends it. The main aspect of rational consciousness, which, in Plato's language, is the rational part of my soul, is its openness to the lower I. The more the gates of the higher are closed to the lower, the more irrational does the latter become. *To the lower, rational consciousness appears to be phenomenological; but it is really the existential consciousness of the higher I.* The ethical duty of the lower is to realize the higher as its own higher existential consciousness. This is true self-realization. Reason thus acquires a true ontological significance, which is denied to it by the existentialists and the logical positivists. It is not in its essence and being mere ratiocination. The waking I is the higher rational self, the reality principle, of the dream³⁸ I; the highest I, that which transcends the Ucs by turning it into Cs, is the rational self of the waking I. There is nothing mysterious and ununderstandable in the ontological status of reason. It is the higher "I am" in so far as it appears to the lower. *For what is existential can be phenomenological and vice versa, but at different stages of self-realization.*

The I-structure described above belongs to every normal person.

³⁸ One may compare and contrast this idea with Freud's reality principle.

How do the ego-structures of the psychologies of Freud and Jung fit into it? Abnormal structures are distortions and deviations from the normal. What Jung calls the whole, ideal personality, if realized at all – Jung himself is not sure whether complete realization of the self is possible, as it is the complete integration of the Cs and Ucs, when the Ucs will naturally disappear – will be the conscious realization of the total “I am” of deep sleep. The ego he described, which partakes of the Ucs and Cs, is now described in terms of the three states. The position the paper presents is how the phenomenological distinction between the I and the ego is possible, while Jung does not make this distinction. The distortion of the ego in terms of Jung’s concepts – such as anima and animus and other imbalances between the Ucs and Cs – can easily be introduced into the present position. But the immanent and yet transcendent “I am” is the savior of the psychic person, when its gates are opened to the distorted ego. Then the psychic irrational person becomes rational; and normality is restored to the abnormal ego. But this “I am” is not utilized in Jung’s psychological interpretations.

The topography of the self as given by Freud is mainly that of the abnormal person. I cannot believe with the existentialists that there is no Ucs. Even the dream I is unconscious of the waking I; otherwise, there will be no dreams. I am completely unconscious in deep sleep. But the concepts of the Id, Super-ego, life-instinct, and death-instinct, as described by Freud, do not fit into our scheme, without being greatly revised. The libido is present in the Ucs as the force creating the dream subjects and their objects and emotionally tinging our perceptions and thoughts of the waking state, but is not necessarily sexual. The Super-ego and the Id, though belonging to the Ucs, are not ontological, but are creations through social and other environmental pressures. The unconscious, causal “I am,” the ground of all the other egos, can do what the Id does in both the normal and abnormal persons. The unconscious Super-ego may be compared to the highest “I am,” but the latter is not built up artificially by social pressures. It is always ontologically present and can work as conscience in morality and reason in cognition. Normally it works as such. But an abnormal ego can create what Freud calls the Super-ego, which is hyper-moral, but cannot be hyper-rational. In fact, we do not find what rational consciousness is in Freud or Jung.

So far I have described the ego-structure of our self, which is an “I am,” and considered only the Ucs that belongs to man’s personal life. But is there a cosmic Ucs and a cosmic “I am”? Jung very nearly said

that it exists, when he referred to the Super-ordinate Subject and the Logos, but has not differentiated it from the personal Cs that has liberated itself from the personal and collective Ucs. However, this question belongs to the philosophy and psychology of religion, which I cannot handle here. For the present, I shall be content with saying that I believe that there is a cosmic Ucs and a cosmic "I am." Otherwise, I cannot find a ground for the universal features of our experience and the common world.

5. Conclusion

What light does the above discussion throw on the problem of the self? The self is either latently – that is, transcendently – or overtly self-conscious, and is of the form of I-consciousness. The only cue for the presence of a self is that it asserts itself as an I. *If I am conscious of a consciousness, the latter must have an I with which I am transcendently identical.* The I appears in our experience immediately as a center; but if we look at it carefully, it is found to be a circumference that goes on receding as we go on trying to fix it. That is why the Upaniṣads call it "the smaller than the smallest and the greater than the greatest," a statement known to Jung. There is a distinction between the I and the ego; but it is not absolute, but relative, and factually does not obtain for the dream ego and cannot be known by us as obtaining for the highest I-consciousness in deep sleep. Wherever the distinction is experienced, the I is experienced as transcending the ego and yet as immanent in it and as identifying itself with it. Without the immanence of the I, the ego can never say, "I am;" but it says so as in "I am six feet tall" and "I am happy." As being transcended, the ego becomes an object, a *noema*. One may speak of the bodily ego, the biological ego, the mental or mind-ego, the rational ego and so on. But their relationships cannot throw the light that the inter-relationship of the three states can throw on the nature of the self as "I am."

If the I and the ego have ontological significance, then reason also, as rational consciousness, has it. Generally we say: "I have reason, but am not my reason." In support of this statement, we point to experiences and activities that are not rational, when we are made to realize that we are not rational. The distinction between the I and the ego makes possible the distinction between the I and reason. So long as the I identifies itself with the ego through immanence, reason becomes another to the ego and is known as being had by it. Reason then is the phenomenological consciousness in its purity, clarity, and truth, with-

out the distortions of abnormality. In an important sense, we have seen, reason is the transcendental consciousness of the ego, the consciousness that envelops it; but it is not experienced by the ego as its own higher "I am." The life's aim of the ego is to become its transcendental I. It can become the transcendental "I am." But the way upwards can be closed by the distortions of the ego and also by all that is implied by egotism and selfishness. The doors to the self-transcendence of the ego can be kept continuously open through intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic activities, the aim of all of which is to contribute to the true self-realization of the ego. If any of the above activities does not transform my immediate I, the ego, into something higher, if in it my true self is closed and lost to me, then that activity is so far distorted and defective. We should also get rid of the idea that rational consciousness is mere intellect. It is the transcendental phenomenological consciousness of my present ego and is intellectual, moral, and aesthetic also. It is my higher "I am" as present and experienced in all the three activities and their forms of consciousness. They change not only the way I look at things, but also my being, which is also the awareness of my being. Such change is true self-development and self-transformation. Everything that has value has value and the value is real because of its relevance to my higher self.

The life and death instincts of Freud's psychology belong only to abnormal egos, for which transcendence to the higher rational "I am" is closed. When it is closed, to live may mean only to have sex. And because to remain the ego as it is, is an unbearable burden, to preserve it may mean regression to undisturbed material being and so death of the conscious ego. But if the essential being of the ego is to be the self-conscious "I am," then its preservation does not lie in giving up the "I am," but in becoming one with its transcendental origin, the higher "I am." For instance, when the dream ego is threatened, it wakes up to its higher "I am," the waking I. This waking up is the death of the dream ego, which, as all religions declare, finds life through death or self-sacrifice. It is realizing or becoming one's higher self. Similarly, there is an "I am" higher than the waking one. The former is the truth of the latter. All the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic activities are and ought to be directed to this higher realization, which religion declares to be true and necessary. Even when the waking I is threatened, the higher self comes to its rescue when prayed for – the essence of prayer being earnestness to become the higher self – just as the waking self comes to the rescue of the dream self when threatened. The upward drive is

somewhat like the Eros in Plato's philosophy. The Andhaka Buddhists called it the *nirvāṇa* instinct. It is not an instinct for regression, but for upward progression. What Freud calls the life instinct or pleasure principle is truly the creative instinct found in procreation, creative imagination, all the forms of art, and even creation of dreams.

Much more can be and has to be said about the I-consciousness. For the academical philosopher, many statements of the paper bristle with new problems, which, when appreciated fully and in their proper perspective, will show how important the problem of the self is for man. But very little has been written about the I-consciousness in western philosophy, although the problem is central to all humanistic studies. The tendency of modern thought, particularly in the English-speaking countries and countries in which their philosophies have become the norms, is to ignore the I-consciousness and even to deny it its own reality. This tendency has become of late the strongest in epistemology. One section is, therefore, devoted to it for pointing out its inadequacies. In psychology, the tendency to refuse mind its autonomous being, after having gained some strength, has been counter-balanced by the discoveries of the Unconscious and of new factors in the structure of personality. Yet in the relevant discussions, the I-consciousness did not get the recognition that was necessary. The practice of identifying it with the ego and of treating the ego as a product of psychological forces generated by the interactions of the individual and his socio-physical environment deprived the I-consciousness of its essential function of being the core of personality and of being the agent organizing and integrating the factors of individuality into a unity. Either the I-consciousness is deprived of its "I" and turned into the pale light of consciousness or the "I" is retained as a bare point of reference, a grammatical mistake, or an epiphenomenal appearance without any substantiality or reality of its own. The attempt has, therefore, been made in this paper to show, by giving an analysis of the three states, how the I and its consciousness can be viewed as essentially one and how the possibility of their distinction is due to the factors of transcendence and immanence involved in the structure of the I-consciousness. It is in epistemology and psychology that the problem has come to the fore: the former deals with the I as the knower either to accept or reject its reality; the latter studies it as mind, consciousness, or person. The western concept of mind is vague and amorphous, and books on general psychology give little or no place to the I. So it was easy and convenient for some psychologists to reject the reality of

mind altogether and develop psychologies without the psyche. The author of this paper found it, therefore, suitable to orient the topic to the depth psychologies of Freud and Jung, which are concerned at least with the depths of personality. But a normal field also is needed in which the depths of the I-consciousness are found and in which the I can realize its isolability from the objects more clearly than in epistemology. For in epistemology, the experience is very often of the form "I see the rose," the apparent epistemological inseparability of the three factors of which have led some philosophers to the diadic theory of perception mentioned in the second section. This normal field of depths is given in bare outline in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* and has been found by the author very significant and useful for the present topic. One can see also the significance, indicated in the paper, of the new approach for religion, how it makes some of the spiritual ideas of religions and mystic experiences amenable to rational understanding by removing from them their apparent misty opaqueness to experience.

CONCERN FOR THE PERSON

STERLING M. McMURRIN

It seems to me that while there are obvious disadvantages in my kind of assignment – such as that I am expected to pull together several things that really don't pull very well, or that I must wait until everything has been said in order to tell you what it is that was said – there are, nevertheless, also certain advantages, such as that I am now not only in a position to tell you what was said, providing my own interpretations and distortions, but am also in a position to tell you what my colleagues should have said but didn't say. I suppose the polite and subtle way to go about this is to pretend that they actually did say everything that in my opinion they should have said.

By concern for the person, I mean especially the practical interest in the organization of the life of society and the enhancement of the culture that is requisite to the achievement of a genuine individualism that is both viable and in principle universal, an individualism that is in fact a respect for the authentic quality and character of the person. I here eschew all common meanings of individualism, of course, and am not suggesting a standardized version to cut across cultural lines. This is a very large matter and I am not so naive as to suppose that whatever we might describe as ideal will be actually realized. But the question which we must continue to raise asks what is the nature of that ideal and whether we can with any degree of success move toward it. It seems to me that in a sense the papers of the Conference tend to converge on this question, that where they do not explicitly focus upon it they are nevertheless relevant to it.

By practical interest in the person, I do not mean an interest that is necessarily moral or political or economic or, indeed, that in any way necessarily relates immediately to the life of the individual. For nothing can be more practical than a set of abstract ideas that may constitute the ground or occasion for decision or action or provide the context

within which these are justified. The papers for the most part, therefore, have been eminently practical in character, as philosophy, we like to believe, is always practical when it is relevant, even though they have been concerned with such matters as logic and meaning or metaphysics rather than with the explicit condition of persons.

Now it seems to me that it is possible to distinguish several factors in the thought, attitude, and action of a people that relate importantly to the task of achieving a genuine individualism, factors which embody and exhibit concern or lack of concern for the person. The Conference papers have in various ways and in varying degrees recognized these and fastened our attention upon them. I will consider them under two headings; *first*, the definition of the self or person, and *second*, the conditions for achieving genuine and full personality. The first is a theoretic matter involving science, metaphysics, theology and ethics; the second is an affair of decision and action, involving morals, politics, and social behavior. Both are philosophic in character and import.

(1) The definition and description of person is a task that properly engages empirical science, not psychology only but at least also sociology, anthropology, and physiology. Yet it is not simply nor primarily a scientific task but is philosophic as well, for it entails considerations of value and is difficult to extricate from metaphysical involvements. Certainly this Conference has treated the person within the context more of speculation than of science, though to say this is not in any way to condemn the proceedings. It is the function of philosophy to philosophize and certainly these papers have called upon a rich fund of experience, knowledge, and wisdom in their attempts upon the difficult and elusive task of determining what we mean by the self, which is, as Professor Hocking said, so familiar, yet such a profound mystery.

Philosophers of a speculative bent, when they treat the subject of the self, find it somewhat difficult to resist the pleasures of metaphysics, of expatiating on the total structure of reality in the interest of properly locating the self. Some of our philosophers have offered little or no resistance to this temptation. What interests me most, I must confess, is the quite firm status provided the individual self by even the most absolutistic among us. It is clear that this is the great age of the individual. The individual has never had such recognition in society as he enjoys today, and I'm quite confident that he has never fared better in the speculations of the metaphysicians. Certainly in this Conference the self as individual has been placed on firm ground. We must admit that several times over the past three days the individual

has been hard pressed to keep his wave riding, as one of our members put it, on that infinite ocean, but each time he has come through in admirable style. I, for one, am very pleased with this and I trust that the rest of you selves agree with me. For certainly this is a not unimportant feature of contemporary philosophic thought, that not only in cultural traditions that are typically pluralistic, but as well in those that are monistic, the reality of the individual self is generally secured. It seems to me that our papers exhibited this whether the world view at hand was naturalistic, theistic, or absolutistic.

Now I don't mean all have had the same conception of the self – far from it. There were differences that appeared and no doubt far more and greater differences that were not exhibited. And quite surely those differences in the metaphysical concept of the self or the nature of its individuality would entail major divergencies in moral philosophy or in social, legal, and political institutions. Moreover, in referring to the individual, I am aware, as you are, that we have encountered here what might be called sophisticated conceptions of individuality, where the self or person is not defined in some kind of total abstraction from nature, from its social involvements, from God, or from the metaphysical ground of its being. Whatever meaning has attached to the notion of individuality, the continuities of the self have been respected. Indeed, though the human person has survived this Conference unscathed and trailing clouds of glory, God and the Absolute, as Professor Castell has observed, have come in for a lion's share of the attention. And I'm quite sure that a careful tally would show that in the metaphysical discussions absolutism and monism commanded far more time and attention than pluralism. Certainly the traditional pluralism of modern occidental thought, as represented by Locke and Descartes or even James, was given a rough time, even by some of the Westerners.

It is a matter of more than passing interest that we seem to have had such a wide variety of metaphysics represented here, and no doubt also of methodology and value theory, and yet that the clashes relative to the problem of the self were so few and comparatively mild. With more time and familiarity, of course, the conflicts would unquestionably grow and there would be some major battles if not general warfare. But probably not so much over the doctrine of the self as over the metaphysical assumptions and arguments with which it is associated. I have in mind, for instance, that in this group there are some who hold that there is a personal world ground in which the self is ontologically rooted, from which it derives both its being and its meaning, and others

for whom the absolute can never be described as personal. Some for whom God is a person described infinitely by certain attributes known finitely in human persons, and others for whom God transcends the distinction of personal and impersonal – is more than personal. Some for whom the self is transient and temporal, and others for whom it is in some strange way eternal.

Now we will have to face the fact that philosophers have a marvelous way with words. They move them this way and that and come up with combinations of them that are often most startling in effect. And our philosophers have been a talented lot. We must be very sure that no one of them has put anything over on us. I don't mean that we need get excited over a few false sentences. Surely much of what we've heard here cannot possibly be true, for if it were, something else would not be true. And besides, the philosophic dialogue to thrive and make real headway needs a good supply of false propositions. It's not the question of truth but the question of meaning that bothers me, and I suspect that it bothers some of you. As a group we do not seem to be at all prejudiced against metaphysics. But to be agreeable to metaphysics does not mean that we are entitled to completely drop our guard, and I would be greatly surprised if on careful examination of the past three days' deliberations we could not turn up a fair sampling of subtle and sophisticated, but nevertheless genuine, nonsense.

In my opinion the intellectual highlights of the Conference have been what they should have been, the definitions and analyses of the self rather than the large excursions into theology and absolutistic metaphysics. But every paper, it seems to me, has in various ways contributed to the attack upon this difficult and stubborn problem. As I write, I am reminded especially of the brilliant statement of McKeon's paradoxes; of Castell's shrewd and incisive analysis which was so clear and to the point and understandable that it seemed almost unbecoming to a philosopher of his stature; Bertocci's hitting hard on the person as creative will; Ramanan's meeting in man of the limited and the limitless; Hocking's strict distinction between persons and things; and Professor Tillich's concept of the self as eternal. I mention these items at random, though numerous others deserve our attention. Certainly we will not forget the point of the Potter-Northrop debate and we will long remember Organ's plea for "high living."

Perhaps the main point made by the Conference, and made very well, and I'm sure with new ideas and new insights, though in principle it is an old concept, was the paradoxical nature of the self. Because of

this idea's centrality in the papers, let me remind you of just a few of the paradoxes of the self: that the self is temporal and eternal, limited and limitless, finite and infinite, being and becoming, a unity in multiplicity. That it is essential and existential, despair and hope, alienation and fulfilment, knower and known, good and evil, action and effect, valuer and value, a created creator, tragedy and triumph, individual and universal, self-transcending, familiar but mysterious, caused yet free. Certainly our philosophers had no fear of paradox. Some casual onlookers may have felt that here they abandoned reason and threw in the towel. My own feeling is that here they exhibited a fine combination of judgment and humility when confronting a profound mystery.

The arguments for the freedom of the self were interesting and instructive. Nothing in our time, it seems to me, is more marvelous or more worthy of admiration than the infinite capacity of philosophers to defend the fact of freedom no matter what. No absolutism is so absolute, no determinism so determined, no necessity so necessary, but that the philosophers of virtually every stripe find freedom shining through in all its glory. As far as I'm concerned this is all to the good. It gives evidence of subtle and sophisticated analysis in determining the meaning of freedom. But, more important, it exhibits the commitment of the self to the self, the defiant determination of the human soul, even the souls of philosophers, with God or without him, to set its own purposes and its own ideals, against the impersonality and moral indifference of the world.

(2) But to turn for a moment to the question of social philosophy, a matter somewhat neglected by the Conference. The papers as a whole were heavy laden with metaphysics, theology, and speculative psychology – not enough attention, perhaps, to the social and moral dimension of the self – and quite certainly they did not come to grips fully with the large problem of the conditions necessary to the fulfillment of personal life. This, of course, was not one of the stated aims of the Conference, but I mention it because of its great importance. Much was done to locate the self in the structure of reality and to assess its relation to the world, but not enough, it seems to me, to locate it with reference to the social world of decision and action and to define it with reference to its values and its moral concern. Professor McKeon's treatment of freedom and obligation and tolerance, law, force, and coercion and Professor Northrop's concern for the large cultural transformations that have produced the upheaval of the contemporary world were the

major exhibits of what I am arguing for. Perhaps you will say they were major enough to take care of the task, and you may be right.

Of this much we can be sure, that today no one with an ounce of philosophic or social sophistication will treat the self as if it were capable of definition in total abstraction from its concrete social context. And if there is a decline in the absolutistic conception of society, there is also a movement away from the atomistic mechanical theory that the social whole is simply a collection of discrete individuals. This was clearly exhibited, I believe, in our papers. The discussion of the self, it seems to me, is so closely related to the concept of society that its success depends on the cooperation of philosophers with social scientists. It is, I think, more a question of social psychology than of theology, more a question of normative psychology than metaphysics. We should probably ask ourselves whether a conference of this kind can hope for full success without a more adequate involvement with the relevant sciences.

A few of the papers touched upon the question of conditions for the full development of the potential of the person, and Professor McKeon met it head on, but it was not a major element of the discussions. It seems to me that the first and primary condition is the very thing we have been working on, that was the purpose of this Conference and Professor Moore's notable conference in Hawaii last summer – the development of an adequate conception of the nature of the individual self and its relation to the world, including its relation to the society of selves. I'm sure that none of us has assumed that there is only one possible theory of the self which can be justified and upon which therefore we should all agree, for we seem to be quite ready to recognize both the importance of differing perspectives and the utter complexity and elusiveness of the self as an object of conceptual thought. If anything has been manifested here, as at Hawaii, it is the value of differences, a respect for the worth of cultural variety and diversity, a note that was clearly struck, I believe, by Professor Northrop's keynote address.

What we have hoped to achieve in these conferences, I suppose, is not a single conclusion or any set of ideas but rather a viable method for engaging in philosophical discussion, a method that will encourage an articulation of some facets of the several cultures that may commonly be unexpressed, as well as facilitate ordinary understanding and the exchange and cross fertilization of ideas.

Now what is true of our pursuit of the meaning of the self should hold

equally for any attempt to get at the conditions requisite for self-realization or fulfillment, or whatever else this may be called. If we are not justified in striving for a single philosophy, we are also not justified in urging a single moral or social system. Surely there is no single best way of structuring human relations in the interest of the full well-being of the individual, and to seek such a way would be to vainly pursue a false ideal. Nevertheless, allowing for many and basic differences and recognizing the values of diversity, we may assume that if the individual person is taken as the residence of intrinsic worth, large areas of agreement are possible and many of our problems, speaking across cultural lines, will be faced in common.

In the first place, in many parts of the world we are still struggling with the problem of large scale social conventions and habits involving recognition or discrimination, mutuality or oppression, which are communicated from one generation to another as social inheritances that become a normal part of the education and common experience of both individuals and groups. I have in mind, of course, such as the discrimination against the outcastes of India, the Negroes of the United States, and the Burakumin of Japan.

Secondly, we are engrossed with the task of providing legal guarantees for what we have come to call civil or sometimes political rights.

Third, and intimately related to the others, is our concern for equality of economic opportunity, and

Fourth, and also intimately related, our commitment to an equality of cultural opportunity.

I suppose that in any gathering of the kind represented by our Conference, though there would be countless disagreements in the detail of meaning or in any prescriptions for action in such matters, on the broad moral issues involved there would be quite solid agreement. But the point of my mentioning these obvious items is that I want to advance a simple thesis: that it is conceivable that we could satisfy all these conditions for the society and the culture and yet fail in the great task of the full cultivation of human personality – that the achievement of political, civil, economic, and cultural equality and all that this achievement entails would provide the person no guarantees. I say conceivable, of course, because I do not believe for a moment that anything like this will be achieved, either universally or in any single nation. Such an expectation would require an optimistic view of the perfectibility of man that no facts would warrant. But at least if we

can gain an indefinite reprieve from the destruction of large scale war, some solid gains should here and there be realized.

My point, and I'm sure you are way ahead of me, is that while we at least have some idea of how to define and tackle such problems as civil rights and mass education, as difficult and intractable as these are, we seem to be at an almost total loss when we confront what will almost certainly be the great issue of the future, that is already upon the industrialized nations: how to nourish, cultivate, and protect the human personality, which we here are at such pains to define, under the dehumanizing, depersonalizing conditions promised by the highly developed technological society of the future, where in enormous concentrations of population the life of the individual will be increasingly ruled by mechanization, automation, administration, and efficiency. Ruled by these, that is, unless in some way now not at all clear to us we learn to create genuine selfhood under conditions that now appear to contradict and deny it.

Now I do not mean that we should fear our growing technology, that we should prevent the extension of such a thing, for instance, as automation. Far from it. Or that we can prevent the growth of our enormous cities. Our task rather is to master the technology rather than the subject to it, and control the cities rather than be overwhelmed by them. But as things now stand we are far from possessing the knowledge and know how necessary to face problems of this kind. We spend hundreds of millions upon technological research to effect the extension of automation. We spend nothing to research the question of what full scale automation will mean for the value structure of our culture, which is built primarily upon the individual's sense of productive vocation, nothing to determine what should be done through our instruments of education to guarantee that an automated society will not suffer a moral, spiritual, and aesthetic decline. We take an almost childish delight in the enormous growth of our cities and are generally oblivious to what this symbolizes – an abject bigness – bigness in social and bureaucratic organization, public and private, bigness in universities, bigness in industry, bigness in government – a bigness that might conceivably mean the fall of our civilization if we permit it to destroy the personal quality of life. And how to prevent this destruction is quite unknown to us.

In recent months we have had fair warning of what lies ahead for us on an ever more serious scale if we fail to overcome the depersonalizing effect of our gigantic institutions, the alienation of human beings that

reduces them to the anonymity of statistics, disregarding their humanness and violating their personalities. We in the United States can no longer say that it can't happen here. It will happen again and again with consequences far more serious in every institution of whatever kind that becomes so dehumanized that the individual person is no longer of primary concern. Of this much we can be sure, if we permit our techniques to become ends in themselves or to become the chief determiners of our purposes and values, our future will be a technological and not a humane culture.

There is no need for me to press this point with you, but I mention it here for a very special reason, because I think it is essential for us to impress it firmly upon others and because it seems clear to me that unless the large tasks associated with this predicament are conceived and formulated through the perspectives and insight most available to philosophy, and are pursued with what might be called a genuine philosophic wisdom, they will not be accomplished.

I am arguing, therefore, that this Conference, and Professor Moore's conference in Hawaii, can only be the prelude to the engagement of philosophers, scientists, and statesmen in a large and continuing effort to affect the social processes of our nations in accordance with the same concern for the person which has brought us together here. To deliberate on the meaning of the self, on the creative freedom of the self, has worth in itself and contributes, certainly, to the clarification of ideas and values and to the facilitation of intercultural understanding. But how much more value it can have as a preface for further analysis and discussion which comes to grips with the concrete self in the context of the difficult world into which we are moving, and which may lead to decision and action that will help to secure the conditions for the cultivation of personality at its best.